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The Opening Address at the ATRS 2003 Conference, Toulouse, France
By
Professor Tae Hoon Oum,
President, Air Transport Research Society, and
UPS Foundation Chair in Transport and Logistics,
University of British Columbia, Canada
July 11, 2003
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen! It gives me a great pleasure to welcome all
of you to the ATRS World Conference being hosted jointly by Groupe ESC (Toulouse
Business School) and the ENAC (Ecole Nationale de Aviation Civile).
Today and tomorrow, in addition to the Opening and the Closing Plenary sessions, 112
papers will be presented on virtually all aspects of air transport and related topics.
2003 is a particularly challenging year to air transport policy makers, aviation executives
and researchers as most of the major network airlines are experiencing unprecedented
level of financial difficulties in the 100-year history of aviation. But I am reminded of
Mr. Georges Clemencau, the French Leader during the first World War. He said "our
country advances ONLY through crisis and in tragedy". Likewise, I am confident to
predict that air transport industry will also advance through these crises. Airlines are
succeeding in restructuring their service networks, and streamlining their operations to an
unprecedented level, and start to listen to what their customers and markets are telling
them more closely. Most major network carriers in the United States and Canada have
achieved a unit cost reduction of about 25% via their recent restructuring efforts. They
will be coming out of these crises with resounding success in order to serve the rising
demands for efficient and cost effective services. Now, I believe it is turn for the airports
and air traffic control systems to do a restructuring comparable to what airlines have been
doing in recent years. In this regard, I am particularly happy to see many papers and
presentations in this conference are focusing the airports and air traffic control systems.
As a final note, on behalf of the ATRS, I would like to express sincere appreciation to
Mr. Herve Passeron, Director of Groupe ESC-Toulouse, and Mr. Grrard Rozenknop,
Director of the ENAC, and above all, Professor Sveinn Gudmundsson for their
tremendous efforts to organize this conference so successfully. I also like to express our
appreciation to AirBus Industries, City of Toulouse, Toulouse Chamber of Commerce,
Aeroport Toulouse-Blagnac, and EQUIS for their active participation in this program and
for their financial supports.
I look forward to a stimulating conference in the next couple of days.
Thank you very much.
The Air Transport Research Society (ATRS)
World Conference
July I 0-12, 2003 Toulouse, France
THE CONFERENCE
The ATRS held its World Conference in
Toulouse, France, in July 2003.
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CON%_NIENT AIRPORTS: POEN'T OF VIEW OF THE PASSENGERS
Adlval Aparecido Magri Junior
Master in Air Transportation Infrastracture
Technological Institute of Aeronautics
adival@infra.ita.br - _tirerotms_hotmail.com
Ci_udlio Jorge Pinto Alves
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ABSTRACT
The competition among airlines or among airports aiming at to increase the demand for its services has been
more and more incited. Knowledge the perception of the users for the offered services means to meet the
customer's needs and expectations in order either to keep the customer, and therefore keep a significative
advantage over competitors.
The passenger of the air transportation wants rapidity, security and convenience. Convenience can be
translated by comfort that the passenger wants for the price that he can pay. In this paper had been identified.
as a result of a survey achieved in six Brazilian airports during 2002, the best indicators in the passenger's
perception. These indicators among any others were listed m the handbook of Airports Council International
(ACI). Distinctive perceptions were observed among passengers with different travel motivations.
This survey had been carried through in the airports of Brasilia, Porto Alegre, Salvador. Fortaleza, Curitiba
and Bel6m. Considering this survey we can identified the most atlracfive airport among them.
This work is a way to help improve quality of service, in particular, m these six airports of the Brazilian
network. The results should be published and made available to all the parties concerned (ahlaort authority,
airlines and service providers) and should lead to corrective action when the passenger is not satisfied with the
service.
Keywords
Terminal, passer, ger, quality, s_-vice, msta!lations, m_,od_logy, measm-emem
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade s, the airports had passed not to be simple terminals for the exchange in
transport ways. New functions had been inserted, receiving multiple services and becoming
true centers of purchase, making possible the access of new users the offered services.
Today, the quality, more than a modism became essential for the valuation of the services,
in any industry, any market. The perception of quality of the airport terminals depends on
some factors. One of them ff relates to the proper characteristics of the passengers. Others
can be linked to the architectural concept used in the conception of the terminal and its
instaHations.
In Brazil, the air transportation and the airports are in process of transition with the
modernization of the airports and the entrance in the market of airlines with different plans
of work and levels of service.
The airports managed for the INFRAERO concentrate 97% of the movement of the regular
air transportation in Brazil, representing, in 2001, 2.1 million landings and takes-off of
national and foreign aircraPt, carrying 73,9 million passengers and 1,25 million of tons of
load. In 2001, the invoicing was of R$1,47 billion. For 2002, the company had the
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perspective of superior growth 8% in the movement of passengers and foresees investments
of the order of R$ 900 million in projects and services in the airport sector.
Currently the airports are dealing with customers who demand different installations and
services. All this situation is generating discussion about the quality and level of offered
service.
Based in the indicators of quality raised by the Airports Council Intemational (ACI, 2000),
this work evaluates 6 Brazilian airports terminals for the indicators identified for the ACI
and develops a methodology of evaluation of the quality in airports terminals, based in the
perception of the passengers. With this, planners and operators of airports, that intend to
create or to extend, start to make use of a methodology to identify to the characteristics or
the aspects that more contribute for the perception of quality of services at airports for
users, making possible to the professionals to undertake solutions who contribute for a large
perception of quality, making possible after all the biggest satisfaction of the customers
(passengers) inside of airport terminals.
QUALITY INDICATORS
Currently, the airports are endowed with diverse operational areas with systems and
processes that are linked. With this, the users can try and evaluate the quality offered for the
installations of the airport. Each process can consist in a quality indicator and all in set can
produce a quality global that can be identified in relation to the offered service.
Thus, one searchs to identify to the indicators of quality in each operation of the airport and
its installations, where each stage of processing can be considered as a link of a chain of
services.
The IATA (1991), (International Air Transport Association), it developed ADRM (Airport
Development Reference Manual), establishing indicators of quality for the development of
airport terminals under the optics of the passengers.
They are indicators established by the IATA:
• easiness of access to the airport through highway or train;
• lesser distances of the curb to check-in and check-in to the gate of embarkment
without changes of levels;
• lesser distances of the aircraft the area of restitution of luggage and customs and of
customs to the curb or the station of train;
• attractive and surrounding architecture that provides a relaxation atmosphere;
• lesser lines in the security and control of passports;
• agility in the departure of the aircraft;
• fast restitution of luggage with ample mats;
• clear and concise visual communication;
• variety of store;
• rest area, conveniently leased close to the embarkment gate;
• good restaurants and the moderate prices.
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It is verified _ &verse absen'ed factors as indicating of quality of s_dce exist. 3_aese
indicators can be most important at the moment of the accomplishment of the survey, being
able to vary as: lime of the survey applications (seasons), type of passenger and trip, local
culture and application of the survey (with the passengers or the operators of the airport).
In this work it was adopted as main reference to the survey carried through for the ACI
(2000), Quality of Service at Airports: Standarts and Measurements, that if classified from
a world-wide survey the indicators of quality in the current airports.
ACI imdlkgtors
For the d_-eLropmmt of _ s,,._Jey had been adopted _e indicators that had _received the
largest concept in the survey from the ACI (2000).
The passage carried through for the passenger in the embarkment processing was
considered in the proposal. This passage is represented by three areas of measurement, that
contains the quality indicators that they will be evaluated and appraised for the passengers.
The measurement areas are:
• processing time;
• available areas (services/facilities);
• level of comfort and quality of attendance.
One considered in the embarkment flow the following sectors:
* access to the airport;
• hall of passengers;
• check-in;
• security check;
• embarkment room.
To follow, the quality indicators that will be evaluated and appraised for the passengers:
The indicators that will be evaluated in the access to the airport/terminal are:
• general signalling;
• vacant number;
• variety of transports.
The indicators that will be evaluated in the hall of passengers are:
* available areas;
• distance between instalation_components;
• availability of elevators/escalators;
• availability of stands of luggage;
• thermal comfort;
• acoustic comfort;
• visual sensation (esthetic);
• availability/confort of seats;
• availability of the signaling;
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• availability/cleaunes of the sanitary;
• general security;
• general cleanness;
• general satisfaction for the given services/quality of the service.
The indicators that will be evaluated in essential commercial services are:
• practised prices;
• available areas;
• quality of the attendance;
• variety of installations.
The indicators that will be evaluated in the information services are:
• availability of the service;
• quality of the attendance.
The indicators that will be evaluated in the FIDS (flight information display system) are:
• FIDS availability.
The indicators that will be evaluated in check-in are:
• processing time;
• available area;
• cordialidade of the attendance.
The indicators that will be evaluated in security check are:
• processing time;
• available area;
• attendance.
The indicators that will be evaluated in the departure lounge are:
• available services;
• confort/availability of seats;
• available area;
• cleanness;
• thermal comfort;
• acoustic comfort;
• visual sensation (esthetic).
Application of the indicators (location survey)
From the preliminary delrmition of these 36 above described indicators of quality, was
developed a survey to catch the relevance attributed for the passengers amongst the
indicators of quality established by the ACI, and other survey with sights to a local
appreciation, searching to soon get an evaluation of the terminal of passengers after the
installment of the service.
Magri Jr., A. A. & Alvcs, C. J. P.
MlCTHODOLOGY AND APPLICATION
To select the airports for the accomplishment of the location survey, had been observed
several considerations amongst which: airports of net INFRAERO of different geographic
localizations, two of them in the South Region, one in the Center-West, one in North and
two in the Northeast.
For the accomplishment of a more including research it was necessary beyond the support
of the FAPESP (Foundation of Support the Research of the State of S_o Paulo), the support
of the DAC (IMpartment of Civil Aviation), with the supply of the air transportation and
the support to a researcher auxiliary and support of the INFRAERO, that allowed our
presence in its rooms of embarkment during the periods of accomplishment of the survey.
The airports chosen for the accomplishment of the survey had been:
• Salgado Filho International Airport - Porto Alegre-RS (POA);
• Afonso Pena International Airport - Curitiba-PR (CWB);
• Presidente Juscelino Kubitschek International Airport- Brasflia-DF (BSB);
• Val de Cans International Airport- Beltm-PA (BEL);
• Pinto Martins International Airport - Fortaleza-CE (FOR);
• Luiz Eduardo Mag_ International Airport- Salvador-BA (SSA).
Strategy mid application
For the development of the survey swamgy, it was considered necessity of ff covering, of
representative form, all tim moments of operation of the mnninal. The possible period for
application was the month of July of 2002. Positive aspect: it is a period of high movement
in the majority of the searched airports. Negative aspect: in some cases it can not represent
a period of typical operation and with adjusted pereeptiom most of its universe of users.
mt...._.,.j_ _ "-'-'vw -,_a''+_ -.o+,h,,_ v_--a' ._--!_'*.3 d._ys ,,e......-_-',,_, m e__ch __L_,____n_..... rm-ri_cl
through collections in the 3 turns: morning, _emoon and night.
The location surveys was initiated in day 07 of July and was finished in 04 of August of
2002, counting on 2 researchers, being carried through in the embarkment room, therefore
in this place the passengers already had observed or used the installations and felt the
quality of services in the airport installations. This strategy of accomplishment in the
embarkment room makes possible that the passengers answer the survey with more
tranquillity, therefore already had carried through check-in and is only waiting for the call
of entrance in the aircraft. The periods had been selected in accordance with the flequency
of the flights in the airports.
Each researcher applied a type of survey, leaving clearly for interviewed the objectives of
the same one, being the form filled for the proper interviewer so that it did not have variety
in the interpretation of the questions.
Survey instruments
The survey instruments had been developed with the purpose d' if identifying the main
indicators of quality of the airports and with the purpose of if analyzing and appraising the
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installations and services of the airport in question. In survey 1 - General (identification of
the main indicators), 22 indicators had been selected to be appraised with: Essential,
Desirable and Indifferent. In survey 2 - Local (analysis of the indicators of quality of the
airport), 36 indicators had been selected to be appraised in a scale that varied: Very good,
Good, Regular, Bad and Very bad. The concepts above attributed had been based on the
publication of the ACI.
Results of survey 1 - General
Analyzing the results of survey 1 - General, it is verified that amongst the indicators of the
access/parking, the general signalling and the vacant number they had been considered very
important being that the variety of transports less important, concluding that the existence
of one has carried efficient can be more important that several not efficient.
In the terminal, it is observed that availability of elevators, baggage trolleys, seats and
signalling are very important and the distance between installations and esthetic are less
important, being able to infer, for these results, that in the terminal the operational areas,
have more re levance, probably for dealing with the processing of the passenger involving
time, easiness, localization and comfort.
In the essential commercial works, it is observed that all indicators are between the
excellent ones, being that the practised prices and quality of the attendance and had make
look like more importance that the variety of installations, indicating that the passengers
and users look in first place the quality and the prices that the variety of installations.
The information services: availability and attendance, FIDS (Flight Information Display
System), the time of processing the cordialidade in check-in and security, had been
considered very important, revealing the importance that if must take with these indicators
in all the stages of processing.
Finally, in the embarkment room, the availability of seats and services they had been
considered essential followed for the esthetic, passing the impression that the passengers
search in first place the comfort that properly services and esthetic place.
Table 1, shows the frequency of indication of the concepts in global terms.
Table 1 - frequency of indication of the concepts
concept % indicators
1 - indifferent 7,07
2 - desirable 35,45
3 - essential 57,48
The results had indicated that none of the indicators can be considered indifferent by the
user. But four, armngst the considered ones, had been considered desirable:
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In _e airport/terminal
• Distance between instalations/components;
• Visual sensation (esthetic).
In the essential commercial services
• variety of installations/services.
In the departm_ lounge
• Visual umsation (esthetic).
The indicator that was considered by the passengers who travel the businesses as being
desirable, but not essential beyond the listed ones above was:
In the essential commercial services
• Practised prices.
Therefore, the quality indicators had been established that are essential and desirable in the
airports, according to vision of the passengers.
Results of survey 2 - Local
Index of quality of the airports
An index of the perceived quality of the services and the installations of the airports was
gotten calculating it applied weighed mean to the indicators of the airports. With this
calculation the weighed mean of the indicators in relation to the concepts of 1 at 5, where 1
corresponds to poor, 2 to the bad. 3 when average, 4 to the good, 5 to the very good.
Table 2, indicates the ........ of .t.. ;_._. .... c ._,,_ _.,o ;..1,o .,o,_,,,_ ,,c ........
application.
Table 2 - Intention of the trips
Airport* Leisure
POA 31,21
CWB 16,11
BSB 20,71
BEL 19,15
FOR 46,26
SSA 22,70
Business Other
65 25 3,55
80 54 3,55
68 57 10,71
78 01 2.84
52 38 1,36
7117 6,13
*IATA code (International Air Trans _ortation Association)
In the next Table 3, to follow more frequently displays the weighed mean of the indication
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Table 3 - Weighed mean of the indicators
Quality indicators Airports
POA FOR BEL SSA CNVB BSB
Accms/Parking
general signalling 4,10 4,19 4,10 4,06 4,16 4,14
vacant number 4,03 4,06 4,11 3,91 3,77 3,53
variety of transports 3,64 3,79 3,60 3,84 3,53 3,40
Airport/Terminal
available areas 4,56 4,41 4,49 4,24 4,27 4,04
distance between imtalation_/components 4,30 4,10 4,11 3,82 3,97 3,76
availability of elevators/escalators/moving walkways 4,31 4,14 3,91 3,95 3,79 3,78
availability of trolleys 4,41 4,41 4,40 4,37 4,27 4,16
thermal comfort 4,57 4,37 4,33 4,17 3,75 4,23
acoustic cemfon 4,47 4,27 4,t4 4,21 4,03 3,84
visual sensation (esthetic) 4,68 4,28 4,50 4,28 4,15 3,99
availability/confort of seats 4,34 4,29 4,17 3,53 3,53 3,67
availability of the signaling 4,25 4,18 4,09 4,00 3,99 3,81
availability/cleannes oflhe sanitary 4,40 4,08 4,43 4,24 4,33 4,19
general security 4,42 4,18 4,06 4,21 4,14 4,01
general cleanliness 4,60 4,36 4,46 4,49 4,42 4,12
general satisfaction/quality of service 4,42 4,29 4,18 4,09 4,05 3,80
Essential commercial services
practised prices 3,43 3,40 3,43 2,88 3,11 2,79
available areas 4,25 3,79 3,75 2,91 3,63 3,53
quality of the attendance 4,13 4,01 3,94 3,82 3,87 3,73
variety of installations 3,67 3,86 3,72 3,56 3,46 3,41
Information services
availability of the service 4,22 4,03 3,77 3,85 3,76 3,59
quality of the attendance 4,29 4,09 3,88 3,94 3,13 3,82
System of information FIDS
lIDS availability 4,24 4,03 3,84 3,91 3,87 3,80
Check-in
processing time 4,14 4,19 3,99 3,85 3,73 3,70
available area 4,35 4,11 4,16 3,92 3,79 3,80
staff friendliness/attitude 4,49 4,31 4,33 4,16 4,19 4,05
Security Check
processing time 4,37 4,17 4,16 3,99 4,08 3,94
available area 4,35 4,13 4,19 4,10 3,98 3,87
attendance 4,49 4,27 4,26 4,36 4,19 4,04
Embark, meat room
available services 4,01 4,05 3,84 3,97 3,60 3,63
eonfordavailability of seats 4,31 4,24 4,03 3,51 3,59 3,53
available area 4,45 4,35 4,39 4,44 3,93 3,85
cleanliness 4,68 4,48 4,52 4,59 4,41 4,15
thermal comfort 4,56 4,29 4,21 4,31 3,85 4,18
acoustic comfort 4,49 4,29 4,18 4,19 4,09 3,83
visual sensation (esthetic) 4_60 4_19 4_41 4T33 4715 3_99
In the next Table 4, it is observed frequency of distribution of the concepts that indicate the
global situation of the quality of services and installations of the airports.
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Table 4- Frequency of distribution of the concepts
Airports
Concepts POA FOR BEL SSA CNVB BSB
1 - poor 0,87 0,59 0,77 1,05 1_8 1,84
2 - bad 1,82 2,01 3,16 2,98 4,46 7,19
3 - average 9,9 13,03 15,28 15,96 19,8 23,91
4 - good 40,75 47,08 44,12 46,53 45,75 40,70
5 - very _goed 46_66 36Q5 36_38 31 _6 27_59 26_35
Graph 1 -Frequency of distribution of the concepts
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In the previous graph, observes that Brasilia (BSB) presents greaters taxes of indication of
concepts poor (1), bad (2) and average (3). Fortaleza (FOR) presents the biggest incidence
of good concepts (4), but Porto Alegre (POA) if detaches with the biggest incidence of very
good (5) and the minor of the unfavourable index. The results of POA and BSB if show
discordant_ Still that, excessively they receive a conceptualization relatively similar.
Applying the calculation of the weighed mean in the results of table 4, one gets the indices
of global quality of the airports displayed in table 5. These hdex had been gotten being
multiplied for 2, the result ofthe weighed mean, for a scale of 1 at 10.
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Table 5 -Index of global quality of the airports
Airports
POA FOR BEL SSA CWB BSB
Index of qualit_ 8,62 8,32 8,22 7,98 7,82 7,66
It can be concluded that in the period of accomplishment of the location survey between the
searched airports, the Salgado Filho International Airport, Porto Alegre (POA), is
distinguished as most attractive for offering to the best quality of services and the best
installations according to its passengers.
CONCLUSIONS
The developed methodology serves
installations and services in the airport.
as an instrument to evaluate the quality of the
This work is resulted of two years of research that resulted in the master dissertation of the
author. The developed methodology made possible that the proper users of the airport
installations contributed of direct form in the analysis of the terminals, how much to the
installations and offered services making possible, thus, to get the quality indicators that are
the essentials, desirable and indifferent in the airport terminals and the analysis of the
installations and the quality of the services offered for the searched airports.
The survey had an application limited (in 3 days for airport) for the gotten resources, but,
these, had been indispensable for the extend of passengers and airports that was possible to
analyze. To get itself resulted still more trustworthy they are indicated to the application of
the methodology in at least four months during the period of one year and per seven days of
the week, thus rraking possible to identify to the quality of the installations and services in
all the operational scenes of the airports as, hours peak and seasonal.
Finally, the work made possible the validation of plus an aid tool the designers and
operators of airports, that they start to make use of a methodology to identify to the
characteristics or the aspects that more contribute for the perception of quality of services
of the airports for its users, making possible to the professionals to undertake solutions that
contribute for a perception greater of quality, making possible after all the greater
satisfaction of the customers (passengers) inside of the aeroportu_o terminal.
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Abstract
To cope with air traffic growth and congested airports, two solutions are apparent on
the supply side: 1) use larger aircraft in the hub and spoke system; or 2) develop new
routes through secondary airports. An enlarged route system through secondary airports
may increase the proportion of route monopolies in the air transport market.The monopoly
optimal non linear pricing policy is well known in the case of one dimension (one instrument,
one characteristic) but not in the case of several dimensions. This paper explores the
robustness of the one dimensional screening model _ith respect to increasing the number
of instruments and the number of characteristics. The objective of this paper is then to
link and fil the gap in both literatures. One of the merits of the screening model has
been to show that a great varieD" of economic questions (non linear pricing, product line
choice, auction design, income taxation, regulation...) could be handled within the same
framework.VCe study a case of non linear pricing (2 instruments (2 routes on which the
airline pro_ddes customers with services), 2 characteristics (demand of services on these
routes) and two values per characteristic (low and high demand of services on these routes))
and we show that none of the conclusions of the one dimensional analysis remain valid. In
particular, upward incentive compatibility constraint may be binding at the optimum. As
a consequence, they may be distortion at the top of the distribution. In addition to this,
we show that the optimal solution often requires a kind of form of bundling, we explain
explicitly distortions and show that it is sometimes optimal for the monopolist to only
produce one good (instead of two) or to exclude some buyers from the market. Actually,
this means that the monopolist cannot fully apply his monopoly power and is better off
selling both goods independently.We then define all the possible solutions in the case of a
quadratic cost function for a uniform distribution of agent types and explain the implications
for airlines in terms of service diffenrentiation.
1 Introduction
To cope with air traffic growth and congested airports, two solutions are apparent on the supply
side: 1) use larger aircraft in the hub and spoke system; or 2) develop new routes through
secondary airports. An enlarged route system through secondary airports may increase the
proportion of route monopolies in the air transport market. Other solutions exist (slot auctions
for example) are out of the scope of this paper (see for example, M Raffarin (2003)).
Because large aircraft took years to develop, required enormous up-front investment and has
useful lives of more than 30 years, Airbus and Boeing had to generate long-term demand projec-
tions. To do so, they prepared 20-year forecasts for large commercial aircraft: Airbus published
its Global Market Forecast (GMF hereafter) while Boeing published its Current Market Outlook
(CMO hereafter). Eventhough these forecasts are produced according to 2 different models, both
manufacturers agreed that there would be a significant growth in the air transportation industry
(worldwide passenger traffic will almost triple by 2019; Airbus forecast an average annual gro_th
rate of 4.9% while Boeing estimates an average growth rate of 4.8%). They also agreed that Asia
would register the world's highest growth rates over the next 20 years (See Ref 1).
To produce GMF, Airbus predicted annual demand for new aircraft on each of the 10000
passenger routes linking almost 2000 airports assuming that passenger and cargo demand would
track the Growth Domestic Product (GDP hereafter) growth as they had over the past 50
years. For each airline, on each route pair, the model estimated the need for specific aircraft
and compared that number against the then existing supply of aircraft. The model calculated
maximum feasible frequency limits for each route based on assumptions about airport capacity,
airplane speed, distance and some other factors. It assumed that airlines would attempt to keep
their market share by adding capacity as demand increased and by increasing aircraft size when
it was no longer feasible to increase flight frequencies. Airbus forecast demand for 14661 new
passenger aircraft and 703 new are freighter over the next 20-year period by 2019. It forecast
demand for 727 new aircraft seating from 400 to 500 passengers (the mainstay of the 747 market)
and 1550 new aircraft seating more than 500 passengers (1235 passenger aircraft and 315 cargo
aircraft). The GMF also predicted that by 2019 , Asia-Pacific airlines would hold half of the
very large aircraft (VLA hereafter) passenger fleet and that 6 of the top 10 airports served by
VLA would be in Asia (See Ref 1).
In contrast, Boeing forecast economic growth in 12 regions in its CMO. It then used these
growth assumptions to forecast regional traffic flows in 51 intra- and inter-regional markets. For
example, travel within China would grow at an average annual rate of 9% compared to 2.8% in
North America. The CMO concluded there would be demand for 22315 new aircraft through
2019. One reason for this difference between the two forecasts was that the CMO included for
more than 4000 regional jets. Despite general agreement on overall growth, Boeing forecast a
much smaller VLA market. The CMO stated bluntly: "The demand for VLA is small" (See Ref
2). It forecast total demand for only 1010 new aircraft seating 400 passengers or more, 40% of
which would be 747-400's (410 new aircraft). Of the remaining 600 planes, 270 would be cargo
planes, leaving demand for only 330 aircraft seating 500 passengers or more. More importantly,
most of the demand for the larger planes would not materialize for at least 10 years (See Ref 2).
The disparity between these two forecasts could be traced to conflicting assumptions regarding
the relative importance of flight frequency, new route development and aircraft size. Airbus
believed that increased flight frequencies and new routes would provide only short term solutions
to the problemof growingdemand.Airport curfews,gateandrunawaycapacityandpassenger
arrivalpreferenceswouldlimit the ability to increase flight frequencies at many airports including
some of the world's busiest airports like London Heathrow, Tokyo Narito, Singapore and LA
International. As Airbus EVP John _ahy said "the trouble is that on these long distance
flights, nobody wants to arrive at 3.00AM and nobody wants to drive at the airport for a
2.30AM departure so that they can have more flights" (See Ref 3). At the same time Airbus
did not believe that development of new routes would prca_ide a long term solution. Adam
Bro_aa, VP for strategic planning and Forecasting, noted "the pace of new route development
has slowed sharply...between 1990 and 1995, the total number of route grew by less than 700, an
average increase of 1.7% per year. Part of the problem was the difficulty of opening new airports.
Tn fact, only I0 major mrports where scheduled to open within the next l0 years and only 18
airports had approved plans to grow (See Ref 3). An even bigger concern _nas the fact that new
routes would not solve the problem of growth at largest population centers, especially in Asia.
While Boeing and others cited the expansion of new routes in transatlantic markets as a model
for growth in transpacific travel, Airbus pointed out that Asia lacked secondary urban centers
to support new destinations(See Ref 4). Thus, hub-to-hub transport would remain the industry
standard in these markets.
Like Airbus, Boeing assumed that increasing flight frequency at existing airports would absorb
certain amount of growth, but that congestion at the largest hubs would require an alternative
solution, which according to Boeing would be new point-to-point routes using medium sized,
long-range aircraft like 777 or 340. In support of this view, a Boeing executive claimed "...60% of
the airlines bought 1000 or so 747s we've sold bought them for their range, not for their capacity"
(See Ref 5). To the extent, there was demand for VLA, the 747-400 would be sufficient for most
airlines.
Recent development in the airline industry supported this assertion. In the USA, following
airline deregulation in 1985, southwest airlines had prospered by introducing new services at
secondary airports such as Providence, Rhode Island and ]slip, N_(. In Europe Ireland based
Ryanair was copying Southwest 's model and had -achieved 25% annual passenger growth since
1989 by offering no-frills, economy service between secondary airports (See Ref 6). More recently
start-ups and buzz and easyjet had adopted similar business models. Transatlantic and to a
much lesser extent transpacific travel reflected this trend towards segmentation. Randy Base,
a Boeing Vice President explained "back in 1987, the only daily flight between Chicago and
Europe was a TWA to London. In those days, 60% of American carriers' transatlantic flights
were in 747s operated by Pan Am and TWA in and out of big East cost airports. In 2000,
United and American Airlines were operating from Chicago to 11 European destinations using
smaller 767 and 777 aircraft (See Ref 7). More recently, both Delta Airlines and American
Airlines had introduced new point-to-point service across the Pacific, the former from Portland,
Oregon , to Nagoya, Japan and the latter from San Jose, California, to Tokyo (See Ref 8).
Related to the opening of new routes was a decline in the average seating capacity in many
airline fleets. In fact, Boeing predicted that smaller jets such as its 777 or Airbus A330 would
provide 160 fragmentation across the Pacific(See Ref 7). Boeing assumed these trends would
continue because people seemed to favor timely and direct service over minimum cost as they
became wealthier (See Ref 2). Another factor _uld contribute to further fragmentation, though
one that was exceedingly difficult to predict, was entr T by new airlines. Nevertheless Boeing
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believedentrywaslikely.
Industry analystsmadeprojectionsthat felt somewherein betweenthe two. The Airline
Monitor, a leading industry journal, assumed that airlines would buy the A380 for its operating
ad_-antages and passenger appeal. Based on this assumption, the journal forecast total demand
for 735 A380 through 2019 (including Cargo planes) (See Ref 9). It is also predicted that the hub-
and-spoke system will remain the industry standard. Even if, new routes development through
secondary airports will not solve entirely the air traffic growth and congested airports issues, it
will enable airlines to lower their cost (low airport fees, city-, region- or government-support...)
and at the same time to have monopoly positions on these routes allowing positive profits (if
there is enough demand of course).
This paper does not intend to show that Airbus's or Boeing's predictions are right or false.
The above comments show that the hub-and-spoke system will remain the industry standard and
also that new route development through secondary airports will be one of the key' feature of
the 21 st century air transport industry. Assuming the above statement, new route development
through secondary airports will also give birth to route monopolies (as it is often the case for
low cost airlines). In addition to being new market shares for airlines, these new point-to-point
services through secondary airports will also enable airlines, at least for a certain period of time,
to have monopoly positions on these routes and as a consequence, to make positive profits.
We assume monopolistic positions for the carrier as the products (point-to-point routes) are so
differentiated from the other products of the market (routes through the hub-and spoke system)
that they are assume to be different. Example: direct flight from Toulouse (France) to Vancouver
(Canada) is different from flying from Toulouse to Amsterdam, then from Amsterdam to Seattle
and then from Seattle to Vancouver.
The objective of this paper is to study the optimal pricing policy' of a monopolist facing a
population of heterogenous buyers. In the air transport literature, on the one hand, after airline
industry deregulation, pricing policy in the hub-and-spoke system, airport dominance (...) has
been largely reviewed (for examples, Graham et al. (1983), Berry (1990), Borenstein (1989,
1990), Bruekner et al. (1992)) but on the other hand, the monopolist's optimal pricing policy
has been put aside even if 60% of the routes in the world are operated through a monopolistic
position. In Economics, the analysis of optimal screening has been subject of a large literature,
partly justified by the great variety of contexts to which such an analysis can be applied: non
linear pricing, product lines design, optimal taxation, regulations, auctions. Although it is often
recognized that agents have several characteristics and principal have several instruments, this
problem is often studied under the assumption of a unique characteristic and a unique instrument.
The case of several characteristics and several instruments has been studied and the qualitative
features of the optimal pricing policy have been established (_Tilson (1993), Armstrong (1996),
Rochet-Chon6 (1998). Nevertheless, only few examples were solved (Wilson (1993), Rochet
(1995)).
The objective of this paper is to link and fill the gap in both literatures. This paper studies the
optimal pricing policy of a monopolist (airline) who produces two goods (operates 2 routes) and
faces a heterogenous population of buyers. The buyers (travel agencies) have two characteristics
(one for each good), two possible values per characteristic and therefore four possible types of
buyer. After a brief survey in section 2, where we recall the qualitative features of the solution
to the monopolist's problem where agents are represented by a single characteristic and the
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principalhasonly oneinstrument,section3 focusesonthe specificproblemof nonlinearpricing
by a monopolistin the simplestpossiblemultidimensionalmodel. Section4 givesthesolution
and showsthat resultsobtain in one-dimensionmodelarenot robustto increasesin numbers
of characteristics and instruments (some upward incentive compatibility constraints are binding
at the optimum). For example, it is sometimes optimal for the airline to pro_dde services above
the first best level to some of its customers. Section 5 studies the problem in a different but
equivalent way and enables to explain distortions in resource Mlocations. Section 5 studies the
general solutions and section 6 defines several sets of solutions and implications for airline in
terms of service differentiation. Section 7 concludes.
2 A brief Survey
2.1 Airline pricing policy
Airline deregulation has led to profound changes in the structure of the industry. In addition
to gi_fing airlines the freedom to set fares, deregulation removed restrictions on entry and exit,
allowing the carriers to expand and rationalize their route structures. This flexibility led in the
1980s to a dramatic expansion of hub-and-spoke net_a_orks, where passengers change planes at
a hub airport on the way to their eventual destination. By funneling all passengers into a hub,
such a system generates high traffic densities on its "spoke" routes. This allows the airline to
exploit economies of density, yielding lower cost per passenger. These economies arise partly
because high traffic density on a route allows the airline to use larger and more efficient aircraft
and to operate this equipment more intensively (at a higher load factor).
Restructuring of the industry in response to deregulation has also led to renewed interest
among economists in the determinants of airfares in individual city-pair markets. This line of
research contains notable contributions by Graham-Kaplan-Sibley (1983), Borenstein (1989),
Morisson-V_ston (1990). These studies typically explore the connection between atrfares and
market-specific measures of demand (city populations and incomes, tourism potential...), cost
(flight distance, load factors...)and competition (number of competitors, market share...) _dthout
paving much attention to network characteristics. Bruekner et al. (1992) shows the impact of
network characteristics in airfares determination by proxdding first evidence linking airfares to
the structure of airline hub-and-spoke networks. When a hub-and-spoke successfully raises traffic
density, ticket prices are likely to reflect the resulting lower cost per passenger. Any force that
increases the traffic volume on the spokes of a network _fill reduce fares in the market it serves.
This effect arises because of economies of density on the spokes. For example, since a large
network (as measured by the number of city pairs it connects) offers many potential destinations
to the residents of an endpoint city, its spoke should have higher traffic densities than the spokes
of a smaller network. With costs correspondingly lo_er, fares in the indi_fidual markets served
should be lower in the large network, other things equal. Similarly, holding size fixed, a network
that connects large cities should have higher traffic densities on its spoke (and thus lower fares
in individual markets) than one serving small cities.
The case of fare determination in the case of route monopolies has received little attention.
With these hard times and cut-throat competition in the hub-and-spoke system, this could be
serious omission.
In addition to being new markets shares for airlines, new routes through secondary airports
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(secondarypopulationcenters),point-to-pointservice,canalsobe seenas a businessmodel.
"Lowcost"airlinesoftenusethis model.Underthe "lowcost"label,wecaneasilysaythat these
carriershavemonopolisticpositiononsomeroutes(Ryanairin Europe,SouthWestin the United
Statesof Americaforexamples).Evenif theyare "lowcost" airlinesandareableto providelow
faretickets,this doesnot meansthat donot usetheir monopolyon their marketniches(they
probablydoto reachsuchoperatingmargin)._rhat weproposein this paperis to assumethat
anairlinemayhaveincentivesto useapart of the "lowcost"businessmodel(secondaryairports)
but onanotherbusinessmodel.Thanksto low "airport costs",point-to-pointser_dcethe airline
is ableto proposeattractivepricesandalsoto apply its monopolypoweron its marketniche.
Moreover,the airlinemayalsobesupportedby cities,regions,or governmentsfor the impact
of a routeopeningon theeconomicdevelopmentof a populationcenter.To doso,weassume
that thereexistscity pairs, populationcenterswherethe macro-economicenvironmentallows
an airlineto operatesuccessfullya newroute. Insteadof providingcustomerswith singleclass
flights,theairlineproposeseveralevelsof services(economy,businessandfirst forexample)to
applypricediscriminationthroughits monopolypower.If an airlinecanoperateonerouteon
suchacity pair,theoptimalnonlinearpricingpolicy isdescribedinsectionastheone-dimension
case. If anairlinecanoperatetwo routeson two suchcity pairs or throughthreepopulation
centers,theoptimalpricingpolicy is describedandexplainedin theremainingpart of thepaper.
2.2 Mechanism design and non linear pricing
The analysis of optimal screening has been the subject of a large literature, partly justified by
the great variety of contexts to which such an analysis can be applied: nonlinear pricing, product
lines design, optimal taxation, regulation, auctions...
Although it is often recognized that agents have several characteristics and principals have
several instruments, this problem is often studied under the assumption of a unique characteristic
and a unique instrument. In this case we obtain the following results:
the set of self selection constraints that are binding at the optimum is typically the same:
the Individual Rationality Constraints (IRC hereafter) at the lower extreme of the distri-
bution of types, and downward local Incentive Compatibility Constraints (ICC hereafter)
everywhere.
we decompose the problem in two parts: first, find the system of transfers that minimizes
the expected informational rent for a given allocation of goods; second, find the allocation
of goods that maximizes the profit of the principal.
because of the informational rent, second best allocation is distorted below, except at the
upper extreme of the distribution of types where it coincides with the first best allocation.
Considering the multiplicity of characteristics and instruments in most applications, it is
important to know if those results are still valid in the multidimensional context.
In the screening literature, the question has been essentially considered in two polar cases:
• one instrument-several characteristics: in this case, it is impossible to obtain perfect screen-
ing among agents. The same level of the instrument is chosen by many different agents
(in Lewis-Sappington(88)_thiscorrespondsto firmshavingdifferentcostsanddemands).
HoweverLaffont-Maskin-Rochet(87)and Lewis-Sappington (88) shorn, it is possible to ag-
gregate these types and reason in terms of the average cost mnc_,uu of all firms ha_ug
chosen the same level of production. Nevertheless, several qualitative properties persist:
for instance, Lewis-Sappington (88) show that price exceeds expected marginal cost, except
at the top of the distribution where they are equal.
several instruments-one characteristic: the situation is very different. Matthews-Moore
(87) extend the Mussa-Rosen's model by allowing the monopolist to offer different levels
of warranties as well as qualities. One of their most striking result is that the allocation of
qualities is not necessarily monotonic with respect to types. As a consequence, non local
ICC may be binding at the optimum.
The most interesting case is the one with several characteristics and several instruments,
because it is the most realistic but also the most difficult.
Seade (79) has studied the optimal taxation problem for multidimensional consumers and
has shown that it _as equivalent to a variation calculus problem with several _riables. McAfee-
McMillan (88) make a decisive step in the study of monopoly pricing under multidimensional
uncertainty. They introduce a General Single Crossing Condition under which ICC can be
replaced by the local conditions of the agents' decision problems. They also show that the optimal
screening mechanism can be obtained as the solution of a variations calculus problem. In 92,
Armstrong provides a very clear treatment of the difficulties involved in the multidimensional
extension of the Mussa-Rosen's problem of optimal product lines design by a monopolist. _rflson
(93) contains a very original and almost exhaustive treatment of nonlinear pricing models: several
multidimensional examples are solved.
Focus can now be made on bidimensional problems: Rochet (84) studies an extension of
Baron-_,yerson r%o_lation problem in a bidime__ional context where both marginal and fixed
costs are unknown to the regulator. Contrarily to Lewis-Sappington, Rochet allows for stochastic
mechanisms (as Baron-Myerson did): this provides a second instrument to the regulator. On
a particular example, Rochet (84) shows that the optimal mechanism can indeed be stochastic,
as conjectured by Baron-Myerson. Following Spence's early(80) and deep contribution, Dana
(93) gives in a different context a partial solution of the discrete screening model with two t3_pes
and two attributes, and finds two solutions depending on the correlation of types' characteristics.
Armstrong-Rochet (98) study a bidimensional scTeening model in which four types of agents, who
are discretely distributed, can undertake two kinds of activities. Each activity can be undertaken
at a high or low level. They consider two ways to solve the problem:
• The relaxed problem: they only consider the five downward ICC. They show that three
types of solution can occur ( cases C and D are in fact identical if one permutes activity A
and B). Those solutions change according to the correlation bet_een activities. The binding
constraints are in those cases are the IRC of the lowest type and a set of do_mward ICC.
The highest type always gets his first allocation and there is no distortion at the top. This
can be explained by the considered ICC: when only do_-n_-ard ICC are considered, rents
do not depend on the high type activity levels and therefore do not need to be distorted.
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• Thefully constrainedproblem:they considerthe wholesetof ICC. This gives rise to a
fourth solution ( actually there are two, but they are symmetric): one upward ICC and
the transverse ICC are binding. As a consequence, an "intermediary type" gets his first
best allocation and the highest gets an allocation above the first best level.
2.3 A Brief Recall of the Unidimensional Case
Consider an economy in which a monopolist, an airline, sells his production (travel on this route)
to a heterogenous population of two types (t = {t z, th}), customers haxdng low (l) or high (h)
demand of services on this route, who are represented in proportion _ and 7rh (Trt ÷ 7rh = 1). As
the airline operates through secondary airports, it can lower its airport fees and thus proposes
point-to-point service, attractive prices and can fully apply its monopoly power. The monopolist
wants to maximize his profit:
i
=maxqZ[u'(t, q)- u'(t, q)- C(q')],
i
where ui(t ', qi) = t_q_ and Ui(t _, q_) = u(t _, q') -p_q_. This maximization problem is subject to
the Individual Rationality and the Incentive Compatibility constraints:
IRC : U(t i, qi) >_ O,
zcc: u(t', q') - u(t', ¢) > _(t', q_)- u(tJ, qJ).
We then obtain:
U t = u(t z, qZ) _ plq_,
U h _ ul= (t h - tl)q l,
U l _ U h > (t t - th)q h.
As a consequence buyers of type h get their first best allocation whereas types l receive a down-
ward distorted allocation.
Writing the Lagrangian and computing the solution gives:
L= Z[ui(t, q) - Ui(t, q) - C(q')] - _ #q(Y(ti, q') - U(t', qJ) - u(t', qJ) + u(t j, qJ) )
i i,j
- _ 3,i U i"
The first order conditions give:
At = -1,
]_h/_ --71"h,
71"h h tl),pZ= C,(qZ) + lr__F(t _
ph= C,(qh).
This means that the airline is able to find the optimal pricing mechanism and service alloca-
tion that enables its profit maximization. Customers with high demand of services will receive
the_ first k^_.o=,_allocation (price _uals marg_mal _ *_cos_j whereas _"_*_,_u_=_ with I_, _=_,_,_.... _ of
services will receive a downward distorted allocation of services (below the first best level of
course). Airlines pro_4de sela_ices below the first best level on low fare tickets to give incentives
to customers with high demand of services to buy high fare tickets instead of bu3dng low fare
tickets. They just, propose "minLmum" se_dces to "poor customers" and offer "superfiuit3," to
"rich travellers".
Focus can now be made on the bidimensional case.
3 Statement of the Problem
We focus here on the specific problem of nonlinear pricing by a monopolist in the simplest possible
model (two characteristics, two possible values per characteristic and therefore four possible
types), and first give the solution which has the same qualitative features than in dimension one,
in the case of a linear quadratic cost function( in a previous version of his paper with Chon_,
Rochet (95), alone, studies this problem, where production is a level of quality, and we study the
case of quantity with a non zero cross cost) whereas Armstrong-Rochet (98) study the case of
constant marginal costs. Such a solution appears when the correlation between characteristics is
near zero and the cross cost parameter is not too big: in such a case, only downward local .ICC
and IRC of the lowest type are binding but according to the value of the cross cost parameter,
the quantities can be distorted downwards or upwards. This differs from dimension one (except
when there is no cross cost parameter) and the highest type receives his first best allocation of
goods. We call it the regular case. Matthews and Moore (87) study a standard model (Mussa-
Rosen (78)), taking three types into account, the I.RC is only effective for type 3. In this case
type 1 faces undimzrted quality while the other two receive degraded quality (unidirectional
downward distortion), but allocations are not monotonic. In Dolmenfeld-%_hite (88) there is
unidirectional upward distortion. But Srinagesh-Bradburg (89) find bidirectional distortions(one
upwards, one downa_rds). We then define the complete solution in three different situations,
first, where there is no cross cost and a discrete uniform distribution of types, where we obtain
the same four solutions as in Rochet (95), second, where there is no cross cost and a general
discrete distribution of t3q_es and also in the case of a dis_ete uniform distribution, with a non
zero cross c_ parameter, where we obtain ten other solutions.
3.1 The Model
We consider a natural bidimensional extension of the Mussa-Rosen's (1978) model, in which a
multiproduct monopolist sells two goods to a heterogenous population of four types of discretely
distributed buyers. The model is different from Mussa-Rosen's because production represents
quantities and not qualities. The airline operates two routes, route 1 and route 2 and provides
her customers with quantities of services on route 1, ql, and on route 2, q2. Customers are
characterized by their type, t = (tl, t2), their demand for services on route 1 and 2 (distance,
departure time, arrival time, number of possible changes, on-board space, ...).
Buyers utilities are quasilinear:
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U i = u(t i, ql, q2) - P(ql, q2) - E,
u(t i, ql, q2) i i + t i _i
---- tlq 1 2(/2;
piqi i i i i= Plql +P2q2,
where # is a bidimensional vector of characteristics of the consumers (his type), q is a bidimen-
sional vector of the quantities of the goods and p is the unit price of the goods, u(t, q) represents
the monetary equi_-alent of the goods, with characteristic vector q for a consumer of type t.
Notice that q and t have the same dimensionality so that perfect screening (in the sense
that consumers with different types always buy different quantities of goods) is possible, i.e.,
we assume that the (full information) optimal resource allocation q(') involves perfect screening.
0(') is defined as follows:
Vt • T, _(t)= arg maxq[S(t, q)],
where S(t, q) = u(t, q) - C(q), and T represents the set of possible types and C(q) is the cost
function of the monopolist:
1 2
C(ql, q2) = "_(ql + q22)+ pqlq2.
We use such a cost function, as we assume that for a low quantity of services, the necessary
services are served first (the flight itself) and as the number of services increases, the services
become more and more superfluous and as a consequence, more and expansive, p is used for
positive or negative production synergies. We also assume that the surplus function S(t, q) is
strictly concave, differentiable in q and has, for all t, a unique maximum 0(t). The set of 0(')
will be used as a benchmark for evaluating the distortions of resource allocations entailed by the
monopoly power under bidimensional adverse selection.
3.2 The Monopolist% Problem
We describe the strategy of the monopolist as a set of price-quantity allocations (/, qi) satisfying
ICC and IRC :
IR:U i >_O, for all i,
IC: u(V,q i) _piqi _ E _ >_ u(V, qi) _piqJ _ E', for all i,j.
The airline has to define the price of a ticket and the associated quantity of services for each
type of agent that satisfy his or her IRC and the ICC.
They are equivalent to:
IR:U i >_O,
u' - us >_u(t qJ)- u(tJ, ¢).
Finally, _ri denotes for all i the proportion of agents of type i in the population of potential
buyers. The monopolist's optimal strategy is obtained by maximizing his profit:
71-i i iMax E, (Pq - C(¢) +
which is equivalent to:
Max Y'_i7ri(u( ti, qi) _ U i _ C(qi) ) under the above constraints.
Note: we write this expected profit as:
Max E 7ri(piqi - C(qi) + Ei)'
i
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insteadof the commonlyusedexpression:
Max _ 7ri(piq _+ E-) - _e_" __a
i i
We choose the first formulation because C(q) is convex. As a consequence, C(_-_., q_) > __,_ C(q').
With a technology that generates such a cost function, it is less costly for the monopolist to use
"just in time production" and to maximize profit as previously mentioned. This is the case for
services.
There are two characteristics and two possible values for each characteristic. Therefore there
are four possible types of consumers. We denote these types by letter i = A, B, C, D.
= (e,,e=),
tB = (tlh,_), (TrB),
tc=
tD=
To avoid symmetric problem and to better differentiate B and D, we assume:
- > - D,
which means for example that route 2 is shorter that route 1.
The specified a quadratic cost function is:
°
C(ql, q2) = _(_ + _) + Pqlq_, P • ]-1, 1[.
This implies that _ is linear:
The Lagrangian of the problem :
L(U, q) = _-_.i7ri(u( #, q') - V' - C(¢)) - _,_ p,j(U i - Uj - u(t', qJ) + u(t j, qJ) ) - _", _iUi
where/zij and _' represent respectively the (non positive) multipliers associated to ICC(i, 3) and
1RC(i). The first order conditions ( which are necessary and sufficient for the linear program)
give:V/, &L/SU' = -rr' - Ej(iz,j - izj,) - A' = O,
rr_+ ,_ = _j(/_j_ - #,j) and adding these equations on i gives:
E,r' =-E,_'= 1,
+-*Vi, 7r' < _-_i(/_j, -/_), with = if U' > 0 (equivalent to A_ = 0).
This is equivalent to say that at least for one i, the IRC is binding. This is economically clear
since adding a uniform fee to a price schedule does not alter ICC, and increases the monopolist's
profit.
Following Border-Sobel (87), we say that j attracts i when IC(ij) is binding. These relations
(who attracts whom?) are crucial for determining distortions in resource allocation. Therefore
if i attracts no one (#ij = 0, Vj), i receives his first best allocation.
V_qaen U i > 0: 7ri = _-_d(/_ji - p,j). This condition explains the trade off faced by the
monopolist in the choice of unit price pi price paid by types t i. A small increase for pi to pi + e
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hasa directeffectonprofit: it increasesit by eTri per unit, where 7ri is the proportion of types t i.
However this marginal increase also has a complex, indirect effect on profit: for all js who are
attracted by i (-#j_ > 0), prices have to be decreased by c, otherwise IC(ij) would no longer be
satisfied anymore, which decreases the profit per unit by e#_j. Symmetrically, for all js such that
i is attracted to j (#ij < 0) prices can be increased by e so that IC(ij) still binds. This increases
the profit per unit by -e_i j. This condition shows that these effects are exactly compensated
when prices are optimally chosen.
4 The Solution (1)
To solve the problem, the question is to guess what constraints are binding and then check that
is indeed the case. Intuitively for tz large enough (the lowest level of service that the airline offers
is the travel itself) and p not too big, all quantities served will be strictly positive, which implies
that IR(A) will be the IRC that binds. In this case:
4.1 The regular symmetric case
By analogy with the one dimensional case, it is tempting to assume that only downward or
leftward ICC _4ll be binding. This is what _e call the Regular Case ( Regular because only
downward or leftward ICC can be binding). If, moreover, all such constraints are binding, we
obtain what we call the Regular Symmetric Case, represented on diagram 1 (see diagram 1),
where an arrow between i and j means that IC(i,j) is binding (j attracts i), and a circle around
point i means that IR(i) is binding (U _ = 0).
We assume now that: AtlTr B > At21r D. This assumption allows to better differentiate the
market of good 1 from the market of good 2.
We look for the regular symmetric solution of the monopolist's problem.
Applying the first order conditions, we get:
_BA -_- #DA = 71"A -- 1, (AA = -1)
--_BA -_-_CB -_ 7_B,
--_CB -- _CD = 7_C,
_CD -- _DA = _D,
and the otherLagrange multipliersare equalto 0.
We then obtain the optimal quantities (substituting ql in q_ and vice and versa) as functions
of #BA:
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q_l
_=
qC=
_=
4=
_=
_=
_=
In this case, agents utilities are:
U A = 0,
u" = Ah_,
UD = Z_t2_,
uc =z_t_¢+ At_d =At_ + At_,
where Ati = t_ - _.
We have 4 unknowns (#ijs) and 3 equations. The missing equation is obtained by examining
diagram 1. The difference of utility between C and A can be computed along two paths (through
B or through D):
uc - u_ = At_ + At_ =At_ + At_.
Replacing the expressions of qis in the above equation and solving the system of four equations
with four unknowns, we obtain:
[Af:2((TrB 4- 7rC)/TrD) + A_(1/_ A) - pAtlAt_((Tr A - 1)/TrA)]
#BA = [((1/_A) + (1/:rD))A_ + ((1/_rA) + (1/:rB))A_ + 2pAt,At2/_rA ].
This defines a solution for the problem only if all #,is are non positive, which is equi_-alent
to:
RSC0:#BA _< -_r B
<:_ 7_A7_ C -- 7_B7_ D > --'%_(_rD(_rC +_'D))+PwD(1--_rA--2v:B)Atl At2
-- z,_
RSCI:#_A > -:r B _ _rc
7rATr C -- 7,1-B7£D _ --'_I (_B(_C'_'_'B) )+P'EB(I--_rA--2TB--2WC)Atl /kf_2
-
_Ve then look for the other conditions that must be checked by the parameters of the model
for the RSC to be solution (see appendix 1) and we obtain conditions on q_s and/,_is.
These conditions can be written as functions of ]ZBA:
RSC0:#BA _< -'n B,
RSCI:_BA > _Trs _ _c
RSC_:_< _,
RSCa:_< _,
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At At Ah(1--'_A) > O.
RSC4:q_ < q_,
A._ 11-A -b-/r B A¢
,-, - p_t_(_--a_-)] o._BA[-_ +At_--p_ >_
RSC_:_ < qf,
_-,).. FA t [lrA"_TrB'_ At
_'BAt 2_ _--_-_-_J+ P_--_]+ _' -- pAh > O.
nsc6:_ < q_,
p_]+_ _,_ >o.
asCT:qg< q:',
Ah(_B+_ c)
eO _BA[_--_ -_- pAtl(_) ] -1- _ "4- P _rI) _ O.
RSCS:q_ _<qC,
#BA --<0.
RSC9:q_ < qlc,
#BA "_-1 - _rA >_ O.
For 0 = 0, notice that the solution exists only when:
- ]- _B_D [ (see conditions RSC1, and RSC2 or(_c _rB_rD) e \at1)
RSC5).
The optimal strategy of the monopolist is defined as a set of price-quantity allocations satis-
fying IRC and ICC. With fixed quantities as defined previously, optimal prices are determined
by the following equation:
pi _(ff qi) __ oc, i, _ ___(_(t j _i_ _rti _i_
We can notice that the unit prices paid by buyers of type i are a convex combination of the
marginal cost and of the marginal utilities of buyers that are attracted to i (his quantity vector
qi). In our case, with linear preferences, we get:
pi OC ," ix= _tq _- E, _(t3 - t').
When i attracts no one (#j_ = 0 for all i,j), i pays prices equal to the marginal costs and
gets his first best allocation. In the other case, (#j_ < 0) prices are always superior to marginal
costs, because only downwards local ICC bind: as a consequence, in the R.S.C, #ji ( 0 implies
that tJ is superior to ff.
Proposition 1 In the regular symmetric case, prices are superior to marginal costs except for
the highest type who is charged with a price equal to marginal cost and gets his first best allocation
in quantity. The price charged on a good depends on the consumed quantity of the other good:
p_ depends on q_. The optimal nonlinear pricing requires a kind of form of bundling.
To show the second part of the proposition, we consider types A and D for the good 1: we
know that tA = tD and the solution gives the following result: pA > pD and @ < qD and this
comes fxom the fact that qA < qD as t A < t2D. Symmetrically we obtain the same result on good
2 for types A and B.
When p = 0, we have the following solution for prices in the R.S.C:
OC z -i _ i
tia = th_ 4==_ Pia = -_q(q_] _ % = q,
• OCz ix i
t'_ = t _ .=:v p_ > -_q tqi_) e:=. q_ < gl,
=> no upward distortion.
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Asin Lewis-Sappington(88),pricesal_ys exceedmarginalcosts,exceptfor thehighestype
wherethey areequal.
4.2 Complete solution: the case of a general discrete distribution and
p-O
4.2.1 The Reg-l__ar Symmetric Case
We have previously seen that, the regular symmetric case does not exist for all distributions. This
solution is defined by its two frontiers: #cB -< 0, and _ > q_l (or q_2 > q_2, see figures 1 and 2).
These two frontiers give the following conditions:
__ ( A$2 _27rD ( C 77/)),[icB < 0 ¢=. _c _ _ro > -'S_" : +
7TB TfD
_ >-_ ¢=_ _ : - :r° <- _--7-
[ (-_!_27£D(7[C_-7[D_ _rBTrD]Proposition 2 If ,'raTrC-7_rr D £ t-_ A,a / _ /, _-gr-j the solution is regular symmetric.
Types C get their first best allocation and qD q_l, q_2, q_2 are do_tmwards distorted. There is no
upward distortion.
4.2.2 The Separable Case
Now we assume that One of these two conditions is no longer satisfied anymore: if 7raTrc --TrBTr 1) _>
7rB_D
this means that C is also directly attracted by A. Thus, the non local downward ICC is
binding. As a consequence, _ = q_l, q_2 = q_2and the solution is now separable (see diagram 2).
q_:t,qff, q2c:q_2 are equal to the first best allocation.
Diagram 2 enables to compute the indirect utility levels and we get:
U A = O,
U B = Atlq¢l,
U° = _t2_,
The F.O.C and the conditions on quantities give:
[IBA _" #DA _--" 71"4 -- 1, (AA -- -1),
--PBA -F [ICB ----7t'B,
--[ICA -- PCB -- PCD = 77C,
]_CD -- [IDA = 7[D_
4=W.
We get the followingresults:
15
7rB 7r D
PCB = 7[B "_- _BA < O, ],,LED = 7rD -}- _DA < O,
_CA _- 7rB -t- 7r C -_- 7r D -_- _BA Jr- ]_DA < O.
Proposition 3 When, there is a strong positive correlation between types (T:ATr C -- 7rB Tr D > _B_--I_
), the non local downward ICC is binding, and the solution is separable: qD A B'-- _A
----ql,q2 ---- ¢/2,
qC = qf , qC = q2D. C gets his first best allocation and qD, qA, q_, qA are downwards distorted.
The optimal quantities are:
qD= =
= qlc = th,
qD= q2c :
We have to check that all the Lagrange multipliers are negative under the condition
7rBTr D
7[A7[C -- 7[B7[ D > --
-- 7[A
and itisindeedthe case.Conditionson quantitiesto satisfythe ICC arealwaystrueinthiscase.
For such a distribution,the optimal solutiondoes not generate perfectscreeningand the
allocationsdo not requirethe kind of form of bundling mentioned pre_dously:for each type,
the unitpricechargedon a good does not depend on the consumed quantityof the other good.
Optimal quantitiesdepend on the marginal distributionof types. But we stillhave the usual
unidimensionalresult:pricesaregreaterthan marginal costs,exceptatthe top ofthedistribution
where they are equal.
4.2.3 The Regular Asymmetric Case
Now we assume that the other condition for R.S.C to be solution( 7rATrC--TrB_r D > --{&t2_2arD{arC-_"
-- k Atl ] "' \" J
_rD) , i.e.,/_cs < 0) is no longer satisfied. In this case, we obtain a solution in which C is not
attracted to B (_CB = 0). We call it the regular asymmetric case (Regular because only down-
ward or leftward ICC can be binding and Asymmetric because there is no attraction between
B and C, whereas D attracts C)(see diagram 3) .
Diagram 3 enables to compute the indirect utility levels and we get:
U A = 0,
U B = Atxq_,
Uv = At2q A,
U c = Atlqlgl + At_cfi42.
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TheF.O.Cgive:
Weget the follo_/ngresults:
--_tDA -+-#CD = 76D,
_tCD = --7;C.
_tBA _ --TrB
_t DA --_ -- TffD -- 7[ C
#CD = __C
Now we have to check thatB isnot attractedby C. _ iseq-ivalentto:
_t_(_ -_) < m__(q_-_),
and this condition implies after computations that:
.At2 _27rD(TrA 7rc
The same condition applies to show that B is not attracted to D.
_t2 2 A 7rC 9rD_ __( Zit2 _2vrD [ vrCProposition 4 When 7rATrc -- 7rB_ D 6 [--(ml ) 7rD(Tr + + ,' ,z_tl, - ,- + _rD)] the
solution is regular asymmetric: B and C receive their first best allocation, whereas q_, , q_ , q_2 are
distorted downwards.
The optimal quantities are:
H
4=_ _+_7rA At2,
7rC
qf=6 - V_t_,
q_=_,
qC=th,
q_=_.
Note that D is not attracted to B if:
__ _B_.D _>_ __(_!1 )2_.B(,.TA "4- T "C "4-_=c
_).
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If wehadnot assumedthat Atlr, B > At2:r D, we would have obtained the same condition for
B and D to not attract each other.
In this case the unidimensiona/qualitative properties are almost satisfied. For the good 1, the
usual results axe satisfied in the sense that the downward local ICC are binding ( C is attracted
to D, and B is attracted to A). This is not the case on the market of good 2: D is attracted to
A, but C is not attracted to B. We also have to notice that two different types get their first
best allocation(these types pay prices equal to marginal costs) and perfect screening is obtained
in this optima/solution.
__ (Z_t2)27[D(TrC "+" 7/'9), the Lagrange multipliers are allUnder this condition, r,ATrc -- 7rBrcD > --_z tl
non positive, and conditions on quantities are all satisfied.
4.2.4 The Singular Case
Now we assume that rcAlrC-- :rBrcD < --(-_t_ )2rrD (_rA+ :rC+ lrD), i.e., (Atl (qD--q A) < At2( qC--q2 A)
is not satisfied anymore), and B is now attracted to C and D.This condition also means that
/kt 1 7rATr C At 2
_S > -t-
-- /kt 1 +At2 7[D Atl +At2"
In this case the solution is singular: surprisingly, the transverse and an upward ICC are binding
(see diagram 4).
Diagram 4 enables to compute the indirect utility levels and we get:
U A = O,
U B = Atlq A = Atlq D -- Atlq D + U D:
U D -- Atzq_2,
u = z t,q + = +
The F.0.C and the conditions on quantities give:
We get the following results:
_BD "]-]_CD -- #DA = 7rD,
--#BA -- _BC -- _BD -_-.fiB,
#BC -- I_CD = 7[C,
qC = qD,
Atl(qD _ qA) = At2(qD _ qA).
We check the sign of #ijs:
#sc = IZB___9_D---.
7[C 9TD #Be = --0_C and #BD = --8TgD,
#cm _- --(1 + 0)7rC and #DA ----" --(1 -J- 0)(7[ C + 7[m),
and #BA = --TrB + O(_C + _m).
#CD j- #BD #BA ] [_BD PDA ]71.m @ -- = (At2) 2 "_--- gives the following for 0,71.A t'-_ 71.A
O= (_rBrcD -- lrA_rC)At_ -- At_rD(1 -- _rB) <_ 0 by assumption.
At21(Tr C 2t- 7rD)(7[ A -_- 7[ D _- At27cD(1 -- 7rB)
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_,,_en _TBTrD< t_._2_D/_A + _rC + r,D) the o.1o,+_., is o_._.,,7._ BProposition 5 "_ _A_c - -_1 J " _"
gets his first best allocation and C attracts B. As a consequence qC is distorted upwards. D also
attracts B and consequently q_2 is distorted upwards.
All the conditions on the quantities are always satisfied for such distributions.
In this solution, it is optimal, for the monopolist, to price below the marginal cost on good 2
for types C and D and to give the first best allocation to an '%utermediary" type, t3_pe B.
The intuition for upward distortions is as follows: proportion of type B is so high that it
is in the seller's interest to extract maximum surplus from them and thus sell them their first
best a/location. But the seller has also to prevent types B from choosing the a/locations offered
to other types, in particular type C. In order to reduce competition between qC and qD, it is
therefore optimal to increase q_2 above the first best level.
To sum up, here are the four solutions of the monopolist's problem:
• rcA_rc- 7rs7rD 6 [_!, --(_-_,_)27rD(TrA + 7rc + _rD)] : Singular Solution.
• _A_c_ :_D e [_(_)2_(_ + _c+ _ _:_D:_c,, '_*,, , + _D)]: Regular Asymmetric
Solution.
• 9TA_ "C -- _BTrD e [--(_---_,)2_D(71"C---D'_ "B'D'I-,- ), _-'-;:r-] : Regular Symmetric Solution.
[_BTrD
• wATF c -- 7FB_ D 6 [ _--_X--, 1] :Separable Solution.
We have seen that, in our problem, four possible solutions exist depending on the correlation
of types. Dana (1993) a/so finds solutions depending on the correlation of types but only gets
two since he assumes that At_ = At2 and 7rB = 7rD.
4.3 Complete Solution: the case of a Uniform Discrete Distribution
and p6 ]-1, 1[
We assume:
7rA = _.C = _C
2'
Ws=_ m= (l-e)
2
See Appendix 2 and figure 4.
We have obtained four solutions in the previous section: we call respectively A,C,D,E the
singular case, the regular asymmetric case, the regular symmetric case and the separable case.
We obtain ten other solutions (see diagrams) depicted in figure 4. Two constraints are always
binding: for all (e, p) the individual rationality constraint of types A (not surprising) and IC(AD)
that is D is al_ys attracted to A. Two other constraints never bind: IC(CA) and IC(CD).
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Therearetwosolutions(GandN) wherethesellerneveroffersafirst bestallocation.V_rhat-
everthetype is,the allocationis distorted.
Wego fromD to C when _cB becomes positive, then IC(BC) is not binding anymore.
We go from C to A when IC(CB), IC(DB) fail, then they are binding.
We go from A to B when _BD becomes positive.
We go from D to E when IC(AC) fails.
We go from E to F when #cs becomes positive.
We go from F to G when IC(CB), IC(BC) fail.
We go from G to H when #CB becomes positive.
We go from H to M when #SA becomes positive.
We go from M to N when IC(BC) fails.
We go from D to K when IC(DB) fails.
We go from K to J when #co becomes positive.
We go from J to I when _BA becomes positive.
4.3.1 Case B
An upward ICC is binding (B is attracted to C). As a consequence, qC is distorted upwards for
the same reasons than in case A. B gets his first best allocation.
4.3.2 Case F
B and C get their first best allocation, qD is not distorted, whereas q_l, qD, qA are distorted
downwards. The solution is separable on the market of good 1 (the solution is separable on the
market of good _ means: t_ = tj -_ q_ = _): q_l = qD < qB = qC.
4.3.3 Case G
This solution is similar to the case E solution, but B is attracted to C. This means that
qA _ q2_ = q2e whereas qD is optimal. The solution is not globally separable anymore, but it is
still separable on the market of good 1. In this case, the seller never offers a first best allocation.
4.3.4 Case H
B does not attract C, but is attracted to C. As a consequence qC is distorted upwards and the
solution is separable for the good 1. B gets his first best allocation even if rB becomes relatively
small (when e increases).
4.3.5 Case I
The downward local ICC are only binding on the market of good 2: C is attracted to B and D
is attracted to A. The transverse ICC is also binding (B is attracted to D). As a consequence
we obtain this condition on the quantities obtained by types B and D :
C gets his first best allocation.
4.3.6 Case J
C gets his first best allocation and we obtain the following conditions on quantities:
At,(qf - ¢)= - ¢),
Atl( - > At (q -
2O
4.3.7 Case K
This solution is similar to the regular symmetric case but the transverse ICC is binding. This
solution differs from the case D solution because we obtain:
q_l <q D <q_l <qC,
B and D receive the same quantity of good 2.
4.3.8 Case L
.Thp so_!uti__n differs from the case K one because q_2 > _ and B gets his first best, allocation.
As in case C, the proportion of type B is so high that it is in the seller's interest to offer them
their first best allocation to extract the maximum surplus from them.
4.3.9 Case M
B gets his first best allocation whereas C receives an upwards distorted allocation. It is surprising
in this case, as in the case H (especially the South-East of the H area), because the proportion
of buyers of type B is relatively small. The solution is separable for the good 1.
4.3.10 Case N
The seller does not offer any first best allocation. The solution is separable for the good 1. For
the market of good 2, D receives his first best allocation and
q_2= q_2.
5 The Equivalent Approach
In our simple model (discrete distribution of four _2aes of buyers, 1Anear utilities in money), _
defined the global solution to the monopolist's problem: we defined the allocations and rents for
each solution. To do so, following Spence (80)we maximize the expected profit of the seller under
Individual Rationality Constraints (IRC) and Incentive Compatibility Constraints (ICC); we
decompose the problem into two subproblems:
• minimize the agents's expected utilities for fixed allocations
• Choose the allocation so as to maximize the expected surplus minus the expected utilities
Rents are defined so that IRC and ICC are satisfied and computed according to the binding
constraints (or attractions, see Border-Sobel (87)).
These attractions allow us to define optimal paths from a D'pe of agent to a dummy type
(the '_owest type", type A in chapter 2 ) that enable to compute these rents. Thanks to Rochet
(87) that shows that closed paths (from a type of agents to himself) do not increase expected
utility (and axe thus non optimal), _e know that the rents defined by optimal paths from a tTpe
to the dummy type axe optimal.
Once we know the solution and the optimal rents _ can write the monopolist's problem as:
• Compute the optimal rents according to binding constraints.
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• maximizetheexpectedprofit of the sellerunderthe constraintsthat eachtype of agents
getshisoptimalrent.
Thisnewformulationoftheseller'sproblem,theequivalentproblemhereafter,whichofcourse
leadsto the samesolution,enablesto explaindistortionsin resourceallocation. Distortions
dependonoptimalpathsandmoreespeciallyof the length(the numberof type involvedin the
path) andthe numberof theseoptimalpathsthat definea solution.
After somebriefremarkson the aboveresults,westudythe equivalentproblemandexplain
the wayallocationsaredistorted. WeconfirmRochet-Chone(1998)that definesthe setsof
agentswhodo participateas: i) a set of types who get no rent: this set is in fact reduced to a
singleton, ii) a set of types who get strictly positive rents and iii) a set of types who get strictly
positive rents and their first best allocations. Wethen study the Regular Symmetric Case (
see case D in section 4) to show the equivalence of the two problems and to explain distortions
in resource allocations. V_re also study the general solution ( defined in section 4) and define
several sets of solutions: ordered types, called Pure Cases ( solutions that enables to define
a complete type ordering implying uniqueness of rents), single optimum, called Almost Pure
Cases( uniqueness of rents and partial type ordering), several optima, regular solutions ( only
downward binding ICC), singular solutions ( some upward or transverse ICC are binding). We
also exhibit two special cases in which the monopolist only produces one good and this is closed,
but not equivalent, to Armstrong (96) who shows that it is sometimes optimal for the monopolist
to exclude some customers from its products in order to extract more revenue from other higher
value consumers.
5.1 Remarks
As defined in Border-Sobel (87), we say that j attracts i when IC(i, j) is binding. These attrac-
tions (who attracts whom?) are crucial for determining distortions in resource allocation and
also to compute rents. If j attracts i we can define Ui as a function of U j and q/. If j is attracted
by another type, say k, we can define his rent as a function of U k and qk and so on. If j is not
attracted by any other type, this means that j is the dummy type or lowest type and his IRC
is binding (see section 4).
A path is defined as a way to reach the dummy type from another type ( _dth one or several
steps from type to type). An optimal path from one type to another is defined as a succession of
attractions from one type to the dummy. As successions of attractions always lead to the dummy
type (see section 4), we can compute the set of rents using backward induction. This means that
the set of possible paths defines the set of possible rents and the set of optimal paths defines a
solution and the optimal rents associated to this solution.
Example: i is attracted to j and j is attracted to the dummy type, say k. This defines the
optimal paths Vi = {i _ j ---, k}, 9,j = {j --, k} . Then, we have:
u' = uJ + u(t', ¢) - u(t , qJ)
uJ = u k+  (tJ, ¢) - u(t ¢)
U k = 0
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then,weobtain:
U_ = u(t i, qJ) - u(t j, qJ) + u(tfi, qk) _ u(t.e, fie)
Uj = u(t j, qk) _ u(tk, q_)
Uk=0.
This enables to solve the first subproblem of the monopolist's problem: "minirniT_ expected
utilities". We can then define a set of rents U(q) such that ICC are satisfied for all i,j and the
rent of the lowest type is zero. According to these attractions, we can say that j is an immediate
successor of i and also an immediate predecessor of j. This also means that for any optimal path
we are able to define an ordered type subset where {i --* j -* k} is equivalent to:
i_j_'k.
Consequently for any solution, _e can reorganize T into a partition of ordered subsets T.
We define as closed paths, successions of attractions that leads one type to himself. Using
Lemmas from Rochet (87): considering arbitrary paths in the set of types T, a path from type t i
to tJ is denoted by a function 7. We denote the "length" of "y :{0, 1,.2}-* T. Finally, we say
that a path oflengthlis closed if: 7(0) = 7(I).
Lemma 1: U(q) is non-empty if and only if for every closed path "_ :
l--1
u(t,¢,+,, - q:¢,))< o.
k==O
Lemma 2: When the above condition is satisfied, U(q) has a unique element U , character-
ized for all i by:
1--1
U4_ = sup y_ u(t_(k+l), q_(k)) -- u(t_(k), q_(k))
"t k==O
where the sup is taken over all the possible open paths from type ti to the dummy type, whose
utility is zero.
This means that rents computed according to optimal paths from a type to the dummy one
are optimal. On the one hand, these rents do not depend on the distribution of types but only
on the set of types. On the other hand, quantities and distortions, on which depends these rents,
depend on the distribution of types (see section 4).
5.2 The Monopolist's Equivalent Problem
As we know how to compute the optimal rents according to optimal paths, we can now _u'ite the
monopolist's problem as:
Max E _ri(u(ti' qi) _ C(qi) _ U_i)
i
l-1
s/e-U_i= sup _ u(t,,(k+l),q_.,(k))- u(t,,(k),q_,,(k))for all i.
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Fromsection4, weknowthat whateverthe solution:
uA=o.
We can explain this as follows: at least for one type, A in our model, the IRC is binding. Since
adding a uniform fee in the price schedule does alter the ICC and increases the seller's profit,
it's optimal for the monopolist to give no rent to the dummy type.
We also know that there are usually several ways to compute the optimal rents of the other
types. There exists as many ways to compute these rents as the number of possible optimal
paths from one type to the dummy type.
For example, if there exists two possible optimal paths from type t c to t A, "71C through B and
_/Cthrough D, there are clearly two expressions for U c. In this particular example, the Regular
Symmetric Case, we have:
=
+
uc( c) = +
This means that in this particular case, there are two constraints on type t c : the constraint
U c = maxUC(3,c) for all _/c
-- .),C
is equivalent to:
u_C=uC(
or
u_ c= fuC( f) + ocuc( f),
considering _c like 'the probability that type t c chooses path r e to reach the dummy type".
Once we know the solutions, we are able to identify, for all types, all the possible expressions
of the optimal rents in each solution. To solve the monopolist's problem, we have to define for
all solutions, the set of possible optima/paths: for solution s E s*, we define -y(s) as the set of
possible paths. In _/(s), we define for all # all the possible paths to reach t A as "/i(s):
' '72-..'Y,} if there are n possible optimal paths from ti to t A.
7(s) = {'_'_, for all i, for all possible optimal paths p}.
i from t _Notice that if type t_ _ t i belongs to one of the optimal paths _/v to t A, this means
i between t j and t A defines an optimal path between these two types andthat the truncation of "_p
also an expression of the optimal rent of type tj. From the above example, this means that an
expression of U_B is:
U B = AtxqA,
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sinceB belongs to 7 C and an expression of U_D is:
since D belongs to .yC.
To refer to the above formulation of the monopolist's problem, we define a type ordering for
e2zh optimal path. _,_ defines the follo_ng t_pe ordering:
C_B_A
this means that in this optimal paths B is the immediate successor of C and A is the immediate
successor of B and _ defines the ,,_uique 32; 7_ defines the foLlo_q_ng b_pe_ ordering:
C_D_A
this means that in this optimal paths D is the immediate successor of C and A is the immediate
successor of D and this defines the unique ._.D. We can reorganize T into a partition of ordered
subsets T :
TI={C,B,A},
T2={C,D,A}.
As _/c is of length 2 (l = 2), we can define:
l--1
k==O
where k = 2 represents the highest type, C in this example, k = 1 represents the immediate
successor to the highest type in the optimal path 7 c, B and k = 0 represents the dummy type,
A. We also define:
l--1
U c(_,c)= Z u(t_(k+1),q,_(k))- u(t_._(k),q,_(k)(k))
k=O
where k = 2 representsthe highesttype, C in thisexample, k = 1 representsthe immediate
successorto the highesttype inthe optimal path 7,c, D and k = 0 representsthe dummy _'pe,
A.
The Lagrangian of the problem can now be written as:
L(U, q)= Z{_r'(u(t', q') - C(q') - U_') - Z A_-(U_' - D"(')_)}
i j
= Z{cr'(u(t" qi) _ C(q')- U')
i
l-1
- - -
j k==0
where A_.represents the non positive multipliers associated to the constraints on the optimal rent
of type t i computed along the optimal path -y_.
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Thefirst orderconditions(whicharenecessaryandsufficientfor this linearprogram)give:
OL
= -Td-_-_&}=0, for alli,OU _ J
,_ = - _ _, for a_4==:_ i,
J
and:
cOqicO-Li= 7riOS(ti,Oqiq') + Y_k#i_a AjkcOUk(7_)_q/= O, for8/Ii,
as(#,¢) 1 auk(._)
Oqi lr' = for all i.
_,ai j
We make the sum for all k # i as closed paths are not optimal. This means that there exists
no (classical) solution when two types attract each other (see special cases in section 6, in which
the monopolist only produces good 1). We also have:
°uk('Y_)= (<1 _ t,), for alli.
Oqi
%¥e can also write the Lagrangian of the problem as:
L(U, q)= _ {rri(u(t i, q_) - C(q _) - U_ i) - Ai Z a} (U-i - Ui(7_ )}
j
=_ {.'(_(t', ¢) - c(¢) - u_ i)
i
l-1
-_' _ o}[u_i - (___,u%(k+,, %,k))- u%(k), q,_(k)(_)))] ,
j k=0
where Ai is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint: the optimal rent of type t i is a combination
of all the possible rents U i ("/_) which can be chosen by types t _ who reach t A along the optimal
path 7_with probability a_ :
U _=_--_ a}(U_ _ i_ - U (7_.1,
J
J
for all i and j,
In this case we obtain as first order conditions:
OL
= -:,r'-)d_-_'e_ O, for alli,OU _ J
_ri = -Aifor all i,
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and:
OL i OS(t i, qi) arTkl_.k_W
_i j 7r oj _ =0, foralli,
k ,kOS(e,¢) 1 x-. k _OU (_j)
*=* W -7 2 =for= L_, _ a_i.
5.3 Optimal Resource Allocations
The first order conditions with respect to qi give:
os(¢,¢) I ._ou_(_)
0q, ,fo an ,
where i belongs to one of the optimal paths that links t3_pes t k to the dummy type. If types t i
do not belong to an)" optimal paths, this means that it does not attract an3" types. In this case,
._ou_(_)
=o
and the first order condition gives:
OS(t i, qi) = 0
0¢
and Wpes P obtain their first best allocation.
In our setting, when p = O, the first order conditions can be written as:
OS(t i, qi) rk ,_
_o_ (%)
= rri Oq i +Y_E$; 0---_ =0, forallianda=l,2,
J
• OUk(_.k_
.=. _,(ti _ qi ) + y_ E Ak _ ' '_' = O,for all i and a = 1.2,
_¢i j 3 Oqi
e=_rri(t i, _ _ qi) + .._, _ - t_) = O.for, all i and a = 1,2,
J
_ y_E _k(t '+1 '*=*q_ = t_+ .._._. -- t_),for all i and a = 1,2,
¢=_qi = ti + -, oit % - t_),for all i and a = 1,2
k¢_ j
The surplus function is assumed to be convex, differentiable in q and has, for all t, a unique
maximum _(t). The set of O(t) will be used as a benctmaark for evaluating the distortions in
resource allocations entailed by the monopoly power under bidimensional adverse selection; the
first best allocation is:
O(t_) = ti., for all i and a = 1, 2,
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anddistortions:
ti ^ i
- q(t
..j___ - t_),for all i and a = 1,2,
*=*q(t_) A , A(q,t') -t'
-q(t_) = ----fi (t_+1 _), for all i and a = 1, 2
where:
k
k#i j
=- _r aj <_O
k¢i j
which depends on q (see section 4).
The distortion in q(t_) can be seen as a ratio between the weighted sum of the differences
between P's predecessor and t / and the proportion of types ti in the population. The weights are
represented by A_, Langrange multiplier associated to the constraint:
u_ k - = o.
Even if ),(q, t _) is always negative, the sign of the distortion depends on the sign of It_+1 -P]:
upwards distortion if it is positive, downwards otherwise. The sign of the distortion of type
ti's allocation only depends on its predecessor's type. If type t is attracted to type # (t i is Ps
immediate successor) and if there exists a good a such t_ - t / < 0, then:
=
^ i
q(ti_) > q(t,).
This generalizes the result of no distortion at. the top of the distribution: the highest type
who attracts no other type, gets his first best allocation. The intuition for upward distortion:
if the proportion of type t is high it might be interesting for the monopolist's to extract the
maximum surplus from type t _ and thus sell them their first best allocation. In this case, the
seller has also to prevent type t from choosing the other types's allocations and especially his
immediate successor's allocation, q(t-1). To reduce competition between q(t-) and q(t-_) it might
be therefore optimal for the seller to increase q(f21) above the first best level and this is the case
when:
t-_'l > ta.
• We call Pure Case a solution such that there is for the highest type an optimal path
which runs through all of the types (and also unique since no closed paths are optimal),
this means that we can define a unique ordered subset T E T. We can then rank these
types from t °, the dummy type to t-, the highest type:
T= {t°,P...,t-}.
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This also means that if there are T types, the longest optimal path, from t to t o is of length
T - 1. And for all optimal path of length I _e have:
_(l- 1) c _,(z),foran z= {1,...,T- 1}
In this particular case, the first order conditions give:
OL
OU_ = -or i - Ai = 0, for all i,
¢==_ Ai = __ri, for all i,
1 _(t':'- t_),for an_=d _= 1,2,q(t_) - 4(t2) = _r
k>i
¢=_q(t i_) _ ^ i 1 -- _-_k<i_¢rk (t_+l ti =q(t_) = lri - _), for all i and a 1, 2.
As a consequence,
S_(t i, qi):
In this particular case, as in the classic one-dimensional case, $(q, t i) does not depend on
q,
)_(q, ti ) = 1 - )-_'_<i _rk, for all i.
7r i
the subproblem 2 can be solved by maximizing the virtual surplus
&(t',qi)=S(ti, qi) - $(q,t')[u(t'+l,q ') - u(t',qi)], for all i,
S.(t i, q,) = S(t i, qi) 1 - _k<, Irk [ti+l _ t,]qi, for all i
7£i
&({, q)= s({,q).
where { is the highest type, nobody's successor. This generalizes the result of no distortion
at the top of the distribution. But this does not imply that allocations are only downward
distorted.
• _re call Almost Pure Case a solution such that there is a single optimal path to compute
the rent of each type, this does not mean, as above, that there exists a single optimal path
running through all the types. This means that we can define several ordered subsets, say
J:
T = {T1, T2...Ta},
and for every Tj we can rank its types from t°, the dummy type in Tj to [j, the highest
type in Tj. t ° = t o for all j. T is such that :
T_n T_n... n Tj = {t°}.
This shows an important result (which is valid for all solutions, not only almost pure cases):
Proposition 6 whatever the solution, the set of types that participate and get no rent is
always a singleton, the dummy type, if all the quantities served by the monopolist are strictly
positive.
29
o the lowesttype in Tj and t o the lowestTo show this, imagine there are two such types, tj
type in Tj, as nobody attracts them, we have (which is also equivalent to say that attract each
other, i.e, a closed path exists between to and to):
We also have:
for all i, i + 1, k
- q(t°) =
for all i, i + l,k E janda=l,2.
As above, )_(q, #) does not depend on q
(to o o" = ti)qi = O,
uo_ (to_ o 0= tj)qj = 0,
t oqjO = qiO = 0 for all (ti° - 5-) # 0.
If (t,° -t_,) > 0, this means that _ is upwards distorted and qjO is downwards distorted, then
we have:
qiO > qi__0> _o > qjO,
which cannot be satisfied with:
q O=0qia.
As a consequence, qjO = qO = O(QED). Then we define by 13_the length of the optimal path
of type t _in subset Tj, _ the length of the longest one and by 7(lj) this optimal path from ti
to t°.This means that for all i # 0, there exists a unique -y(_) running through V. And for all
optimal path of length li we have:
7(lj - i) C _(Zj), for all t = {i, ...,_),
J
In this case, the first order conditions give:
OL
= -rr i-A i=0, for alli,
OU_
*==_ Ai " for all i,--71 -_ '
q(t_) ^ i 1 _-, rk(ti+l i
- q(t_) = -- - t=),
7ri L...¢ _ a
k>i
E janda=l,2,
1 - Ek<i zrk (t2+1 t_)
7/.i
A(q,t i) = -(1 - Elrk)'f°r all i,i + 1, k • j.
k_<i
As a consequence, the subproblem 2 can be solved by maximizing the virtual surplus:
S_(ti, qi)=S(ti, qi) 1 - _;_k<i rk[u(ti+l,qi ) _ u(ti, qi)], for all i # tj,
T; i
S_(tj,qj)=S(tj, q3) for all j.
3O
• In a muchmorecomplexsolution,in whichsometypescanreachthe dummytype _,ith
severaloptimalpaths,wecanalso define several ordered subsets T1, T_...Tj but
T1 n T2 n... n ¢={t°},
the intersection of all these ordered subsets is not reduced to a singleton. In this case,
/,:6=i j
depends on q. Wre can notice that:
and
4 E_i -rr-=- a j, for all z,
J
J
_-_a} = 1, for all i
J
which means that:A} e [-Tri,O], for all i,j. a} can be seen as the probability that type
t i chooses the optimal path j to reach the dummy type. These constraints on Lagrange
multipliers are crucial to determine the general solution of the monopolist's problem. The
study of the Regular Symmetric Case in the following subsection is an example. We can
also notice that in this kind of solution:
_(q, t i) > --(1 -- y_ rrk), for all i, i + 1, k E rn,
k<i
A(q, ti) >- y_ y_ r_a_.
k_ j
Then the part of the distortions in resource allocations due to optimal paths starting from
t k is _rrk (Ak = _rrk). Then the part of the distortions in qi due to type t k is:
e 0].
As a consequence, we can write distortions as:
k¢_ j
where _a# E]0, 7rk[ if there exists at least two optimal paths from t k going through t i,
7rka_ = 7r_ if there is only one such path, and 7rk¢{ = 0 if no paths runs trough t i (in
• Z
this case there exists at ]east one J such that t' = t j). This generalizes the result of no
distortion at the top of the distribution in each Tj.
This confirms a result of Rochet-Chone (98) saying that for any solution we can define several
ordered subsets Ta defining several sets of agents (in our simple model we do not obtain as they
do the set of agents who do no participate and get nothing):
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asetT o (reduced to a singleton):
T o = {t °, for all j } = {t°}.
where t3° is the lowest type in subset T3. The element of T O gets a rent U_°.
U°=O.
a set T = {#} for all i such that:
U i>O,
q(ti)# O(#).
• asserT
_= {_j,for all/I,
• where tj is the highest type in subset Tj.Every element in T is such that:
U_ -j > O,
q(_-_)= O(_-j).
5.4 The Regular Symmetric Case in the Equivalent Problem
The monopolist produces two goods with the following cost function:
1
C(q) = _(_ + q_)
and wants to sells these two goods to a heterogenous population of four type: We denote these
types by letter i = A, B, C, D.
t_ = (tl, 4), (='_),
t s = (t),t[), (_rs),
t C = (t_,t_), (_rC),
t D l h
= (tl, t2), @D),
and t h - t_ = Ate, for a = 1, 2. Buyers utilities are quasilinear:
u' = u(t',ql,q_)- p(ql,q_)- E,
u( ti, ql, q2) i i i i= tlq _ + t2q5,
piqi i i " "= Pl ql + P_2q_.
This solution is such that, C is attracted to B and D and A attracts B and D. We can then
define two optimal paths from C to A, one running through B, the other through D. This defines
7 c = {C --- B _ A} and 7 C = {C --- D --. A}. Consequently, we can define two ordered subsets
T1 = {t A, t B, t c} and T2 = {t A, tD, t C} and two expressions for U c .
U C (7 c) = At2q2BU_ B,
UC(Tc)=Atlq D +U D
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asB and D are immediate successor of C. As A is the immediate successor of B :
u_B = Atlq_,
and also the immediate successor of D :
U_ D = At2q_ .
Then:
gC(,_c) = at2_ + A4_,
U'_(3'2) = At_ + ,St2q_.
In this case the monopolist problem can be written as:
Max Z 7ri(u(ti' q') - C(q') - U ')
i
s/c :U_ A= O,(AA),
:U_B = _tx@, (A_),
:U_ D = _t2@, (AD),
:u_C = At,ff + At,@.(),[).
The constraint on U c can also be written as:
u_C=._LF(_f) + _2g_(_f),
O"1 -_-_2 = I_
G1 =0".
The first order conditions give:
OL
OU _ = -_-'- _ _,_= o, for_Ui,
i
AA = -n -A,
AB = -'r B,
¢=_ AD= __z,,
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and
OL
oq,.
_ lriOS(t_,q _) ,kOUk('Y_)
oq,. +_ Z__ _ - o,fo__l _and_= _,2
OL = _A(ff_ _) + (h" + h_)ZXtl= O,
Oq---(
Oz = _(t# - _) + (h_ + h°_)!,t_,
<==>_
OL =_.B(t f_qB) =0,
"¢==_Oq-----(
OL = rc'(t_ - qB) + (hC)At2 = 0,
OL = lrC(tc _ qC) = O,
¢:::::vOq--'_
OL = Irc (tC _ qC ) =0,
¢::=_ 0-'-_2
OL
Oq----_ = 7rD(tD1 --q£1:191)+ (h2C)Atl = 0,
OL
.<=_o---4p_= (t_-_) = o.
To define the solution, we have to determine the value of the non positive Lagrange multipliers.
We still have two unknowns, h e, h e and only one equation hc+h C = -Tr C. The missing equation
is obtained by:
uC(_) = uc(_)
At2q_ + Atlq_l = Atlq D + At2q_2,
.=_ At,(q; - _) = At_(q_"- q¢)
We write quantity as functions of A1c and define its value with the above equation: if paths .yc
and .),c are both optimal they provide the same rent.
7rA
7( A
q_=t_+ h_A.
(___C __ AC) At1,
Solving Atl(q D - qA) = At2(q# -- qA) we obtain:
._r B _- lrc 1 1 1
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Thisdefinesasolutionif all A_ are non positive. We obtain the condition already found in chapter
2 according to the non positi_vy of the Lagrange multipliers:
A_ - c
_A_rc -- _ > ---r-_¢(_ + _D).
The other conditions that must be checked by the model are such that: If type t i is attracted by.
its immediate successor t i-1 we have:
U i - U i-I = (t i - ti-1)q i-l,
and if t i-1 is n_ a_racted to t i _,'C h2.ve:
u_ _-_ - u__ _> (t'-1 - t')¢,
¢=* U_ i - u_i-1 < (t i _ ti-1)qi,
¢==_ (P - ti-1)q'-I < (t i - t'-l)q ',
and we obtain, as in chapter 2:
7r A
In this solution, q_l, qlc, qC q_2 are equal to the optimal resource allocation, q¢1,q_2,q_2, _ are
downward distorted. The distortions Dis are:
--7I" B(-_ + Af),_t_ (- "_ - _c)._t_,--_zxt_ ,D_l = 7r A E 7t.A
- f - e _-##=
-_-_'gAt2,
--Tr C
_r D •
and for all i = {.4, B, C, D} and _ = {1, 2}, D_ _< 0, since for every optimal path defining an
ordered subset, we always have:
t_+1 _> ti_, for all i,a.
We can explain distortions as follows:
• Type t s is attracted to t A, and only t A,
then the weight of the distortion on q_l due to type tB's attraction is
mTi-B"
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Type t D is attracted to t A, and only t A,
tDl = t A,
D A
t 2 > t 2 ,
then the weight of the distortion on qA (due to type tD's attraction is
--TT D.
• Type t c is attracted to t B, and also t D. Then the part of the distortion due to type tC's
attraction is
--Tf C.
This weight is split between distortions explained by 7 C and 7 c. This means that we can
define distortions as:
D¢- (__B _ a:rc) Atl
,irA
DA= (__D _ _rc(1 _ a)) At2,
_-A
--(711C .
= -7 xt2,
w_C _l
D ° = - ajAtl,
"ITD
where a E ]0, 1[ depends on q,
U_c = auC (TC) + (1 - o)UC('yc),
and can be seen as the "probability" that type tc chooses paths -yc={C --. B --_ A} to
reach the dummy type, (1 - a) for %c. This means that a weight -aTr c is dedicated to DeB
and D1A and a weight -(1 - a)_ c is dedicated to D D and D #. Types t B and t D have only
one path to reach t A, so the probability that they choose these paths is one. Consequently,
the weight -Tr B is totally dedicated to D A and the weight -:r D is totally dedicated to D A.
Even if, on each route, there are only two levels of demand of services, the airline in this
case has to propose 3 levels of services on each route. In this particular example, we have the
following solution:
q_=qf >q_>q_l
qC=q2D > q2B > q2A
which means 3 levels of services on each route.
Customers C receive their first best allocation of services on each route. They fly first on
routes 1 and 2. Customers B fly first on route 1 and fly "above economy" on route 2. Customers
D fly first on route 2 and fly "above economy" on route 1. Customers A fly economy on both
routes. We can also think about services that can be provided outside the aircraft to allow the
airline to offer the same level of services on board to customers B and A on route 1, and D and
A on route 2.
In the following section, we study the set of solutions s* = {a, b...n} already defined in section
4 as cases {A,B...N}.
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6 The Solution (2) and implications for service allocation in the air-
line industry.
In this section we use the set of solutions defined in section 4, in which characteristics are such
that:
t =4,t =6,
At1 = 2,
t'.=4,t =5,
At2 = 1,
and types are distributed as follows:
and
7FA__ 7I.C ----- E
2'
=8=to = (1 - e)
2 '
pe]-:,:[.
Even ff there are only two levels of demand of services (high or low), as the optimal pricing
policy requires a form of bundling, the optimal resource allocation often requires 3 levels of
services, sometimes 4 on each route.
6.1 Pure Case
A Pure Case is a solution such that there is a ,unique optimal path of length which _runs through
all of the types defining a unique ordered partition T of T. As a consequence, this also defines
a unique optimal path for each Lype and consequently a unique expression for each rent.
Solution i (case I in section 4) is the only Pure Case in the set of solutions. The attractions
are as follows: C is attracted to B, who is attracted to D, who is attracted to A. _,Ve can then
say that C _- B _- D >- A. _Ve can thus define:
T= {A,D,B,C}.
In this case, we have:
u__B=/ktlq£1)l - /kt2q_2 + mt2q_2,
U D = At2q_2 ,
U A=O.
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andquantitiesare:
- t A,
rA - _rc) At2
qff=tf + - =c)atl,
7r D
7rc + 7rB
qB=tf ,
_Tr C
q2B = tf + --_ At2,
qC=tC,
qC=tC.
This solution is singular as a quantity is upward distorted. As distortions depend on the prede-
cessor's type, qD is upward distorted: B is attracted to D so distortions in qD are positive when
t D > t B and negative otherwise:
tD < tls _ Df < O,
ty > tf Dy > o.
As a consequence,
qC=q_l >qt>qD,
q_>qC > q_2 > q_4.
Again in this case, customers C fly first on both routes. Surprisingly, customers D fly "above
first" on route 2 and economy on route 1. Customers B fly first on route one and "above
economy" on route 2. Customer A fly economy on route 2 and "above economy" on route 2.
6.2 Almost Pure Case
An Almost Pure Case is a solution such that there is a single optimal paths to compute the
rent of each type. There exist several distinct optimal paths such that every type has one and
only optimal path running through it.
Solution c (case C, Regular Asymmetric Case in section 4) is the only Almost Pure Case
in the set of solutions. The attractions are as follows: C is attracted to D, who is attracted
to A, and B is attracted to A. We can then say that C >- D >- A and B >- A._Ve can thus
define: T1 = {A,D,C} and T2 = {A,B} defining: ._.c = {C --* D --* A},q 'D = {D --* A} and
3,B= {B-+ A}.
The set of optimal rents is accordingly as follows:
u_c = Atlq_ + At2q_2,
U_ a = At2qlA,
U_ D = At2q A,
U A=0.
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This solutionis regularandquantitiesare:
#=#+
_rA At2,
(__D _ r:c),:xt2 '
7( A
__C
 =tf,
#=if,
qr=tf,
Cand B are the highest type in the respective ordered subsets T1 and T2. As a consequence, C
and B obtain their first best allocations.
_e have the following solution:
qC=q_2 >q_2 >q_2
which means 3 levels of services on each route.
Customers C and B receive their first best allocation of services on each route. Customers
C fly first on routes 1 and 2. Customers B fly first on route 1 and fly "above economy" (at his
first best level) on route 2. Customers D fly first on route 2 and fly "above economy" on route
1. Customers A fly economy on both routes.
6.3 Regular and Completely Ordered
Such a solution does not exist since we have to rank t B and t D. To be able to do so, whether there
exists an attraction between them or they can reach each other through t c without involving any
transverse binding ICC. In both cases there is upward distortions: whether t B or t D attracts the
other, quantities allocated to the attracted one are distorted, one up_-axds and one downwards
as:
tf> ,
¢>q;
ff t s or t # can reach the other one through t c implies that. qC is upward distorted as:
6.4 Regular and Partially Ordered
Solutions d, e and f, respectively Regular Symmetric Case and the Separable Case, are regular
and allow partially type ordering.
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Forsolutiond, see the previous Section.
In solution e, C is attracted to B and D and A attracts B, D and C. We can then define
three optimal paths from C to A, one running through B, the other through D, and a third
one going directly to A. This defines .yc = {C --* B --* A}, _/c = {C --* D _ A} and
%c = {C--_ A}, 7 D = {D --* A},')'B = {B --* A}. Consequently, we can define three ordered
subsets T1 = {t A, t B, tC},T2 = {t A, t D, t c} and T3 = {t A, to}and three expressions for U c
In solution f, C is attracted to D and A, and A attracts B, D and C. We can then define
three optimal paths from C to A, one running through B, the other through D, and a third one
going directly to A. This defines .),c = {C _ D ---* A}, .yc = {C _ A}, .),D = {D _ A}, .yB =
{B --* A}. Consequently, we can define two ordered subsets T1 = {t A, t D, tC},T2 -_- {t B, t C} and
two expressions for U_ c
Solutions d,e and f defines a type ordering for each good: for the good 1, C = B >- D _ A
and for good 2: C = D >- B _ A.
Again, we obtain the following solution:
which means 3 levels of services on each route.
Customers C receive their first best allocation of services on each route. They fly first on
routes 1 and 2. Customers B fly first on route 1 and fly "above economy" on route 2. Customers
D fly first on route 2 and fly "above economy" on route 1. Customers A fly economy on both
routes. We can also think about services that can be provided outside the aircraft to allow the
airline to offer the same level of services on board to customers B and A on route 1, and D and
A on route 2.
6.5 Singular and Completely Ordered
A pure case belongs to this class of solutions.
Solutions a, b, h, i, j, k, m are singular (upward distortions) and completely ordered (there
exists an ordered subset Tj of four types).
In this set of solutions there are two possible type ordering:
C _ B _- D _- A for solutions i, j, k,
B >- C >- D _- A for solutions a, b, h.
This can be explained as follows:
• solutions a, b, h occur for low values of e equivalent to low proportions of types t C and
t A and high proportions of types t B and t D. It is in the monopolist's interest to extract
maximum surplus from types tB and thus sell them their first best allocations. Even if
rrB = _rD and whatever the solution, neither D is the highest type nor D is superior to B.
This comes from the parameters of the model, Ata > At2.
In this case we have,
4O
Again,customersC fly first on both routes. Surprisingly, customers D fly "above first" on route
2 and econoI_- on route 1. Customers B fly first on route one and "above economy" (at their
first best level) on route 2. Customer A fly economy on route 2 and "above economy" on route
2.
• solutions i, j, k are such that B is attracted to D. This enables to rank them and defines
the unique and expected type ordering C _- B _- D _- A, where C is the highest as t_ > t_
for all a, i. Then B is bigger than D as B has more impact on distortions than D since
Atl > At2. At last A is the lowest type as t A < t_ for all a, i.
In this case we have,
qlC=q l>q l >q l,
Again, customers C fly first on both routes. Surprisingly, customers D fly "above first" on route
2 and economy on route 1. Customers B fly first on route one and "above economy" on route 2.
Customer A fly economy on route 2 and "above economy" on route 2.
6.6 Singular and Partially Ordered
Solution l is such that:
7 c= {C --* D --* A},
79= {D --* A},
7_I = {B---, D---, A},
3{2= {B --* A},
defining:
TI={A,D,C},
T2={A,D,B}.
B and C obtain their first best allocations while q_ is upwards distorted and q_, q_, qA are
downwards distorted. Even we can rank B and D we cannot rank C and D and define a unique
type ordering. _re have:
T°= {tA},
= {tc,ts}.
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In thiscasewehave,
q_=qf > ¢ > qf,
Again, customers C fly first on both routes. Surprisingly, customers D fly "above first" on route
2 and economy on route 1. Customers B fly first on route one and "above economy" (at their
first best level) on route 2. Customer A fly economy on route 2 and "above economy" on route
2.
6.7 Special cases
Solutions n and g as two types attract each other, B and C.
This kind of solution means that there exists two types such that:
U i-U_ _ = (t i-tj)q i,
u J-u _ = -(t'-tJ)q_
q_=q,:foran (¢ - t_)¢ o
If (t_ - t_) > 0, this means that q_ is upwards distorted and q_: is downwards distorted, then we
have:
ql > _: > _e:> ¢:,
which cannot be satisfied with:
As a consequence, q_ = qJ: = 0.
In solution g we can define the following ordered subsets:
T1 = {C,B,A}
==_C_B_A,
T2 = {B,C,D,A}
_B>-C_-D>-A.
In this particular case where B is at the same time the immediate successor, in T1, and the
immediate predecessor, in T2, of C. We have:
and consequently:
U c _ u_B = At2qB,
u:B - u_C =-At2q C,
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In this solutionoptimalpaths-y,_define the rents of B and C are as follo_-s:
rr c = At2_.2 _- AQ_._I , with probabillt_, _c
=At2q¢2 + Atxq_l, with probabilitya c,
= _t2_ + _t,_, withprobabmty_L
U_ B = Atiq_l, with probability a B,
=--At=q2c +/kt=q_2 + At]q#1,with probabilityoff,
=--At=q c +/kt2q_2+ Atlq_1,with probabilityoff.
As Vc C 3_ and Vc C _ we have:a c = off and a c = a_ and consequently: a c = af. Then we
have:
q5 =t2 -F At2 7rC -4-At2_ ,
_=@- _t_ _ _t_(_f * _)_
71-B 7rB
where the second term of each distortion is explained by mutual attractions, which means ac-
cording to distortions that are usually computed as:
q(t'_) "t' =-X:Z -'-''-'+' ',, _ -t_),
are computed:
t=g_ i
t i ^ t i rrkerk.(ti+l _ t iq('_) -- q(") = -- Z _ J'-" '_)'
k j
that we make the sum for all k as _ = _/_ when k and i attract each other and t_ - t_ # O.
qC __ _ implies:
(_ + _)_ , ,,f_.c
_rc .- 7rB -0
which is impossible. If we neglect closed paths (and mutual attractions), using:
t i ^ t _ _Z" _a_(t _+1q( '_) q( '_) = -- Z- - t,_),3 _a
Ug4 j
this second part of the distortions does not appear and the condition becomes:
+_---1
71"C 7rB
which is also impossible. This defines a solution in which the monopolist only sells good 1 as:
In this case:
q_=_=@=o.
T°= {t_,t_} = {t_},
7"=0,
_= {t_,tc} = {t,"}
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asin the classiconedimensionalcaseof coursesinceonly onegoodis produced.This does
not meansthat good2 is not profitable. This means that there is no optimal mechanism en-
abling the monopolist to fully apply his monopoly power and he is better off selling both goods
independently.
We then obtain the following solution (see separable case in section 4),
q =qlB>qlD--q l,
Again, customers C fly first on both routes. Customers D fly first on route 2 and economy on
route 1. Customers B fly first on route one and economy on route 2. Customer A fly economy
on both routes.
Solution n is equivalent as B and C attract each other implying:
=
implying the sum of strictly positive terms to be negative,
7r C 71"B
rT--_+ 7U =-1
if we neglect mutual attraction, which is of course impossible. Computing utilities:
U c
U B
= At2q_2 + Atlq_l, with probability a c,
= At2q¢2 + Atlq D, with probability cr2c,
=-At2q c + At_q_2 + Atlq_41, with probability a_,
=--At2q c + At.q_2 + Atlq D, with probability a B,
as C is attracted to B but cannot reach A as B is not attracted to A. This creates a closed
paths, C --* B ---*C. Again:
q_ = 0, for all i.
We then obtain the same solution as in case g.
In both cases, there is no optimal selling mechanism enabling the monopolist to fully apply
his monopoly power. In this case, as we assume that both routes are profitable, the airline will
market these routes independantly.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have derived the complete solution of a two-product monopolist in the 2*2 case
with a quadratic cost function and linear preferences. We have seen that a solution with the
same qualitative features than the one in dimension one does not exists for all parameters neither
for all distributions.
In the case where there is no cross cost parameter, we have discovered four possible solutions
depending on the correlation between types, as in Armstrong-Rochet (98), whereas Dana (93)
in a different context, but a similar setting, finds only two solutions. One of the most striking
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result is the solutionfor stronglynegativecorrelation,the singularcase: there is an upward
binding ICC (B towards C and not D towards C because Ata > At2 ) and a transverse one
(B towards D because Ata "___At2). A_ a consequence, the highest type C receives an upw-ards
distorted allocation, whereas an "intermediary" type, B, gets his first best allocation (and also
in the regular as3nxmaetric case). The type who has the highest indirect utility lex_el does not
always get his first best allocation( see t3_pe C in the singular case), and is not necessarily the
only one to get it.
_en we take p into acrmunt several other solutions appear each one having its own properties.
_Ve know that D is always attracted to A and never to B and C. The monopolist al_3_ captures
all the surplus of the lowest, type (A) and the others alwa3_ obtain a strictly positive surplus.
We also show that the bidimensional monopolist's problem has solutions such that:
• the optimal pricing mechanism often requires a form of bundling
• it is sometimes impossible for the monopolist to apply his monopoly power, and he is
sometimes better off selling both goods independently,
• if all the quantities served by the monopolist are positive, there is no closed path or mutual
attraction and the set of types who get no rent, is reduced to a singleton, the dummy type,
• distortions depend on the number of optimal paths and also on their lengths, especially
the number of types involved in these optimal paths,
• the sign of the distortions in types tis allocations only depends on their immediate prede-
ce_q-,Drs_
• the rule of no distortion at the top of the distribution is always satisfied.
In this particular bidimensional setting we succeed in finding the global solution as there axe
only two arguments, two characteristics and four types. We are also able to solve _he problem
by maximizing the expected virtual surplus for Pure and Almost Pure cases. In a general
multidimensional setting, solving the problem is always feasible as we have enough equations to
determine all the unkno_ns. But to do so we have to be able to answer the question: "_rhat is
the set of optimal paths that defines the solution?
On the airline side, empirical research is needed on route monopolies. Further research should
also be undertaken on network monopolies connecting secondary airports.
8 Graphs and Figures
9 Appendices
9.1 Appendix 1
Conditions on quantities for the Regular Symmetric Case:
uB- uA=
V A - U B ___ -Atlq_l,
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U D -- _ rA -_" At2q_2
UA - UD >__-At2_
5
oC>_ 
Uc - v A = At_ff + At2_
Vc - UA =/xh_ +/xt2_
U C - V A >_ Atlq_l + At2q#2
Uc _ uA <_At, q[ + At2qc
Uc - UB = At2_
U_ _ uc >_-At2q c
U c _ U D = At_q_1
v_ _ o-c >_-AhqC
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UB - Uv =/xhqlD -/xt_qy
U a _ g D >_ Atlq D- At2q D
U o - U B > -Atlq_ + At2q B
9.2 Appendix 2
We write here the F.O.C of the problem in the 2*2 case when buyers are uniformly distributed.
In this case we obtain the following equations for the optimal quantities:
[t1 + , - p(t A + 2At2
qC = 1 [tC 2Atl-"A_-"r)c(_--rz-_L_ + - p(tf + 2At:"_"+_"_)]
qD = 1 ...+.c_ _ p(t D + 2At2t,_-+.,_o_l[t_+2Ah ___ 1-_ ,_
q_2 = 0__T=___[t21 A + 2At-_z , - P(t A + 2Atl-_'_ -"_* )]
[t_+2/xt: 1__ , _ ___
qC = 1 c -.,_c-._c p(tf + 2Atlt'_'+t'_ ',(l_-g:-__[t2+ 2At2 _ - _ )j
qD : 1 D on.lt --_AD--_BD
We have the following equations for the Lag'range multipliers of the problem:
--'IRA -- AA -- #AB -- ]ZAC -- PAD "_- #BA -47 #CA + #DA -----O,
--7[B -- AB -- ]_BA -- #BC -- #BD -j- #AB + #CB + #DB -_-O,
__C _ AC -- #CA -- ]_CB -- #CD -_-#AC -_-#BC -_-#DC = O,
--Trm -- Am -- #DA -- #DB -- ]_DC 2c [LAD -_-[2BD _- _CD = O.
To derivethe complete solutionwe replicatethe technicused in section4. We takea solution
and findthe frontiers(theconditionson quantitiesand the sign of #ijs).V%rethen look for a
solutionifone oftheseconditionsfails.We then findthe bindingconstraintsand then we check
the conditionsof existenceof a solution.We always obtain a system of P equationswith P
unknowns. V_rehave N equations (o_Lu_and the missing equationsare equalityconditionson
_,Oq /
quantities, obtained by examining the attractions and the different possible paths from one type
to another. And so on... (see figure 4). This has been done with Mathematica 3.0 ( a mathematical
software).
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Abstract
The limited growth poss_ilities in the home markets - not the least of which, based on capac-
ity and expansion problems - force the large airport operators to enter into, via partnerships,
cooperations and alliances. The German airports already cooperate among one another in dif-
ferent forms.
The purpose of the paper is to examine the structures and possibilities of cooperation among
airports in Europe (e.g. Airport Systems, Airport Networks). The experience of German air-
ports with different cooporations and alliances will be also considered.
Finally the forms of cooperations among airports are analysed by means of interdependence-
profile-models with different features (mutual dependence, coordination volume, complexity,
cooperation profit, value, degree of formalization and temporal frame), in order to find out
how high the cooperative attachment of cooperation is to be evaluated.
Keywords: Cooperation, Airport Alliance, Airport System, Airport Network, Airport Hold-
ing, Interdependence-Profile-Model, Satellite Airports, Joint Ventures, mutual dependence,
coordination volume, complexity, cooperation profit, value, degree of formalization and tem-
poral flame
1. Introduction
The limited growth possibilities in the home markets - not the least of which, based on capac-
ity and expansion problems - force the large airport operators to enter into, via parmerships,
cooperations and alliances. The German airports already cooperate among one another in
different forms.
The purpose of the paper is to examine the structures and possibilities of cooperation among
airports in Europe (e.g. Airport Systems, Airport Networks). The experience of German air-
ports with different cooporations and alliances will be also considered.
Finally the forms of cooperations among airports are analysed by means of interdependence-
profile-models with different features (mutual dependence, coordination volume, complexity,
cooperation profit, value, degree of formalization and temporal frame), in order to fmd out
how high the cooperative attachment of cooperation is to be evaluated.
2. Different Forms of Cooperations among Airports
For some years airports announced cooperations or partnerships among each other. The num-
ber of airports who have partnership shares in other airports, or own other airports, increased
too. Some forms of cooperation among airports will be represented at the following:
2.1 Cooperation within Airport Alliance: Cooperation in the Secondary Market and
Competition on Primary Market
Cooperation of the airports occur in the most different sections of the airport business. How-
ever, a cooperation is also possible in a single field. Airports arranged a free-and-easy-
cooperation in some more area of operations, like the cooperation among the south-german
airports ("South German Airport Alliance"): Munich, Dresden, Leipzig, Nuremberg and
Stuttgart. In this case, it was stressed that a practical cooperation is only striven by mutual
investments by protection of independence and without interlacing or fusion of the coopera-
tion partners.
2.2 Cooperations between large Airports and their satellite Airports
In the case of cooperation with ownership stakes, one airport acquires business interests of
another airport and takes influenc_ on the business policy and the development of the other
one. In Germany airport ownership cooperatiom can be divided in two ways: ownership stake
among a large airport and a small "satellite airport" (Fmnkfim - Hahn, Dusseldorf- Gladbach,
Munich - Augsburg, Stuttgart - Baden Airport) or a large airport and a distantly located air-
port (Fmukfim- Saarbruecken and Fmukfim- Hanover).
2.3 Cooperation within Airport Holdings and Airport Systems
The cooperation form of the holding company supports a homogeneous and comprehensive
strategic appearance of the parmers. The concept of a airport holding company is especially
widespread among the European airport systems. The airports of Berlin Schoenefeld, Tegel
and Tempclhof are part of the dominatin_ BERLIN BRANDENBURG AIRPORT HOLDING LTD.
(BBF). For the members, this holding company takes care of the following tasks: accoun-
tancy, controlling, marketing, public relations and environmental control as well as the project
control for the Single-Aixport Berlin-Brandenburg-International (BBI) and the preparation of
the privatisation of the BBF. A few months ago the airports Leipzig-Halle and Dresden be-
came the CENTRAL-GERMAN-AIRtK)RT-HOLDING.
2.4 Cooperation within Airport Networks
This is a timber form of the cooperation with ownership stakes by a Non-Airport-enterprise -
An example for this are the activities of the 100 percent subsidiary of the building combine
HOCHTIEF LIMITEDCOMPANY, the HOCHTmF AirPort Ltd. This enterprise invests in airports,
develops and operates them like the airport Athens-Spata. The project of the new international
Athens Airport was consmmted by a consortium as BOT-Model. Since 1997 the HOCHTIEF
AirPort Company tenders in cooperation with the Irish airport management company AERm-
ANTA INTERNATIONAL for privatisation of airports. In this case, they received the accep-
tances of a bid for minority stakes at the two privatisation in part of airports in Germany, Dus-
seldorf and Hamburg.
The airport network of the HOCHTIEFAirPort, that is the invesmaent to commerce airports,
exists in present 39,9 percent at the ATHENS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT S.A. and to-
gether with AerRIANTA 50 percent at the Airport Dusseldorf and 36 percent (with an option
of further 13 percent in the next years) at the Airport Hamburg. Furthermore this airport corn-
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pound have also indirect the investment on the Airport Moenchengladbach with 70 percent,
because its included in the Airport Dusseldorf stake.
For HOCHTIEFAirPort Company is - after the integration of the airports into their airport net-
work - one of the aims the creation of additional profit potentials from compound effects
("Economies of scope") for the member airports. On account of the view into the processes,
the organization and the cost structures of "their" different airports the stake owner can per-
form optimal Benchmarking. Efficiency gaps of the airports can be filled systematically by
the continuous comparison of the processes and the means.
2.5 Cooperation within Joint Ventures (e.g. PANTARES ALLIANZ)
The limited growth possibilities in the home markets (not in the end on account of capacity
and expansion problems) force the large airport operator companies via parmerships up to
cooperations and stake ownerships in the global field. Example is the cooperation between the
Schiphol group (Airport Amsterdam) and the formerly hard competitor Airport Frankfurt
(FRAPORT). In November 2000 this first alliance between two international hub airports was
announced officially under the market appearance of the common subsidiary PANTARES.
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3. Analysis of different Airport Cooperations
For enterprises it is in practice of great importance which kind of attachment, which interde-
pendences on the one hand exist to the cooperation partner and on the other hand exist be-
tween cooperation activity and other enterprise activity. By means of an interdependence pro-
file, will be attempted in the following to illustrate the importance of airport cooperations by
some features (mtmml dependence, coordination volume, complexity, cooperation profit,
weight, degree of formalization and temporal frame). For this purpose, some cooperation forms
between airports were analysed by means of the above criteria. The aim was to find out how
highly the cooperative attachment of cooperation is to be evaluated. A bipolar continuum
seems apt for this purpose. The interdependence section of TROENDLE (illustration l) is
taken as a basis for this model. On a scale from zero (low) to one hundred (high): At one end
we find the simplest market transaction/exchange, which can not yet be taken as cooperation,
and at the other end a complete fusion of the partners which cannot be designated as coopera-
tion any more.
Illustration 1: Interdependence profile by TROENDLE
Interdependence Pmt_e Model of Cooperations
_mtual Dependence
Coordination Volume
Complex_,
Cooperation Profit
Value
Degree of Fornmlizafion
Temporal Frame
i
i
i
i
i ! _ i i
10 20 30 40 50 60
---------> cooperative attaclunent
J
0 70 80 90 100
lOW __ high
On_du_) (po_ed)
The individual positions between these extremes show the extensity of the cooperation rela-
tionships (small - high) by means of the criteria mutual dependence, coordination volume,
complexity, cooperation profit origin (here: individual - pooled), value, degree of formaliza-
tion and temporal frame.
The individual dimensions of the interdependence section by TROENDLE are to be interpreted
as follows:
• The more distinctly the criterion of mutual dependence is developed, the larger is the at-
tachment between the enterprises. The smaller the substituability of service produced by
the cooperation partners is, accordingly, the greater is dependence.
• The coordination volume indicates how extensive the communication requirements are in
order to match the business actions. The more frequent and more extensively the partners
must coordinate their transactions, the more certainly one can speak of cooperation with
fare-reaching mutual adaptation measures. The coordination volume depends largely on
the decision rules and possible capital majorities.
• The complexity of a cooperation is an indicator of the number and interdependence of en-
terprise functions which are concerned by cooperation. Complexity is very high, for in-
stance, during the foundation of a joint venture, but small in the case of a pure agreement
about a standardization of a product.
• Cooperation profit can either result in commonly, and must then be divided up between
cooperation partners ("pooling"), or it results individually. However, a combination of
both kinds (e.g. Joint Venture) is also conceivable if the partners supply cooperating en-
terprise individually. A cooperation profit resulting commonly corresponds more to an in-
tense cooperation than a reciprocal cooperation with which the profit results individually
because of exchange.
• Furthermore, the value of a cooperation is important for an enterprise. The more larger the
sales part respectively dividend, or the resources put into this cooperation are, the greater
is the importance of the cooperation for an enterprise. The value consequently also en-
closes the risk of failing respectively the profit contribution for the enterprise. The more
comprehensively a cooperation is controlled by contract, the more important it is for an
enterprise. A partner can also proceed better in contract injuries.
• The degree of formalization finally gives information about the kind and form of the
agreements. A smaller formalization points to a smaller importance for the enterprise.
• Finally the criterion temporal frame shows that a cooperation put on a long-term basis
normally has more cooperative elements than a short-run one. If a cooperation is at short
notice, it resembles only a market transaction.
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Illustration2 givesa survey off the criteria of the examined cooperation forms between air-
ports.
Illustration 2: Forms of Cooperations - Results of the Dimension Model
SOL.Ill GERMAN AIRI'ORT ALLIANCE
30 80 70 70 80
Airport Umion (e.g. ADV - U_lON oF
Gm_tMA_¢AmeoaTs) 60 90 90 20 50
AirpmM©_i,m
Du_.iderf and Giadbach 90 10 80 90 90
Atrp_ cmperae_
Frankfm't and Hahn'*'* 90 60 90 80 100
Atn_rt eeopem_
Munich and Aagld_-g 80 40 30 70 70
J_p,m_
Sm_r(tadB_k_-_ 70 3O 9O 90 9O
Mlu_g,emeat eutrac_
(e.g. FRAIN_T/Atlk'_-Sll_ta)** 50 l0 20 0 80
Joim Vestm-e
(e.g. PA_ixlu_s Au_z)** 80 80 100 50 100
Holding (e.g. CENTRAL GERMAN AIR- 50 70 90 100 q0
rO_T rt_c)
Airport S_tem
(e.g. Berlin Airport_) O0 80 90 100 !00
Airport Network
(e.g. HOCHTIEF AIRPORT) 70 50 100 50 100
Mm_i¢_ AUg)art
Enterpri_ (e.g. _T AG) 30 50 80 40 60
50 50 61A3
10 50 52,86
30 100 70,00
40 100 Se,,e0
5o 100 62,86
30 100 71,43
100 70 47,14
i00 70 s2,s6
100 90 84,29
1oo 100 94,29
(20)
50 100 74,29
50 70 54,29
It becomes clear from the illustration that the cooperative attachment is good in the case of a
Joint Ventttre (e.g. PANTARES ALLIANZ), a holding company (e.g. CENTRAL GERMAN AmPORT
PLC.) and an airport system (e.g. Berlin airports). The mean values of this first group are 80
scale points and more. Noticeable is that the cooperation within an airport system had a better
rating in general than the Berlin example, because according to planning in 2004 (this system
will be replaced by the new Berlin-Brandenburg-International-Airport) the temporal flame had
to be classified with a very small index (20). In airport systems, the temporal frame is usually
to be evaluated very high (value 100), because for example the title has been denied by the
EU up to now.
In the second group there are the majority of the selected cooperations between large airports
and their satellite airports as well as the airport network of HOCHTIEF AIRPORT GMBH with
still high scale values (mean values between 70 and 80). The cooperation of Frankfurt with
Hahn stands out from this group (mean value of 80). In this case, the reasons are mainly the
coordination volume (with 60 higher than the others in this group) on account of the airport
expansion and accessibility as well as the high weight of cooperation with a neighbouring
airport because of the capacity problems in Frankfurt.
The high cooperative attachment of the airport network compared to the other cooperation
forms of this group is especially given in the case of complexity and value (with 100 scale
points in each case). The criterion temporal frame is dominate within this group (100), since
the participations and investments can be seen as long-term engagements.
In the third group there are the cooperations which have a mean value of less than 70 scale
points. The SOUTH GERMAN AIRPORT ALLIANCE miss a better cooperative attachment only
because of small values of criteria of cooperation complexity (70) and of a more detailed for-
realization of cooperation (50). Cooperation within the SOUTH GERMAN"AIRPORT ALLIANCE
could be to be intensified in some fields of activities and controlled more comprehensively by
contract. In this way the evaluations of the two criteria would improve. The more complex a
cooperation is, the larger are its dependence and its temporal frame. The airport cooperation
between Muinch and Augsburg is to be seen apart from its affiliation to the SOUTH GERMAN
AIRPORT ALLIANCE. Seen in such a way, the dependence of the two partners is by far higher
(80) than dependence in the entire alliance (30). The two airports Munich and Augsburg show
a very high dependence on account of their proximity and the financial commitment (from the
viewpoint of Munich). Coordination (40) and complexity (30), however, are very small com-
pared to the alliance very small since cooperation has only concerned the expansion of Augs-
burg up to now. This airport cooperation clearly remains behind the above-mentioned ones
(Frankfurt/Hahn, Stuttgart/Baden-Airport and Dusseldorf/Gladbach) concerning business
functions affected by cooperation.
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The examples which have a mean value between 50 and 60 are in the fourth group: GERMAN
AIRPORT UNION ADV (52,86) and the multicorporated airport enterprise of FRAPORT AG
(54229). The later is positioned almost on the other side of the continuum hierarchy and nearly
out of bounds in the field of cooperation. Management contracts (e.g. between FRAPORTand
Athens-Spata) received the lowest dimensioning of all examined cooperation forms. Espe-
cially the completely individual cooperation profit (Value: zero) clari_- similarity to the barter
deal (know-how for payment) and show proximity to the market continmnn. The complexity
of the management contract was only limited to the flying business, so the evaluation could
only turn out very low. An expansion of the complexity can be increased by additional man-
agement contracts.
The result of dimensioning and the attempt of a grouping of the analyzed cooperation forms is
tobe seeninillustration3.
Ilustration3: Groupingofselectedairportcooperationforms
Grouping of selected airport eoopm'afion forms
Scale vnlum Scale values Scale val_es Scale values Sale values
of OtoSO of S0to 60 of 60 to 70 of 70 to 80 ofg0to 100
Group V Group IV Group 111 Group H Group I _
Mauagemeat Airport Union Airport Airport
contract Alliance Network
Airport System
Multicorporated
Airport enterprise
Airport cooperations between
large airports and their sateflite
airports
•J_ Cooperative attachment -J_
Airport
Holding
Joint Venture
On account of the considerations, experiences fi'om practice and results of dimensioning the
cooperative attachment is especially high in the case of Airport Systems, Joint Ventures and
Holdings. Especially in airport system good assumptions exists for cooperation.
In particular the important aspect of a possible shift of air traffic between neighboring COOl>-
oration partners - even ffthis can only be realized with great difficulty in reality - is to be put
through legally within an Airport System. In the final analysis this aspect becomes the deci-
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sive factor for more complex and higher-quality cooperation. However, an Airport System
must be approved by the EU, has only got an outlook to success for airports within a common
conurbation.
The cooperation forms "Joint Venture" and "Holding" offer similar advantages for a narrow
cooperation between airport enterprises as an Airport System with regard to complexity of the
affected business fields, value and degree of formalization of the cooperation - except for the
aspect "shift of air traffic". Airport Systems and Holdings can be regarded congruently to re-
gard (except for the "shift of air traffic"-aspect), because the European Airport Systems are
generally organised in the legal form of a Holding Company.
The examined airport cooperations with investment of a large airport in a satellite airport
showed that every situation influences the cooperation in a different way. Great differences
are to be found especially at the extent of the coordination and complexity of the cooperation
fields. The very low degree of formalization during one-sided investments lets the author pre-
sume a controlling majority, so that possibly agreed cooperation contracts are not or hardly
not important.
The cooperation form of an Airport Network (e.g. HOCHTIEF AIRPORT GMBH) shows advan-
tages concerning of mutual dependence, complexity, value and temporal frame of cooperation
compared to an Airport Alliance (e.g. SouTH GERMAN AIRPORT ALLIANCE). The clear in-
vestment structure and benchmarking by the "center" of the Airport Network HOCHTIEF AIR-
PORT GMBH is the main reason for the advantages of this form. The selection of members for
this Airport Network, the complex benchmarking via all groups and the long temporal flame
of the cooperation on account of high investments supports a greater cooperative attachment
compared to an Airport Alliance (like the SOUTH GERMAN AIRPORT ALLIANCE).
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The present article discusses and analyses the major impacts of the Brazilian carriers fleet renewal
regarding Brazilian airport infrastructure in the most important region of the country, the Southeast
(SE). A brief historical overview of the country's airline fleet will be presented, demonstrating the
need for its renewal (m fact, Brazilian carriers started a major fleet renewal program m the last five
years), while analyzing the periods in which a new breed of aircraft was put into service by the
major carriers operating in the SE region. The trend of operating the classic regional jets plus the
forthcoming entry into service of the "large regional jets" (LRJ, 70-115 seaters) in several point-to-
point routes are presented along with the country's carriers" reality of operating these former aircraft
in several high-capacity and medium-range mutes.
The article will focus on the ability of four of the major Southeast's airports to cope with the fleet
modernization, mainly due to the fact that the region studied is the most socioeconomic developed,
by far, with the largest demand for air transportation, thus making the impacts much more
perceptible for the communities and the airport management involved. With the emergence of these
impacts, several new projects and investments are being discussed and pushed forward, despite
budgetary constrains being a reality in almost every Brazilian city, even in the SE region.
In view of this, the paper presents how the general planning could be carried out in order to adapt
the airports' infrasmmnaes m function of the proposed (and in some cases, necessary) fleet renewal.
Ultimately, we will present the present picture and two future scenarios m order to determine the
level of service in the existent passenger terminal facilities in the wake of the possible operation of
several new aircraft.
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1. INTRODUCTION
During the 80's and more especially in the late part of the decade, the world began realizing that a
new political, economical, social and cultural order was coming to stay. In Latin America it was no
different. In Brazil the government began abandoning the regime of indexation of the economy and
price regulation. Regarding air transport issues, in November of 1991, seeking to establish a clear
set of policies tuned with the liberalization trends being pushed forward by the federal government
under then-elected president Femando Collor de Mello, the Department of Civil Aviation (DAC)
lead the organization, implementation and discussions of the V CONAC, the 5th National
Conference of Commercial Aviation. Culminating with the liberalization policy (called
flexibiliza¢_o in Portuguese, a quasi-total deregulation), in mid 2001 the DAC along the Ministry of
Finance published a Ministry Act issuing the full freedom of fares for the domestic market.
In March 2003, Brazil had four major carriers, totaling 251 aircraft in operation: TAM with 103,
VAKIG with 100, VASP with 26 and GOL with 22 (the later as of April, 2003). The market-share
expressed in available-seat kilometers (ASK) for the domestic market in March of 2003 was of
36.43% for VARIG, 31.11% for TAM, 17.64% for Gol, 13.49% for VASP, and near 1,5% for all the
other 10-or-so scheduled-service regional airlines.
Since the mid 90s, all Brazilian regional carriers face structural economical problems, mainly
because these small regionals cannot reach the most important and lucrative markets between major
cities. The city-pairs flown by these regional players do not generate enough traffic to catapult them
into a new group of would-be "medium carriers". Thus, nowadays, Brazil has its majors and the
small regional players; there are no "medium" size carriers operating in the country. The market-
share distribution aforementioned is a clear confm'nation of this fact.
2. THE BRAZILIAN DOMESTIC FLEET
With the present division of majors and small regionals, the Brazilian fleet can also be simply
divided into three groups:
(1) Medium/large wide-body aircraft operating international routes (VARIG's MD-11s, 777s and
767s, plus TAM's A330s);
(2) medium capacity aircraft for domestic routes (737s in VARIG's, VASP's and Gol's fleets, plus
TAM's A320/319 and Fokker F 100s), and
(3) a few regional jets (ILls) combined with the assorted turboprop aircraft flown by the regionals.
Due to its importance, this paper will primarily focus on the single-aisle, narrow-body aircraft flown
domestically by the major carriers (group 2). This group represents nowadays 66% of the entire
Brazilian airline fleet (see Table 1).
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Table I _ Br*_ AL.'!ines' Fleet Evolution (!990-2002) - Only. Scheduled Carriers' Fleets Appropriated
Aircraft/Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
A300-B2/B4 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
A310 ....... 1 2 2 - - -
A319 .......... 12 6 13
A320 .......... 6 21 31
A330 ......... 2 5 7 9
707-320C 4 3 2 2 2 2 .......
727-100/I00C 15 14 5 S 5 5 9 9 9 9 7 5 4
727-200/200C ...... 2 4 6 6 2 6 4
737-200 39 43 36 34 36 38 43 3g 40 35 35 35 32
737-300 36 54 39 39 38 35 33 40 47 49 46 55 41
737-400 3 7 4 4 4 5 5 6 7 4 1 5 4
737-500 - - - 4 4 7 10 14 17 17 19 20 18
737-700 ......... 5 5 16 25
737-800 ........... 2 6
747-200/300 8 9 9 11 8 8 6 5 5 5 - - -
747-400 ..... 1 1 ......
767-200/300 13 15 16 18 18 19 19 23 23 18 17 17 12
777-200 ............ 2
ERJ-145 ....... 6 ] 1 I 1 20 18 15
DC-SF - 3 3 ..........
DC-I 0-30/-30F 12 15 12 10 10 10 10 10 10 3 2 3 3
MI)-I ! - 2 6 9 10 10 16 18 20 21 13 16 14
Fokker FI00 2 4 9 14 17 20 28 30 39 39 39 50 48
ATR-42 - - - 1 1 3 3 7 10 10 11 14 14
Cessna Caravans - - 13 21 27 37 46 45 45 46 45 10 7
EMB-110 45 41 37 31 29 29 44 38 34 34 15 13 8
EMB-120 8 12 12 16 17 22 23 30 27 27 31 29 18
DH Dash-8 - 3 5 5 4 3 - 4 4 2 - - -
Fokker F27 19 12 12 8 9 8 8 6 6 6 2 3 3
Fairchild FA22 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 - - -
Fokker F50 - - 2 6 6 16 19 19 15 15 17 10 -
Locldteed
Electra II 14 14 12 1 .........
Total Jets 136 173 145 153 155 163 185 207 239 229 232 285 284
Total Trbprops 92 87 98 93 97 121 146 152 144 143 121 79 50
Total 228 260 243 246 252 284 331 359 383 372 353 364 334
Notes: Cessna Caravans includes Grand Caravans -- Trbprops = turboprops -- EMB-110 = Bandeirante, EMB-120 = Bms_
Source: DepartmemtofCivilAviationStatisticalYearbooks.
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2.1. The necessity of fleet-renewal: TAM and VASP
The majority of the aircraft in group 2 are either very old (25+ years in operation) or relatively old
(+13 years in operation). Although the age of an aircraft does not directly represent a safety concem,
it certainly point towards several disadvantages in the airlines' daily operations, such as a higher
fuel consumption, higher rate and cost of maintenance, higher level of noise and gas emissions,
lower level of service to passengers (noise, outdated interiors, etc.), plus the smaller number of
passengers carried.
This put, any process of fleet renewal of a given airline must constitute a relevant part of the
financial projections of the company, in fact being a part within the vital long-range strategic
planning done by any carrier. However, in the wake of some particular situations, airlines are
practically forced to incur in a fleet renewal or a fleet "replacement" process (not necessarily
renewal, but can be combined with). The latter can be exemplified by what has happened with TAM
and its Fokker F100s in 2002/2003.
The Dutch-built F100 was acquired in the beginning of the 90s (see Table 1) and was extremely
important for TAM's history, not only because it marked the introduction of the jet age in the
airline, but that it introduced the jet service in the Rio-Sao Paulo air bridge (Ponte-a&eaJshuttle
Rio-S_o Paulo). This move by TAM forced VARIG, VASP and Transbrasil (then operating as a
pool, with VARIG Lockheed Electra turboprop aircraft) not only to discard the Electras from the
route, but also to review their strategic position as a pool, which would soon terminate.
Entering service in various major and medium-size cities, the F100 proved to be the workhorse of
the airline. Pictured everywhere in TAM's ads and aviation magazines in Brazil, the F100 was
associated directly with the airline's new image of modernity. Unfortunately the crash of an aircraft
departing from downtown S_o Paulo/Congonhas (SBSP/CGH) airport in an early morning flight of
the Rio-S_o Paulo air bridge in October 1996, caused the death of all passengers and crew onboard
plus several people on the ground. The cause of the crash was determined as beginning in a major
malfunction of the starboard engine thrust reverser control devices, prompting it to deploy during
the critical take-off run at Congonhas, then worsened by the crew's inability to interpret the on-
board computer reactions to minimize the problem. The crew's fight with the on-board computer
reactions was a the decisive cause of the crash. The image of the airline was scratched not only due
to the horrible accident itself, but also due to the particular flight, which was routinely used by
important businessmen, government officials and politicians travelling from $5o Paulo to Rio.
The following year, when TAM began overcoming the accident in S_o Paulo, a passenger died when
she was literally blown away of another F100 during a flight from S_o Jos6 dos Campos to S_o
Paulo, when a depressurization of the passenger cabin occurred following the detonation of a home-
made bomb by a nearby-seated passenger (as reported). Even being a non-aeronautical cause, the
accident reactivated the negative public view of the aircraft. At the time these two accident occurred,
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TAM stated that it wo_d only rettma the fleet, of Fl00s if ",he leasing contracts were not renewed
satisfactorily. However, for the unfortunate of the carrier, five year later, in August 2002, on the
very same day, two F100 were involved in two emergency landings: one in the Campinas/Viracopos
International Airport (SBKP/VKP) and another in a countryside location, both in the state of Sao
Panlo. With the public (mainly business passengers) shifting mostly to VARIG and Gol flights when
knowing that a F100 was the assigned aircraft for any given mute, TAM decided to anticipate the
aircraft replacement. In fact, this replacement was only planned to begin in 2005, but as the serious
accidents unfolded and prompted a major negative reaction of the flying public, the company was
forced to rethink its slrategy. In 2002 the airline decided to return 21 F100 aireratt, out a total of 50.
An airline whose particular situation practically demands an urgent fleet renewal is VASP. The
company was once synonymous of new technology when in it brought to Brazil the first Boeing
737-200 Advanced to operate in South America, in 1969, and in 1986 the first 737-300 (then a new
model of the 737 family). Regarding the 737-200s, some aircraft are approaching their useful life
when analyzed by the number of cycles. Presently, VASP's fleet is composed by three old-version
A300s, four 737-300s (mainly operated in the Rio-Sao Paulo air bridge) and twenty of those veteran
737-200s. Not only due to the nearing end of their operational and economic lives, VASP's 737-
200s are noisy Stage 2 aircraft, which should be phased out completely by 2010, as recommended
by ICAO.
Complementarily, the airline is aware that the operational limit of the mentioned aircraft will be
around the year 2005, since the necessary investments to adapt the aircraft to environmental
demands of neighboring airport communities, plus the necessary structural maintenance will turn the
operations economically unviable. In reality, the problems associated with the Boeing 737-200s do
not affect only VASP, but also VARIG, the other operator in the country.
A major solution for this complex almost-entire-fleet-renewal problem for VASP may come in the
form of capturing investments to lease or even acquire brand new models from the Embraer
170/175/190/195 family beginning in 2004 or early 2005 at the latest. This alternative will be briefly
explored in a forthcoming section.
2.2. A New Breed of Medium-capacity Single-aisle aircraft
According to analyses conducted by Boeing (2002), the Latin-American market should account for
2100 of the 24.000 jets that the market should acquire in the next 20 years, in a package worth some
US$107 billion. This confirms ctm-ent Brazilian airlines" situation, where almost 65% of the aircraft
operating in scheduled passenger transport in the country are in the 100-150 seat range, with an
average age of 20 years (DAC, 2002).
In the aircraft market renewal, Airbus Industries announced in 1981 that it would develop an aircraft
for short/medium routes, with a 150-seat capacity. After the official launch of the A320 program, in
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1984, the first prototype of the aircraft flew in February of 1987, receiving aeronautical certification
in February of 1988. The A320 came as a reference in technology, being the first commercial
airplane to be completely operated by fly-by-wire, plus the side-stick in replacement of the usual
central column stick. With the configuration, the A320 cockpit layout resembled more aF-16 fighter
jet than a commercial aircraft. After reprogramming some of the software packages related to the
fly-by-wire flight controls, Airbus experienced several successes from the A320 family. In fact, the
opportunities of the basic design are such that the manufacturer has built an entire family of twin jets
around it: the A321 (a slightly larger aircraft, with a 7-meter fuselage stretch capable of seating 185
passengers in a two-class configuration); the A319 (the slightly smaller derivative of the A320, with
a 4-meter fuselage shortening and capable of seating 124 passengers in a two-class layout); and the
A318, the smallest member of the family, with a 107-seat configuration in its common internal
layout. Clearly, with the launch of the A318 program in the late 90s, the European manufacturer was
aiming the "large regional jet" (LRJ) niche market, with aircraft to fill in the need to replace Fokker
F 100/F70s, 737-200s, and DC-9s/MD-80s worldwide.
Boeing's prompt response to the outgrowth of the A320 family was a far superior successor of the
widely known and also greatly successful 737-300/-400/-500 series: the 737-NG (New Generation).
The 737-NG can be treated almost as a new family, with its models -600/-700/-800/-900. This
family have larger, more aerodynamic wings (25% more area) optimized for higher fuel efficiency,
higher speed and higher cruising altitudes, plus more efficient and more powerful CFM56 engines.
Moreover, the 737-NGs also have larger fuel capacity, averaging 30% more than the -300/-400/-500
series, paving the way for transcontinental flights and even making it a contender for the lower-end
of the ETOPS certification.
As a simplification, one could assume that the -600 model is the natural replacement for the 737-
500s and other similar aircraft, while the -700 would replace the -300, the -800 would be a natural
substitute for the -400, while the -900 would fit into a "new" market for the family, almost coming
as close to a "short 757".
In Brazil, airlines operate with the two manufacturers: TAM operates A319 and A320, respectively
13 and 24 aircraft, while VARIG currently operates 2 Boeing 737-800s and 5 -700s (as January,
2003). Exploring the Southwest-led fleet commonality for low-cost/low-fare carriers, Gol operates
an all-Boeing fleet comprising 22 737-NG aircraft (eighteen -700s and four-800s).
2.3. The Regional Jets
The Regional Jet (RJ) phenomenon began in the U.S. as a follow-on to the successes from the
turboprops used by the regional and commuter carriers code-sharing with or subcontracted by the
majors and nationals. In the beginning used simply as feeder and to link secondary and tertiary cities
to the main hubs dominated by the majors, first the turboprops and then the RJs are now under the
spotlight with its present darling role of hub bypassing. As mentioned above, the RJs success was
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dire_!y defiv___ from the turboprops' own _ccess, being the former much more praised by the
flying public for its speed, comfort and sense of safety and modernity. In fact, the RJs were designed
to be an efficient yet affordable (in terms of operations) replacement for the turboprops.
Motivated by the success of ILIs m the 30-60 seat range and foreseeing a necessity for airplanes to
fill the gap between these aircraft and the 737-600/-700 or the A320/319 family, the four main
aircraft m_mlr_cturers have heavily invested in the "'larger regional jet" (LRJ) concept. This entirely
new family of aircraft will be in the 70-120-seat range, with an extremely positive market ahead (see
forecasts on Table 3). The first attempt came from Bombardier with an outgrowth of its successful
C J700 (a 64-seater), mining it into the CJ900 (90-seater), as already in service with the Mesa Air
Group (as of May, 2003).
Table 2 - Regional Jet Order Book by the Two Largest Manufacturers (as of December/2002)
Manufacturer/Aircraft Delivered Backlog Firm ordcw Options Total
CRJI00 226 0 -- -- 226
463 206
18 57
CKI700 68 130
CRJg00
• ERJ 135/140/145/145XR
i 66975198
Notes: Dam as Dec. 31, 2002 - Embraer data does not reflect impact of the Swiss
International ordel" renegotiafion - Table column key exactly as appears in source -
Data does not contemplate an ozder for 100 170/190s placed by LetBlue in June, 2003.
Source: Bombardier Aerospace and Embtaer, via Air Tmmsport World, MayJ2003.
Table 3 - Regioml Jet IMiveri_ Forecast
Seats pea- aircrlft
30-60
61-90 1175
91 - 120
I
Totals
2003-2012
1745
1090
4010
2013-2022 2003-2022
1765 3510
1415 2590
1420 2510
4600 8610
Source: Embraer, via Air Transport World, May,r2003.
In the race for the most efficient and most appropriate model to fill the gap cited above, Embraer
will probably take a very comfortable position as it is, by now, the sole of the four major
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manufacturers (other being Boeing, Airbus and Bombardier) that have developed a totally new
design and not an outgrowth of a smaller version (as Bombardier) or, on the contrary, a shortened
version of a larger aircraft (such as Boeing with its 737-600 and Airbus with its A318). The
Brazilian manufacturer new family is the Embraer 170/175/190/195 (in the 70, 76, 90, 96-108 seat
range respectively).
It is important to point that both Boeing and Airbus, with shortened versions of the "not-really-
designed-nor-developed-for-regional-jet-service" 737-NGs, Boeing 717 (formerly McDonnell-
Douglas MD-85) and A318s, are direct competitors to Embraer's 190/195 models (or vice-versa, as
the latter aircraft are still to be produced). It is also important to complement that only the Embraer
jets were specifically developed and designed from the drawing boards to be a "large regional jet",
this being one of its main advantages over the much heavier competitors' models. However, when
bringing to light the relevancy of fleet commonality, an airline may prefer ordering the Airbus A318
or the Boeing 737-600 instead of the Embraer 190/195 simply because it already has other members
of the European or the North-American family in the fleet. This is exactly what TAM is considering:
the airline has manifested interest in acquiring A318s to replace Fokker F100s. On the other hand,
JetBlue, an all-Airbus low-cost/low-fare operator in the U.S., ordered 100 Embraer 170/190 in early
June, in a contract worth around US$3 billion.
Complementarily, when considering a major fleet renewal, Embraer with its totally new family of
170/175/190/195s could end up composing the entire fleet of a given small or midsize cartier.
VASP's current fleet of veteran 737-200s in their l l0-or-so seat configuration is a particular
potential candidate for a complete modernization with the new Embraer twin jets. Considering
VASP's average load-factor of 50-55%, replacing the old 737s with, for example, a mix of Embraer
170s and 190s would be an extremely interesting solution. In the particular case of VASP, the
problem is not with any possible delivery delays of the acquired aircraft (being from any
manufacturer); it is the critical financial situation of the carrier that currently blocks any short-range
fleet modernization.
Interestingly, several Brazilian aviation professionals say that the new Embraer family is extremely
well suited for what they call "first-world operations". The aircraft's embarked avionics and flight
characteristics are a pilot's dream, not to mention its airfield performance and reliability in mid-
temperatures and cold weather. On the other hand, airlines operating in less-developed or
developing countries and without much access to capital, see the new family as extremely costly
(US$20+ million the smallest 170) and point that the aircraft would have multiple restrictions if
operated in very hot weather and short runways, exactly the cases of almost every non-capital airport
in Brazil and in several other developing and less-developed countries. In fact, these aviation
professionals argue why Embraer has not yet designed the 170/175/190/195-"Lite" versions, these
being a kind of "no-frills" aircraft models of the new family. Time remains to be seen if either
Embraer or any other major manufacturer will come any closer to this approach regarding its LILIs.
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Table 4 - Profit Improvement- Narrowbody _-rsus RJ
Per segment
Revenue CtJS$)
737-200
5,846.23
Load factor t%)
50-sentRJ
4,458.90
%chuge
-24
Expenses (US$) 7,434.88 3,738.00 -50
Operational Income (US$) (1,588.65) 720.90 n.nL
Margin -27% 16% --
Revenue ASM (US$ cents) 0.092 0.167 82
Cost per ASM (US$ cents) 0.117 0.14 20
Yield (US$ cents) 0.144 0.194 35
RPMs (x 1000) 40,669 22,962 -44
ASMs (x 1000) 63,546 26,700 -58
64 86 22 pts.
Passengers 76 43 -33
Source: An unidentified U.S.-based major amine, via Air Transport World, May/2003.
3. THE SOUTHEASTEILN AIRPORTS FOCUSED
There are approximately 746 public aerodromes registered in Brazil (ROTAER, 2002). The
Department of Civil Aviation (DAC), the Brazilian Federal Airport Authority (INFRAERO), states,
cities and a few private consortiums are responsible for the management of these public airports.
According to Institute of Civil Aviation 0AC) data, 74,456,117 passengers passed through all the 65
airports managed by INFRAERO, being 9.352,856 from international flights and 64,423,933 flying
domestically. To demonstrate its importance throughout the system, INFRAERO's airports are
responsible for 95% of the total volume of passengers indicated above.
The regional and geographical division of the country is defined by the Brazilian Institute of
Geography and Statistics (IBGE), being Brazil presently divided into 5 regions: North, Northeast,
Southeast, South and Center-West. Table 5 depicts the territorial distribution and the regions"
differences regarding its social-economic power (and consequent political influence).
Table 5 - Geographical Regions of Brazil
Relaeve tret of
Braze (%)
18.87
Aerodromes
99
Gross lateraal Product
(ia US$ m._ons)
20,700
Population
11,636,728
North (N) 45.25 129 14,289 12,900,704
Northeast (NE) 18.25 171 42,121 47,741,711
South (S) 6.77 133 56,670 25,107,616
214
746
10.86
100
187,156
321,390
Sources: ROTAER (April, 2002) and IBGE (via www.iboe._ov.bO
Southeast (SE)
Total
72,412All
169,799,17o
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3.1. The choice of the Southeast Region of Brazil - The Importance of Four Airports
Major historical settlements founded by the Portuguese (including turning Rio de Janeiro the
country's capital until the 60s, leaving Salvador behind), combined with prosperous mining,
agricultural and cultural activities during the 18_ and 19th centuries, and more recently the heavy
industrialization, were the main reasons for the Southeast to become the most populated and richer
region of Brazil. As can be seen in Table 5, population distribution in Brazil is not proportional to
the geographical size of each region. This combined resulted in a socioeconomic inequality of the
country through a mega-development of the Southeast in contrast with the North, Center-West and
Northeast regions. Airport implementation and infrastructure development would not be contrary to
this reality: out from the total of 64,423,933 passengers flying domestically, nearly 32% used either
one of the four major airports located in the downtown areas of the four capitals of the Southeast
region (S_o Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte and Vit6ria).
3.1.1 Congonhas (downtown) Airport - City of S_o Paulo, state of S_o Paulo (SP)
Congonhas (CGH/SBSP) is the second largest airport in passenger volume. It can be said that
Congonhas functions almost as a hub for both TAM and Gol, concentrating and distributing traffic
originating from of cities of several Brazilian states. Nowadays it is processing approximately
29,000 passengers a day, traveling through 52 different destinations dispersed throughout the
country. However, the airport is operated under a series of air side capacity restrictions, while also
having serious surface access limitations. This is the direct consequence of the airport being
engulfed by the largest and most important city in the country. Back when it was opened to the first
flight, in the 30s, Congonhas was no where near the city, its neighbors being far apart farms with its
crops and cows. Nowadays, its privileged city-center location is hated by the surrounding
communities and beloved by the airlines and thousands of businessmen, politicians and government
officials that have to fly routinely to S_o Paulo.
Congonhas Infrastructure Summary:
• Runways: 17L/35R (1,940 x 49 m) and 17R/35L (1,435 x 49 m), not capable of
simultaneous operations.
• Apron area: -130,000 m2 -- Parking Positions for 26 Aircraft.
• Passenger Terminal operational area: 13,102m 2.
3.1.2 Santos Dumont (downtown) Airport - City of Rio de Janeiro, state of Rio de Janeiro (RJ-)
Rio de Janeiro/Santos Dumont airport (SDU/SB1LO is the fifth busiest airport in Brazil in terms of
passengers. The main connection to/from SDU is to S_o Paulo/Congonhas through the Rio-S_o
Paulo shuttle (ponte-a_rea), the main route in the country. The other most important links to/from
SDU are to Belo Horizonte/Pampulha (PLU/SBBH) also in the SE region and to Brasilia
(BSB/SBBR), the country's capital.
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in the beginning of the 90's the airport experienced a major modernization of its operations: the
introduction of jet service by TAM (Fokker F100s) and by the VARIGNASPFFransbrasil pool right
after (737-300s). Before these aircraft entered service, the Ponte-a_rea had been operating the
Lockheed Electra II turboprops (in VARIG colors) for 18 years. In just a few months, fourteen
Electras were replaced by ten 737-300s, combining a substantial increase in capacity (from the 90
seats in the Electra to the 132 seats in the 737s) with a slight reduction in flight time (the flight
became 7-10 minutes faster, in average).
Santos Dumont Infrastructare Summary:
• Runways: 02R/20L (1,323 x 42 m) and 02L/20R (1,260 x 30 m), not capable of
simultaneous operations.
• Apron area: -65,000 m 2 -- Parking Positions for 15 Aircraft.
• Passenger Terminal operating area: 4,952 m 2.
3.1.3 Pampulha (downtown) Airport - City ofBelo Horizonte, state of Min_ Gerais (MG)
The airport began its activities as a technical stop in the flights of the Military Airmail, in 1933, in
the then-called "Linha do Sio Francisco" ("San Francisco Route", named atter the river Sao
Francisco that extends from the Northeast region all the way through the state of Minas Gerais)
linking Rio de Janeiro (then capital of Brazil) to Fortaleza. In 1937 this technical stop in Belo
Horizonte was transformed into a routinely-flown link to Rio de Janeiro, at the time operating the
twin-engine Lockheed 10E Electra I, with a two-men crew and the capacity for six passengers.
Beginning in the early 70s, already under INFRAERO management, Pampulha airport (PLU/SBBH)
grew steadily with the development of air transport in the country and particularly in the Southeaster
region. Soon, the already community-engulfed airport could not satisfactory support the increasing
demand and the need for new services, mainly international flights. In view of this, the Ministry of
Aeronautics (through INFRAERO) decided to finance and buitd a new airport, to be located far
away from growing Belo Horizonte. The Confins/Tancredo Neves International Airport
(CNF/SBCF) was opened in January 1984, being considered at the time one of the most modem
facilities in Brazil. A few months atter opening, the new international airport registered about 75%
of the movement of aircraits and 95% of the passengers in the Belo Horizonte area.
For the desperation of the surrounding communities and for INFRAERO itself, Pampulha started to
regain one flight after the other, starting from 1986 with the creation of the direct flights among the
downtowns of the cities, linking the downtown airports of Rio, S_o Paulo, Belo Horizonte and
Brasilia (the then-called VDCs or "'V6os Diretos ao Cenlxo", standing for "Direct Flight to the
Center"). The picture got even worse with the multiplication of jet services during the 90s, where
Pampulha completely outpaced Confins in passenger and aircraft served. This reflected the
consequences of the majority of businessmen, politicians and government officials Waveling to/from
Belo Horizonte preferring to fly to/from downtown Pampulha than to/from distant Confins
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International. Today, the later airport is even called a "white elephant", being one of the most
undemsed sites in the country, despite being a top-level international facility.
Pampulha Infrastructure Summary:
• Runway: 13/31 (2,540 x 45 m).
• Apron area: 36,456 m 2 -- Parking Positions for 8 Aircraft.
• Passenger Terminal operational area: 4,500 m2.
3.1.4 Vit6ria Intemational Airport - City ofVit6ria, state of Espirito Santo (ES)
According to INFRAERO data, there are presently 74 aircraft daily in the airport, with eight airlines
operating almost a million passengers per year. The number of passengers transported in January of
2002 was the largest of the airport's history to date: 104,781 passengers, a number 20% higher if
compared with January 2001.
Vit6ria International (VIX/SBVT) registers one of the highest rates of growth in the country, with
12% per year, well above the national average of 8%. With the recent discovering of a great number
of highly potential oil fields near the coast of the state of Espirito Santo, the opportunities for an
even higher growth of the state's economy may push forward a major modernization of the airport.
In fact, INFRAERO has already a draft project to review the airport master plan, where a second
runway would be added along a new passenger terminal building and new cargo facilities.
Vit6ria International Infrastructure Summary:
• Runway: 05/23 (1,750 x 45 m).
• Apron area: 24,360 m 2 -- Parking Positions for 6 Aircraft.
• Passenger Terminal operational area: 3,294 m 2.
3.2. Major Links to/from the Four Airports
In Brazil, the number of frequencies and the schedule of each given flight are defmed for DAC, by
the scheduled airlines, under bulletins called Hotran (for "Horfirio de Transporte", or Schedule of
Transports). The capacity of any given flight (or rome, when all Hotrans of that route are summed
up) vary according to the number of frequencies, the size and configuration of the aircraft used by
the airline(s) and specified in the Hotran document.
According to the manufacturers (Boeing, 2002), airlines (should) acquire airplanes to fly specific
routes in view of their market and demand forecast studies. Therefore, Tables 6 through 9 will
present the destinations flown by the scheduled airlines in their routes to/from each of the four
depicted airports, pointing the percentage of each equipment type used in a given airport for a week.
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Table 6- Destinations taffrom Congonhas Airport (CGH), in 2002
Cay_ i_
Anmultma IS
No. ef flights 737-200 737°300 737-500 737-700 737-800 A319 A320 FIN ERJI45 ATR 42
_Ara_ 6
Beg-m 28
B¢lo Horumnm 196
Brardlia 223
Bauru 18
_c,m_ 53
Cricilima 16
Conlmb_ 7
Curitilm 232
Caxias do Su] 41
CuUt_ 52
7 7
11 67 33
14 15 32 41 7
Pres. Prudentc 23
Mamus 21
Florum6polis 65
Fortale.za 41
Rio de Janelro (GIG)
C_mikma 72
34
Santana do Pmai_ 10
6
Juiz de Fora 19
Jo_o _ 7
JomviU¢ 47
Cam_mam 13
51
Mam_ 7
Matilia 23
Mlmei6 1
Nave_ate
Smtto/h_elo
i Natal
PortoAlesre
_Passo Fundo
PortoS%,_
Recife
7 6 13 13
7 49 33
17
7 6 13
12
7 7
73 2
88 26
18
7 7
16
7
114 29
24
14 6
7 14
14 11 7 14 6 13
20 7 14
80 22 14 21 23
2O7 38 7
14 20
55
7
185
14
Rio_ J_i_, (sDu)
Ribein_ Pre_
42
593
31 16
7 6
19 7
7
18
65
Sio Luis 6
Sio Jos_ do Rio Pt'L_ 28
Salvador 115
Comandatuba 2
Uberll, wli= 69
Uberaba 29
w_, 12
Vitbria 61
Cantos 6
ChapadaDimantma 2
Muex_ri 3
Ji-Paa'lmli 6
T_ flights _ week)
Equipment
market share (%)
2755 35
100% 1%
10
23
10
19
25
23
21 7 7 7
29 7 '_
6
7
7 54 26 7 48 31 12
6
7 6 1
7 14 7 14
286 6 75 202 24
20 16 29
6
14 7 7
1 23 28 14 35 7 7
1 1
39 30
l] 18
12
7 13 12 6 23
6
2
3
6
377 367 389 77 271 546 395 169 129
14% 13% 14% 3% 10% 20% 14% 6% 5%
Source: SGTC - Sistema de Gerenciamento de Tones de Controle (April 2002)
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Table 7 - Destinations to/from Santos Dumont Airport (SDU), in 2002
No. of flights 737-200 737-300 737-500 737-700 737400 A319 A320
per week
7 7
7 56 19
7 6 61 46
5
7 27
5
2
7 34
6
City/Destination
Bel&n 14
Pampulha 136
Brasilia 136
Carnpo Grande 5
Curitiba 45
Cuiab_ 5
Florian6polis 2
Campinas 63
Maringa 6
Macapfi 7
Porto Alegre 15
Petrolina 6
Recife 7
Ribeirao Preto 5
S_o Jos6 dos 13
Campos
Sao Paulo 588 286
Ubedfindia 6
Vit6ria 96 7
Total flights 1155 -- 335
(per week)
Equipment 100% -- 28%
market share (%)
2 6
6
6 74 202
F100
52
10
I1
30 20 25
110 255 -- 262 _ 103
10% 22% -- 23% -- 9%
Source: SGTC - Sistema de Gerenciamento de Tones de Controle (April 2002)
ERJ145
I1
11
7
20
6
14
90
8%
ATR
42
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Table 8 - Destinations to/from Pampulha Airport (PLU), in 2002
I I
i No. of flights _737-200 737-300 737-500 737-700 737-800
per week
84 7 25 12
Cmitiba 13
Fortakma 7
S_o Paulo (GRU) 5
Gov. Vatadares 15
Sanuma do Pamiso 30
Campinas 39
Montes Clams 16
Natal 7
Po_:os de Caldas 5
Palmas 5
PortoSeguro 7
Recife 14
Rio de Janeiro (SDU) 136
S_toPaulo (CGH) 200
Salvador 27
Ub_lindia 16
Vit6m 84
_Araguama 5
i Total flights 715(perweek}
Equipment 100%
mar_ share_)
14
7 7
7 55 19
12 61 41
7 7
13
I
A319 A320 IF100 ERJI45 ATR
42
14 16 5 5
35 19 148 113
5% 3% 2{P/_ 16%
13
10
12
6
-- 89
-- 12%
13
5
7
5
15
20
10
Source: SGTC - Sistema de Gerenciamento de Tones de Controle (April 2002)
53 2
75 1 10
7 6
11 5
12 47 5
5
133 108 70
19% 15% 10%
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City/Defdnation 737-300 737-500 737-700
Belo Horizonte 13
Brasilia 27 7
Boundaries 5
Cricidma 5
Curitiba 7 7
Fortaleza 7
Rio of Janciro 28 7
(GIG)
S_o Paulo(GRU) 18 7
Gov. Valadares 5
Joinville 5
Campinas 18 7
Madng_ 6 6
Montes Claros 6
Table 9 - Destinations to/from Vit6ria International Airport (VIX), in 2002
No. of flights Iper week 737-200 737400 A319 A320 F100 ERJ145
r
84 7 12 47
7 13
5
Macei6 7 7
PortoSeguro 1
Recife 7 7
Rio de Janeiro 96
(SDU)
Ribei_o Preto 5 5
Sio Paulo (CGH) i 69
Salvador 24 14
7
I1
11
5
II
Petrolina 7
Total flights 437 66
(per week )
Equipment 100% 15%
market share (%)
29 27 25 15
14 13 13
14 42 80
3% 10% 18%
6 23
4 6
7
6 135 74
1% 31% 17%
Source: SGTC - Sistema de Gerenciamento de Tones de Controle (April 2002)
ATR
42
10
20
5%
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4. THE IMPACT ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE
4.1 Options for Direct Aircraft Replacement
According with the links listed in the previous tables, there are ten different types of aircraft
operating in the domestic scheduled market m the four Southeast airports depicted. Among these ten
types, 50°/0 can be labeled as "new aircraft" (less than 10 years of service), while the other
remaining 50% can be treated for simplicity as "old aircraft" (10+ years of service). In view of this,
after interviewing several government and airline officials, and academics involved in air transport
issues, ideas of what possible future replacements could be managed by the Brazilian carriers and
their current operational fleets emerged. These opinions are depicted on Table 10:
Table 10 - Possible Replacement for Several _Mrcrafl in Use by Major Brazilian Carriers (2002)
Aircraft to be
replaced (*)
737-200 (95)
737-500 (110)
737-300 (128)
Fokker FI00
(t08)
Possible Replaeemeat
Aircraft (*)
737-600 (110) * *
Differenee in
seating capacity
+ 15%
ER/190-100 (98)
A318 (107) + 13%
+ 3%
737-700 (126) * *
A319 (124)
737-800 (162) * *
A320 (150)
A318(107)
ERJ-145 (50)
+ 14%
+ 13%
+ 26%
+ 17%
-1%
+4%ATR-42 (48)
Motivation and/or Justification
Aims m maintaining the overall dimensions
(wingspan and length) in order to simplify
airport phmnmg (same aircraft planning group),
while permitting the fleet modernization.
Individual airlines should study fleet
commonality and associated technical aspects in
order to determine _hat
type/family/manufacturer it would ultimately
chose for the envisioned fleet modemization.
TAM is the only operator of that aircraft (FI00)
in Brazil, and because of fleet standardization, it
could mos_ probably opt to transition to the
smallest aircraft of the A320 family.
Severalroutesnow been operatedby tmbopmps
couldtransitionto jets, given thatthe airports
depictedhereinare capable of operatingthe new
aircraft.Being Embraer a Brazilian
manufacturer and as itsaircraftare already
flying everywhere m the country, a natural
choicewould be replacing these turboprops
with ERJs (financial and or other capital-related
issues not addressed here).
Notes:
(*)Number ofpasseagetswithtypicalconfigur_on,accordingtomanufacturer'sdata.
(**)For simplificationand compmafivenmflts,theaircraftwiththelargestcapacitywas choseax
Source: Table elaborated by the authors, af_ consultations with Brazilian aviation experts..
4.2 The Apron
The apron dimensions are directly related to the dimensions of the aircraftthat will be operated in
that facility. In short, lengths, wingspans, wheel-bases and ground envelopes will determine the
separation distances among the aircraft themselves, the turning and taxi tracks, plus the separation of
the parked aircraft to the passenger and cargo terminals, just to mention a few examples.
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For planning proposes, aircrafts are classified in groups by physical (dimensions) and operational
characteristics. This classification distributes several aircraft inside a same group. For example,
aircraft inside of a certain wingspan strip they are grouped in a single letter. The standards for
aircraft group classification was set forth by ICAO and they were published in Annex 14, the official
ICAO recommendation for Airport Planning (Standards for Configuration and Operations of
Aerodromes).
This paper assumes, for simplification of the airport planning studies, that the future number, the
position and the group of aircraft that operate in a given airport will not be different from the present
day, only the types/variants/models of aircraft will be a matter of substitution (see Tables 10 and
11). Therefore the planning groups presently in use by the airport authority in Brazil to overlook the
airport master plan will be maintained to make possible a better analysis regarding operation of the
aircraft mentioned herein. In view of this, Table 1 1 presents possible new configurations of the four
listed airport aprons as the operating airlines opt to invest in a fleet renewal process.
Table 11 - Aircraft on the Apron in 2001 and the new Configuration Proposed (%)
Santos Dumont (R J)
[Proposed
Vit6ria (ES)
2001 5
Pampulha (BH)
Proposed
2001 1
Congonhas (SP)
Proposed
737
200
15
737 737
300 500
28 10
3 10 ,
3 20
14 13
737 I 737 737 A318
6001 700, 800
-122i
- 32 i 28 9
18
15 28 3 31
I16
5 36 I 3 19
- 14 3 I
1 27] 17 14
_A319 A320' F100
23 I 9
23 i
i 1 31
- i 1
}12 19
I 12 -
10 [20 14
10 i 20
Source: Table elaborated by the authors based on the airports" master plan data.
ERJ ATR
145 42
8
8
17 5
22
15 10
25
6 5
11
The aircraft compatibility - because of being from the planning group - makes possible a smoother
transition regarding the impacts on the apron. However in some cases, the operation of the new
equipment can generate significant effects in the planning parameters, mainly in safety and security.
To reach more specific results of that impact on the apron, a meticulous analysis of the physical
characteristics of the equipments (particular aircraft-type dimensions) is required.
4.3. Passenger Terminals
To make the capacity of a passenger terminal compatible with demand is one of the main roles of.
the airport management. The capacity of an airport should be able to grow in response to the most
effective and flexible form of management. Unfortunately, airport expansion limitations are
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enormous in several cases and very difilcult to be implemented in its desired, original over'an
concept. Within this complex situation lies the necessity of planning far ahead, in the long-range
mode (it is not uncommon to plan for 20-30 years, but yet very difficult to predict mainly the
technological advances that could be incorporated in this period). One of these difficulties is the
necessity of airlines renewing their fleets with modern, sometimes an "'unthinkable" aircraft 15-20
years in the past (the Airbus A380 and the now-shelved Boeing Sonic Cruiser are examples of this
kind of aircraft, just as the 747 and the Concorde were in the mid-to-late 60s).
As in other areas of the airport, the passenger terminal can be related to a level of service that it
provides. According to IATA (International Air Transport Association), the level of service is
considered as a limit of values or an evaluation of the ability of supplying the demand combining
amount and quality of the services, for consequence respecting the desired (predicted/planned)
comfort and convenience of the terminal for the passengers (present and future demands, as
forecasted in appropriate studies for that matter). Therefore a great difficulty exists in establishing a
quantifiable relationship between available space and level of service.
To allow a comparison in large-scale, between the several systems and sub-systems of an airport,
while still reflecting the dynamic nature of passenger demand (seasonal peaks, for example), IATA
established a measure of variation in the level of service of a passenger terminal, ranging from "A"
to "F" (Table 12). IATA recommends level "C" as the minimum required to offer a satisfatory-to-
good level of service, with of reasonable implementation/operation costs.
Table 12 - Levels of Service for Piammiag Parpmes according to IATA (square meters per passenger)
Termimd Area Level of S¢4-vice A B C D E F
Check-m area 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 tJN
A
Circulation area 2.7 2.3 1.9 1.5 1.0 c
c
Departme gates/lounges 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 E
P
T
Baggage claim areas (arrival) 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1 _. ^
B
Primary _ Totals (m2/pax) 7.9 6.9 5.9 4.9 3.8 L
E
Lee_ (levels of service):
A = ExceHem. Free flow and excellent comfort level
B = High. Flow stable, few delays and high comfort level.
C = Goo_ Stable flow, a_.eptable delays and good comfort level.
D = _. Flows unstable, small _lays and appropriate comfort level.
E = Inadequate. Unstable flows, unacceptable delays and inadequate comfort level.
F = Unaccel_ble. Crossed flows, unacceptable delays and unacceptable comfort level.
Source: IATA, Airport Development Refewenee Manual.
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In the present study, in order to develop a brief analysis of the passenger terminals' situation
regarding a possible comprehensive fleet renewal by Brazilian major airlines, and its possible
impacts in the four Southeast airports herein highlighted, three scenarios were elaborated based on
Department of Civil Aviation official statistical data:
• Scenario 1 - The load factor of the aircraft involved will be the average of 2001 (base year) and
the fleet will continue the same (in other words: 2001 demand; 2001 fleet/capacity);
• Scenario 2 - The load factor of the aircraft involved will be the average of 2001 (base year) and
the fleet will be renewed (2001 demand; new fleet, as proposed)
• Scenario 3 - The load factor of the aircraft involved will increase (targeted year in the future =
2006) and the fleet will be renewed, as proposed (new demand [increased]; new fleet).
(Note: According to DAC data, traffic in Brazil has grown 62.2% from 1997-2001; for simplicity, this growth was
extrapolated to the 2001-2006 period in this study. This extrapolation, here depicted in Scenario 3, is more conservative
than the original DAC data for its "most favorable" scenario).
The first step for the application of the proposed Scenarios will be the determination of the number
of passengers that will be carried by the new proposed aircraft. These numbers were calculated
based on the weekly use of each equipment (see Tables 6 to 9), thus generating more data. With the
numbers of the possible future volumes of passengers, Scenarios 1 through 3 were generated for
each of the four airports herein listed:
4.3.1 S5o Paulo/Congonhas Airport
Table 13-A - Weekly participation of aircraft and total of proportional passengers
used per equipment - CONGONHAS
(Considering the apron in its full capacity of 26 aircraft)
Equipment
737-200
737-300
737-500
737-600
73%700
737-800
A318
A319
A320
F100
ERJ-145
% Apron Today
(Table 11)
14
13
14
10
20
14
Actual Pax
25
466
372
459
126
322
780
393
78
% Apron
Proposed
(Table 111
27
17
14
10
20
11
ATR-42 5 62 --
Total 100 3083 100
Proposed Pax
29
885
716
389
322
780
143
B
3264
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Noms:
% Apron Today = Apron poreent usage by an aircraft in a period of one weeL (base = 2001).
% Apron _ = Proposed apron percent usage by an aircraft in a period of one weeL
Actual Pax = A proportional _ of passengers that now uses certain equipment for a
we_klyuse(proportionbetweenapronuse andthefullcapacilyoftheaircr_).
Proposed Pax = A proportional number of passengers that will u_ certain equipment for a
weeklyuse(proportionbetweenapronuse andthefullcap,_ityoftheaircr_).
w_
Table 13-B- Proposed Scmarios for Congonhas/CGH
I Scenar_ 1 { Scenar_2I
Average load-faaor (per equipment) 63.57% (*) 63.57°,6
Passengers camed 1960 2075 3264
Average no. of passengers per aircraft 75 80 126
Square meters per passenger 6.69 6.31 4.01
Level of service C C F
Scenario 3
100% (**)
Notes:
(*) Data obtaimd from dm DAC Statistical Yearbook.
(**) _factm- in _oymr 2001 with the increment of 62.2% (increase of_
without¢xmsid_'ingin_ thenumbcroffrequencies).
Sqtm_ nmt_ 1_ _ = Actual pammge_ tmninal operational arm divid_l by
Level of service '_F" dene(es urgent need for passengor terminal expansion.
4.3.2 Santos Dumont AirporVRio de Janeiro downtown
Table 14-A - Weekly participation of aircraft and total of proportional passengers
used per equipment- SA_WTOS DUMONT
(Considering the apron in its full capacity of 15 aircraft)
% Apron Today
(Table 11) Actual Pax
% Apron
Prolam_
(Table 11)
Propmed Pax
737-300 28 538 -- --
737-500 10 165 -- --
737-600 ....
73%700 22 416 32 605
737-800 -- -- 28 680
A318 -- -- 9 144
A319 23 428 23 428
A320 ....
FIO0 9 146 -- --
ERJ 145 8 60 8 60
ATR 42 ....
Total 100 1752 100 1917
Notes: See Table 13-A.
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Table 14-B - Proposed Scenarios for Santos Dumont/SDU
Scenario 1
57.14% (*)
Scenario 2
57.14%Average load-factor (per equipment)
Passengers carried 1001 1096 1770
Average no. of passengers per aircraft 67 73 118
Square meters per passenger 4.95 4.52 2.79
Level of service D E F
Scenario 3
92.67% (**)
Notes:
(*) Data obtained from the DAC Statistical Yearbook.
(**) Load-factor in base-year 2001 with the increment of 62.2% (increase of demand
without considering increasing the number of frequencies).
Square meters per passenger = Actual passenger terminal operational area divided by
total passengers calculated.
Level of services "E" and "F' denotes urgent need for passenger terminal expansion.
4.3.3 Pampulha Airport/Belo Horizonte downtown
Table 15-A - Weekly participation of aircraft and total of proportional passengers
used per equipment - PAMPULHA
(Considering the apron in its full capacity of 8 aircraft)
Equipment
737-200
% Apron Today
(Table 11) Actual Pax
385
737-300 3
737-500 20
737-600
737-700 16
737-800
A318
% Apron
Proposed
(Table 11)
Proposed Pax
Notes: See Table 13-A.
F100 19
ERJ 145 15
ATR 42 10
Total 100
164 B n
60 25 100
38 -- --
813 100 852
163
A319 ....
A320 12 144 12 144
31 -- --
176 -- --
-- 5 44
161 36 363
-- 3 39
-- 19
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Table 15-B- _Proposed Scenarios for Pampulha/PLU
Scenariol
45.72%(*)
Scenario 2
45.72%Average load-factor (per equipment)
Passengers carded 371 390 632
Average no. of passeng_ per aircraft 46 7949
6.00
Scenario 3
74.16% (**)
Squa_ meters per passenger 6.30 3.70
Level of service C C F
Notes:
(*) Data obtain_ from the DAC Statistical Yearbook_
(**) Load-factor in base-y_ar 2001 with the increment of 62.2% (increase of demand
withoutconsideringincr_ the_ offrequencies).
Square,metersperpassengeT= Actual passenger mminal operational area divided by
total _ers calculated.
Level of services "E" and "F" d_ot_ urgent need for passenger mmmal expansion.
4.3.4 Vit6ria InternationalAirport
Table 16-A- Weekly partici'pation of aircraft ud total of proportional passengers
used per equipment- vrrOR_
(Considzri_ the apron in its fun capacity of 6 aircraft)
% _mm Tod=y AcbudPaxEqmpmmt (Tamen)
737-200 86
%_
Vropmed
(Table 11)
15
73%300 3 23 -- --
737-500 10 66 -- --
-- 15 99
136 28 212
-- 3 29
-- 31 199
9 1 9
201 -- --
51 22 66
737-600
737-700 18
737-800
A318
A319
A320 1
FI00 31
ERJ 145 17
ATR42 5
Total 100
]4 -- --
586 100 614
Note.____s:SeeTable 13-A.
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Table 16-B - Proposed Scenarios for Vit6ria/VIX
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
47.54%Average load-factor (per equipment) 47.54% (*)
Passengers carried 279 292 473
Average no. of passengers per aircraft 46. 49 79
Square meters per passenger 10.09 9.63 5.94
Level of service A A C
Scenario 3
77.12% (**)
Notes:
(*) Data obtained from the DAC Statistical Yearbook.
(**) Load-factor in base-year 2001 with the increment of 62.2% (increase of demand
without considering increasing the number of frequencies).
Square meters per passenger = Actual passenger terminal operational area divided by
total passengers calculated.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Any study involving fleet renewal is already a complex task. This paper has presented, in a
simplified approach, some of the possible impacts of a comprehensive fleet renewal conducted by
scheduled carriers operating in the Southeastern states over the current infrastructure of four of the
major airports in the region (Silo Paulo/Congonhas, Rio de Janeiro/Santos Dumont, Belo
Horizonte/Pampulha and Vit6ria). As the great majority of the aircraft operated in these airports are
medium-sized twin-jets, the study opted to focus primarily these aircraft and their possible
replacements.
For this, the study identified the existence of ten different types of aircraft operating in the scheduled
domestic market from the four depicted airports. For simplicity, these aircraft were herein separated
into two distinct groups: an "old" group with 737-200s, 737-300/-400/-500s, Fokker F100s and
ATR-42s; and a "new" group comprising 737-NGs (-700/-800), A319, A320 and Embraer ERJ-145.
The simple fleet renewal pictured in this paper was guided by the principles of fleet commonality,
the maintaining of approximately the same overall dimensions, and a possible fleet modernization
(in the case of the turboprops). Due to the diversity of the physical and operational characteristics of
the aircraft involved, only the relationships among the replaced and replacement aircraft, the apron
and the passenger terminal were listed. In fact, due to the maintaining of the overall dimensions
(replacement aircraft in the same airport design/planning group of the replaced aircraft), the possible
impacts of the fleet renewal proposed over the apron were practically discarded in the present study.
However, it must be pointed out that a detailed study should be carried out in order to evaluate
existing ramp equipment configuration and compatibility in relation to the proposed replacement
aircraft.
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In order to permit a broad comparison among the four airports, the level of service indexes
recommended by LATA were used to evaluate possible future capacity constrains and passenger
comfort levels in the respective passenger terminals. For this, three scenarios were built for each
airport, based on the last official data (2001) for passenger volumes. These scenarios give a brief
overview of what could happen with the level of service m the four airports" passenger terminals ff a
+60% increase in demand is confirmed, a comprehensive fleet renewal is carried out, but no
terminal expansions are plannecL These possible impacts can be summarized:
• S_,o Paulo/Congon,L_._ (CGH/SBSP) is operating on the level of ser,:ice lower !_t (L_TA
level "C"), and it will maintain the same level with a fleet renewal, despite a small reduction
in the relation of square meters/passenger (as shown in Scenario 2). However for a mid-term
scenario (Scenario 3), Congonhas' terminal would become unacceptable, as it would reach
IATA's level of service "F".
• Rio de Janeiro/Santos Dumont Airport (SDU/SBRJ) is already operating below the desired
minimum ("C") as it obtained a level "D" for the present demancL With a major fleet renewal
it would get even worse, falling to level "E" (shown in Scenario 2). For the mid-term future
(Scenario3), Santos Dumont's passenger terminal would match Congonlms as well, being
unacceptable in IATA's indexes (would rock bottom at level 'q:").
• Belo Horizonte/Pampulha Airport (PLU/SBBH) has also shown that it has already reached
its operational limit (level "C" in the present passenger demand dam). This level will be
maintained with a major fleet renewal, but, as Congonhas, with a small reduction in the
square meter_passenger relation (as pointed by Scenario 2). However, just as Congonhas
and Santos Dumont, Pampulha will also reach level "F" if the forecasted increase in demand
materializes complementarily with the major fleet renewal (Scenario 3).
• Vit6ria Airport (VIX/SBVT) is a totally different case from the other three airports. It is
presently Olx=rating under the highest level of service ("A"), and will continue with the
introduction of the proposed replacement fleet (as depicted in Scenario 2). Interestingly, if
compared with the other airports, Vit6ria will maintain a level "'C" for its passenger terminal
even in the event of maximizing demand in the mid-term (Scenario 3).
It is important to observe that the majority of equipment located in an airport or in use by an airport
is dimensioned proportionally to the 5, 10 or 20-year forecasted volume of passengers that are
processed by the facility. Thus, if capacity and/or level of service problems already do exist in a
given passenger terminal, it will certainly impact negatively in several other facilities in the airport
site. This put, the present study has demonstrated the relevancy of considering fleet renewal options
as an important variable for presem and future airport planning in Brazil.
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Abstract
This paper addresses the effects of the deregulation of the Brazilian air transportation
industry in terms of the concentration of the market. We will show some metrics that are
commonly used to study the concentration of the industry. This paper uses the Herfmdhal-
Hirschrnan Index. This index tends to zero in the competitive scenario, with a large number
of small firms, and to one in case of a monopolistic scenario. The paper analyses the
dynamics of the concentration of the Brazilian domestic air transportation market, in order
to evaluate the effects of deregulation. We conclude that the Brazilian market presents
oligopoly characteristics and aspects in its current structure that maintain the market
concentrated in spite of the Deregulation measures adopted by the aeronautical authority.
Keywords: Herfindhal-Hirschman Index, concentration, Deregulation
1. Introduction
Sales or production concentration is related to the industry market distribution among
companies according to their size. For the air passenger transportation industry the product
that is being offered by the air transportation companies is the seat of an aircraft. This
productionplays a relevant part in the industry market structure since it should determine
the behavior and development of the air transportation company.
The economical theory suggests that structural characteristics of an industry sway its
behavior, as well as its prices, costs, profits and inventive activities in the market. This
paper is about one of the main dimensions of the air transportation industry, the production
concentration. It assumes that the number and size distribution of companies influence the
expectations related to the behavior of the competitors. For example, in an industry
scenario with a small number of companies, each one playing an important role in a market
that is not coming to any growth, the increase in sales of one company will mean failure for
the others. The companies soon discover why they lost market share and probably react
trying to get back their participation. A company usually cannot take aggressive initiative in
a market without consideration of the probable reaction of the competitors. Besides, the
number of companies and their participation in the market can influence the possibility of
collusions. Collusions will surely be successful if the number of companies in the industry
is small.
So, the reader can notice that the concentration level of an industry can determine the
dynamics of the playing companies and, indirectly, the industry own development. In a
detailed analysis, Industrial Concentration is understood as a process of growth of the
market power of the larger companies on the economical activity. The concentration level
is a measurement that expresses the structure of the industry.
One of the first studies in Brazil about concentration of an air transportation industry is the
paper developed by Espirito Santo (2000). It contains an analysis about the quality of the
national industry concentration and identifies reasons that may increase the industry
concentration. In the author's own words:
"... in 1998, VASP and Transbrasil started a code-share agreement in several domestic
connections. Although it was finished in some months, this was the beginning of new
domestic alliances. Practicing the code-share, the companies can commercialize their
flights together, as if they were one company. This way, the partner companies can cut
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down on the expenses related to giving information about flights, can come to the reduction
of frequency in the constant connections in the agreement- and this way, cut down on the
offering of seats and schedule- and can reduce the passenger's service level and the
straight competition_ This competition, from contestant companies, can become seriously
involved.'"
In Oliveira's study (2001) we're able to notice the importance of studying the concentration
m the air transportation market:
"'... Although there has been much criticism upon what we call Behavior-Structure-
Paradigm - that consists in the relation between the concentration level in a market (its
structure) and the power of the companies (behavior structure) - the writings on air
transportation have become even more emphatic in pointing that the predominant
strategies all over the worm have been emphasized. Besides, the evidences of domestic
alliances creations have been sufficiently concrete to assure that the market power in the
industry has increased more and more. That way, we "re come to the conclusion that the
control of the concentration levels and of market power in sections like the air
transportation has become one of the most important attributes of the authorities, looking
forward to promoting their own good. "'
Our next section will discuss the possible ways to measure the concentration, as well as we
intend to justify the index chosen to calculate the concentration level in the Brazilian Air
Transportation Industry.
2. Concentration measurements
There are several alternative indexes to measure concentration. At first we've got to know
however what are the desirable properties required from a concentration measurement. Hall
and Tideman (1967) suggested the following desirable properties:
(I) a concentration index should have only one dimension,
(II) themeasurementshouldn'tdependon thesizeof the industry,but it shouldconsistin a
measurementworkedout amongthe groupof companiespresentin the industry, that is,
eachcompany"contributionanswersfor its participationin the industry or in theeconomy,
(III) the concentrationmeasuremust increaseif the participation of a companyin the
market increaseuponanother- a smallerone.It meansthat the principle of transfers must
be used, if necessary. The principle of transfers will be defined here as the process in which
the efficient companies get part in the market because of the inefficient ones
(IV) if all the companies are divided in similar parts, the concentration measurement must
decrease accordingly. For example, if two companies are divided in two equal parts, then
the concentration will have to decrease by half
(V) the concentration measurement must be decreasing when related to the number of
companies
(VI) a concentration measurement should be between zero and one
A more understandable series of properties is determined by Hannah and Kay ( 1977 ):
(I) the adhesion of new companies of some relevant size must reduce concentration
(II) unions must increase concentration
(III) costumers changing at random for a specific brand must decrease concentration
(IV) if Pi represents the participation of a new company, when it becomes progressively
smaller, the effect on the concentration index must also be like that
(V) random factors in the growth of companies should increase concentration
Next, some of the most commonly used concentration measures will be shown, as well as
the theory about them.
2.1. Concentration index ( C )
It's the most frequently used
companies, that is:
measure. It measures the participation of the n biggest
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c=Z_
i=1
(1)
Pi - participation of company i in the market
n - number of companies
All the companies that are included in the measurement are equally treated; in other words,
they receive net weight 1. The concentration index only provides limited information about
the distribution of companies through number and size. Picture 1 shows the concentration
of two markets in the Brazilian air transportation industry, the connections:
Altamira ( SBHT ) - Bel&n ( SBBE ),
and Belo Horizonte ( Pampulha - SBBH ) - Brasilia ( SBBR ).
1
-B-- Altamira-Bel6m + BH (Pampulha)-Brasilia ]
I
100%1 _ _ _1
] 90,75%/_ 100_6 % loo,oo%!!
80% I _ ./ ....... wl
°0%I o//4 o IIu 53,95 ,62%
20%
°%0 1 2 3 4 _ '°1Number of companies
Picture I
The information on picture 1 can be used to find the minimum number of companies that
represents some specific participation of market. In SBHT - SBBE, two companies
represent63,62%of the market,while in SBBH- SBBR this numbergoesup to 90,75%.
It's possibleto seethroughpicture 1 that the lines do not touch eachother, in anyplace.
This fact impliesthattheorganizationof theconnectionswill notbe affectedby the choice
of n companies. In cases like that, for any number of chosen companies, the SBBH - SBBR
connection will always be the most concentrated among the two analyzed.
Picture 2 shows the concentration at two other connections in the Brazilian national air
transportation market:
Rio de Janeiro ( Gale,_o ) - Salvador
and Sao Paulo ( Guamlhos ) - Curitiba.
100
8O
o_
Q.
u
Q.
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0%
RJ (Gale_o) - + SP (Guarulhos) -
79,76 S_4_"f 93,43
61,05 _____72,98 65,79
32,51_ 2'86
,/ 32,73
/
_0 .... i
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of companies
Picture 2
On picture 2, the concentration index for two companies shows that SP ( Guarulhos ) -
Curitiba market is more concentrated than RJ ( Gale_o ) - Salvador one. But for
comparisons, the concentration index considering only one company is inverted, that
means, RJ ( Galeao ) - Salvador connection is more concentrated.
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Literally, this concentrationindexis, manytimes,presentedin adifferent way:
i=1 (2)
X_- represents what the interest is
Pi - indicates the part of market of the company on the total amount
n - total number of companies in the market
m - represents the biggest companies in the market, and m is smaller than n, or similar to it
Generally, the values.used are CR4 (or C12), and these measurements can be defined as a
variable number of concentration that indicates the percentage of the correspondent
industry related to the four (or twelve) biggest companies in the industry. Actually, what's
considered is the participation of the biggest companies, that means, it's the res-Mt of
concentrating the m biggest companies in a market with n companies.
According to Feijo et aL (2001), the economical literature suggests concentration zones to
classify the markets. These indicators can be seen next:
Grid I - Concentration zones accord/rig to C and CRM indexes
Concentration zones Definitions
Not concentrated at all Markets in which the biggest companies
have a participation of 25% or less
A little concentrated Markets in which the participation of the
biggest companies results between 25% and
50%
Concentrated
Very concentrated
Those with a market participation varying
from 50% to 75%
The market participation of the biggest
companiesis 75%ormore
Source." Feijo et al. (2001)
2.2. Herfmdhal-Hirschman Index ( HHI )
It can be defined as:
HHIi =  ,Pi 2 (3)
i--1
Pi- participation of the company
n - total number of companies in the industry
The highest value an index can reach equals to 1, and this is possible when there's one only
company in the market. The minimum value (in which the companies are all the same size)
depends on the number of companies. That way, when n = 100, the minimum index is 0.01.
For example, if two air companies have, each one, a percentage of 50% of market
participation, the Herfindhal-Hirschman index is 0.502 + 0.502 = ½.The index gets near to
zero, in a competitive case, with a great number of small companies, and it is equals to one
in a monopoly case - it means, companies generally present great power of market in this
situation, and that can bring loss to the costumers. We can find, in some cases, HHI values
calculated in absolute numbers. For example, the same last situation, two companies with
50% of market participation were considered. Their HHI value would be 5000 points (502 ÷
502 = 5000 ). The square measure means that the smaller companies contribute less than
proportionally for the index value. A simple example can illustrate the different orders
varying according to the measurements:
Grid 2 - Comparison between concentration index (C) and Herfmdhal-Hirschman index (HHI)
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Industry A Industry B
n P; (%) p;2 P; (%) P7
1 50 0,25 80 0,64
2 40 0,16 10 0,01
3 10 0,01 10 0101
100 0.42 100 0,66
Both scenarios bring the concentration index (C) of two companies presented in 90%, but
the Herfindhal-Hirsehman index (HHI) is of 0.41 for Industry A and 0.65 for Industry B.
The concentration index (C) does not consider the relative size of the two biggest
companies, while the Herfindhal-Hirschman index (HHI) does. HHI satisfies all the
desirable conditions identified by Hall Tideman and Hannah-Kay and mentioned before in
this paper. Besides, this index has received increasing theoretical support. Carlton and
Perloff (1998) assure that there is a relationship between HHI and the Market Power. The
market structure can be classified according to the HHI value. Some books propose the
following classification:
Grid 3: Market straeture elma_ed aceordiag to the HerfmdhabHirschmau index
Structure HHI Price competition intensity
Perfect competition Usually less than 0.2 Hard
Monopolized competition Usually less than 0.2 Depends on how much
different the products are
Oligopoly From 0.2 to 0.6 Depends on the competition
among the companies
Monopoly More than 0.6 So_ unless there's the
possibility of new
competitors
2.2.1. Comments
As we could see through the studies and comparisons, there are many writings in The
United States that verify the concentration effects on fees among cities served by air lines,
once the industry was deregulated. Carlton and Perloff (1998) quote some papers where
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they noticedthat the feesarehigherwherethe concentrationis also higher.Thesepapers
arefrom Call andKeeler(1985),Bailey, GrahamandKaplan (1985) and Graham,Kaplan
and Sibley (1983). And they could also notice there's a relevant statistics effect of
concentrationupon development,even though it's got a modest size. The researches
concludedby Borenstein(1992),Brueckner,Dye and Spiller (1992), Evansand Kessides
(1993) discussedthe concentrationon the American market. In thesewritings, the most
usedmeasurewasHHI, andthat's becauseit respectsall thedesirablepropertiesandis easy
to behandled.
The United StatesJustice Departmentprovides the following concentrationzones to
measuretheconcentrationlevelof an industry:
Grid 4: Placing zones
Hill Classification
0.00 - 0.10 Low concentration
0.10 - 0.18 Controlled concentration
0.18 - 1.00 High concentration
According to these zones, the American department uses the verified changes on the HHI to
decide if a company fusion can be allowed or not. The agency analyses the situation
carefully: if the intended transaction happens in a controlled concentration market, and
provokes more than 0.01 of addition on the HHI, or 0.005 in high concentration markets,
the agency will understand that this transaction probably wants to create, or emphasize, the
market power (or make its functioning easier). That way, the proposal goes through a hard
analysis to identify the possible impacts on the competition and the needy solutions to
approve the fusion.
In Brazil the usage of concentration measurements (HHI) in the fusion of two beer
companies: Brahma and Anthrtica, could be notice
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This paperusesthe Herfindhal-HirschmanIndex(HHI) to analyze the concentration in the
Brazilian National Air Transportation Industry.
3. Concentration analysis: Brazilian National Air Transportation Industry- from
1982 to 2000
This section aims to verify the possible impacts on the concentration due to the
deregulation rules the Brazilian government has adopted for the last few years. To do so,
we'll snow the procedures used to calculate the Hea-_tchhal-H_chman Index _q-_-II), and its
development throughout the years chosen for the present study.
We use the concept of Aggregated and Disaggregated Concentration. The Aggregated
Concentration considers the HHI index calculated over the market participation of the
commercial groups of air companies, not over the individual participations of each
company. For example, VARiG Organization is x%rmed by four compaaies: VARIG, Rio-
Sul, Nordeste (since 1995) and Cruzeiro (1991/92). The Aggregated Concentration
considers the participation of the four companies as one commercial group. The
Disaggregated Concentration on the other hand determines the HHI Index for each
company using the individual participation of each company i, as if it were an independent
company.
To calculate HHI, a database was created, with the yearly market share of each company
from 1982 to 2000. The primary source of information was the Annual Statistics Report of
the Brazilian Air Transportation Industry, a yearly publication of the Civil Aviation
Department. The market participation of the national companies was measured by means of
the offered seat.kilometers.
Having the market participation of each company, HHI was calculated through formula 3
(Aggregated and Disaggregated Concentration). For a better and clearer understanding
picture 3 shows the progress of concentration levels in the national market throughout the
years, measured in HHI.
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The reader can notice in picture 3 that from 1982 to 1991 the aggregated concentration kept
high levels - as considered by the economical theory. According to grid 3, we can classify
the market structure of that time as an oligopoly. And we know that in this market, a few
companies are responsible for the biggest part or for the total of the production. In some
markets, some of or all companies get profits in long terms, once there are obstacles to the
entrance of new companies in the market (that makes more difficult the joining of new
companies). In this specific case, there was an oligopoly controlled by the government until
1991. The fees were controlled by the public power, aiming to cover costs and expenses of
minimum wages. The policies in use from 1982 to 1991 were in great part the responsible
for the high concentration levels of the national industry. The controlled competition was
adopted because the authorities believed that the free competition among companies could
make them grow weak, technically, operationally and financially.
Other reasons that helped the achievement of high market concentration were:
(I) entrance obstacle: the joining of a new company in the market needed government
authorization, and what could be noticed was that, in general, it didn't allow the joining,
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aiming to "avoid great competition". From 1982 to 1991, there weren't new companies'
joining the industry, but in 1986. One thing that contributed to this situation was that there
were great economics of scale (Silva e Lopes, 1994). So, if one company wanted to join the
market, it would have to produce in smaller scale and get higher costs than the established
ones. At this time, the Department of Civil Aviation divided the country in five areas, and
chose, for each one of these regions, one local company to monopolize routes between
countryside and capitals. One needy aspect for a competitive market to exist is the
possibiiity of companies freely coming and going in the market, and that wasn't exactly
happening.
According to several authors, the control air companies have upon computer reservation
systems is considered the main obstacle when new companies want to join the market. In
Brazil, till the end of the 80's, each one of the national companies had its own reservation
system. From i990 on computer reservation systems started to be more di_. These
systems were widely known, and the Brazilian companies had to change their old and poor
systems for one of the most known systems throughout the world - not to harm their
internal sales (Nishime, 1996). That's why there isn't reservation systems controlled by
national companies anymore nowadays; almost all of them use systems controlJed by
foreign companies. In late 80's and early 90's, ifa new company wanted to join the market,
it would find difficulties in having its flights presented in similar conditions of those
already in the market. And if by chance, it chose a new system, it would have to make it
popular - it was an expensive procedure and yet, it would face the opposition of the ones
already in place. If it chose to join one of the most known systems in Brazil, it would have
to share places with a big company, what, for sure, would put the beginner in disadvantage
when using or presenting flight information. Yet, a beginner would have to face the
preference for the companies with higher market share.
Hall and Tidman (1967) assured that the concentration must decrease when related to the
number of companies, and that way, the obstacles that didn't permit new companies to get
in the market contributed to high concentration in the national air transportation market,
from 1982 to 1991.
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(II) route and fi'equencies: the regulated market did not allow companies to compete on
fees; so, one alternative instrument that could have been used was the increase in routes and
frequencies. But these possibilities were also controlled by the Department of Civil
Aviation, the institution practically imposed its progress factors. These limits controlled
any kind of competition among air companies, leading to stronger companies (the big ones)
and stronger groups formed by companies with objectives in common. The increase in
concentration happened because the big companies had their participation in the market
higher at the expense of the smaller ones.
Another reason that led the market to a high concentration was VARIG group. It presented
a superior growth when related to the others. At that time the group was formed by two
national companies (Cruzeiro and VARIG) and two other regional companies (Rio-Sul and
Nordeste). Besides, TAM started to get its group together, with Brasil Central fi:om 1986
on.
The reader must have come to the conclusion that the government ruled the concentration
of the companies from 1982 to 1991. This instrument can be useful in promoting the
economic efficiency of the companies, however, we have to consider its effects on the
passenger, yet. This high level of concentration in the industry brought losses to the users,
as we can see: high fees, decrease in routes and fi:equencies and smaller number of served
cities - everything because there was no competition in the area.
But from 1992 on, this situation started to change, and there was an opening process
controlled by the air transportation section in the Department of Civil Aviation. Once again,
if we observe picture 3, we'll see that the aggregated concentration of the industry started to
diminish in ! 9907 This decrease was interrupted in 1993, when Cruzeiro left VARIG group.
Therefore, the new rules set for the air transportation were efficient, when considering the
effect on the concentration.
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This way, we'll display our analysis to check if this low concentration level was enough to
bring any new competition to the market. First of all, it's possible to see that the number of
companies in the market grew - more air companies in the market means less concentration
measurement. As it's known, the concentration is decreasing when related to the number of
companies acting in the market. Again the policy in place played important role in the
process of making the number of companies in the market grow. In 1992, the government
banished some obstacles for the regional companies. Article of number 688/GM5/92 set the
so called Spe_al ,_r Lines (conn,_rig some downtown aL,ports: Congonhas, Santos
Dumont and Pampulha among themselves and with Brasilia's airport). Then, these regional
companies started to have more possibilities of competing, and counting on the advantage
of being in the central airports, with the greatest volume routes of traffic. Another important
factor was that they could start being used fi'om any region.
Ym
m the end of laa-_,,,, and berg of 1998, the _,......._;-'_*,,_q,,-s_,c_n_*_,_,_...v imr,,_a_fl_.antmanag__nent
writings to emphasize the competition among the companies of air transportation.
986/DGAC provided the companies with fees and discounts of 65% on the steady value,
and 05/GM05, that freed "any Brazilian air company to use the special lines". These two
new happenings provoked immediate impacts on the section's competition, once in March /
1998 a real war of fees was started.
The direct reflexes of this deregulation can be summarized in two main aspects:
(I) air fares reduction and
(II) multi air fares instroduction
As the Department of Civil Aviation stopped controlling the concentration of the national
company, the air transportation companies started to set different strategies to act in the
market. That way, some national companies began to use more efficient instruments in
management. The so ca/led Yield Management techniques, already in use in many countries
all over the world (Oliveira, 2000). Using these techniques, even only in part, can be
considered a good indicator that the market presents a greater sense of competition if
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compared to the years when the concentration level was controlled by the government. So,
the industry opening led the national companies to set new goals to their organizations, and
to search ways for a better participation in the market.
Even with this market opening, there still are several obstacles blocking new companies to
join Brazilian market. These obstacles make the industry even more concentrated, and
there's loss if competing. We have:
(I) access to a basic infrastructure: a company that would like to start air service would
face a big difficulty: get space at the airports, because almost all of them are totally busy
with the companies that already exists. The situation gets even harder if the "candidate
company" tries to enter the market using the airports with more traffic - where it's more
difficult to get space, not only related to physical conditions of the airport, but also to to the
limitations of frequency that the new company could have. There's also the fact that the
noble timetables can be totally filled, and only the periods of less movement would rest.
The space given to each company is determined by Infraero, the company that manages the
most important airports in the country, according to their respective market participation.
On the last few years, problems of traffic started to appear in airports, mainly in Congonhas
(SP). They blocked the taking off and landing of the companies, and due to that, any
company, new or not, that doesn't operate in Congonhas will face obstacles - physical
dependences and windows, taking off in noble timetables totally busy. Most of the main
Brazilian airports on the other hand do not hava any serious problem of space for new
eventual companies. But this does happen due to the efforts of Infraero, that appears to take
the appropriate actions to maintain/he capacity of these main airports. As we see, the
situation is comfortable, however, in the future Infi'aero's decisions related to airport spaces
will be seen as if they were a market institution. So, we must include the decisions that
refer to the management of airports on the political acting of the government, related to the
air transportation market (mainly subjects about spaces in the airports).
(II) market strategies for the companies that already exist: some market strategies used by
air companies can make things even more difficult if a new company wants to join the
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Jmarket.We can emphasize the existence of programs that try to create loyalty to a certain
company or group through prizes.
In 1996, VASP, VARIG and TAM started to such programs, stimulating passengers to be
loyal to the airline. This has made passengers to elect to use the service of one company -
at least the ones who use it frequently - and it makes more difficult for. smaller companies
to participate in the market ( they have less participation in mutes determined in the market
as a group).
Jfinior et al. (1998) conclude that a negative fact coming from the deregulation was that it
facilitated the acquisition of smaller companies by the large national or regional companies.
Therefore, although the concentration level decreased because of the measures adopted, the
market today could be a lot less concentrated if the authority had used instruments to
control the concentration. We can check it through picrare 3, where we have the
concentration measured without thinking about group influence (disaggregated
concentration). We come to the conclusion that the authority made a mistake in this aspect,
became it allowed comercial group formation. This situation in the future can provoke a
decrease in competition in this section, once as time goes by, there's a greater chance for
these groups to use their market power.
4. Final considerations
The Brazilian market, even after the deregulation measures adopted, keeps several
characteristics of an oligopoly. The opening process of the Brazilian industry is recent, and
that's why it's going through some adjustments according to the new policies in the market.
Some corrections and adjustments on number of companies working on the deeper routes
of the Brazilian market probably will come to happen according to the great number of
companies offering services for any of these routes. That emphasizes one fact: the industry
has tended to concentrate, it means, the Brazilian market has followed trends from other
countries with similar markets, and that makes the number of air companies offering the air
transportation service small. So, a few companies have relevant parts of the domestic
market, leading to a control of market not desired, when it comes to competition. The
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sections that control the air transportation market could take some initiatives, so that the
market would be more competitive, like trying to avoid abuses when using reservation
systems, coordinate decisions about routes and spaces in the airports, check and control
alliances and agreements that can result in excessive control of routes and frequencies of an
airport on an only group's hand. Just to control fees of an activity does not mean a decrease
in prices because of competition, it's also necessary a proper environment to exist
competition. Following trends noticed in other countries, the Brazilian market has a small
number of companies, what means a concentrated market. Even in markets like the
American one, totally free, the number of companies is proportionally small, and there's
also the case of one only company operating in an airport.
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THE IMPACT OF TOTAL LIBEtLa, LIZATION OF
DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT ON THE SOCIAL \VELFARE
AND ON THE DYNAMIC OF COMPETITION:
COMPARISON BETWTEEN UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION
BY KARIM. ZBIDI 1
Abstract
Since the l_ofApril1997 date of the implementation of the third package of the
liberalization, air transport, within the european Union has become totally liber-
alized. In the United States the deregulation of domestic air traffic was earlier
and faster since it took place in October 1978 after the adoption of the only act of
deregulation. This paper, in its first part, deals with the liberalization of the indus-
try of air traffic in the european union. After a comparison with US system based
on market demand, fare policy and network restrictions, we present our descriptif
results coming from treatments on the OAG data. These results present several
aspects such as the evolution of the competitive structure of the intra-european
routes, the level of airport dominance and the growth of hub structure.
The second part of the paper presents models of entry in the airline industD,. As
profitability" of route flown explains correctly decisions taken by airlines to serve
or not a route, the paper focuses on the specification and the estimation of the
determinants of city, pair profitability in the european union. Treatments done on
the OAG data show a rapid development of leasing space agreement (partial and
total) and code sharing practices between 1995 and 2000 in Europe that's why-
we differentiate first between the two type of competitive strategy of entry(direct
1. CENA (Centre d'Etude de la Navigation A_xienne), LEEA (Laboratoire d'Economie
et d'Econom_rie de l'Abxien), E-mail:zbidi_recherche.enac.fr, T41: (0033)562174128, Fax:
(0033)562174143
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entry and leasing space agreement) and second between the competitive strategy
of entry and the alliance strategy of code sharing. So the estimation of model will
be able to answer the question if the european air transport market is contestable
and in case not to see if the decision of entry is more directed by the level of
airport dominance (as in the domestic United States market)or essentially by the
competitive structure of the routes. We try to explain the nature of entry(direct
leasing or code sharing) by the different levels of these two determinants.
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The deregulation of domestic air transport in the united states took part consid-
erably in the reduction of plane tickets real fares, a fall which involved a social
welfare profit estimated on average at 4.04 dollars of 1977 per passenger (over the
period 1978-1983) according to S.A.Morrisson and C._'inston [13]. Fares x-ariation
was done in such a way that tariffs suggested become more adequate with costs
supported by the airlines to offer their service on different markets. The prolifer-
ation of tariffs is another consequence of the deregulation which is explained by
the policy of price discrimination practised by companies to discriminate between
passengers according to their willingness to pay.
The adoption of hub and spokes networks is another principal consequence of
the deregulation. The number of real competitors (inverse of heriindhal index)
have been reduced on a national scale gi_4ug place to a greater concentration but
this didn't prevent the intensification of competition on the route level. This new
structure of network also led to a stronger concentration of the airports which
became dominated by one or two airlines.
The travellers saw the quality of certain aspects of service worsening. The flights
duration and the average load factor increased so it becomes more difficult to find a
place in time preferred flights. However, these losses have been widely compensated
by the improvement of other qualit 5, aspects of service, m particular the increase
in flights frequencies and the reduction of interconnected flights (connected flight
between two different airline)(M.GaudD- et R.Mayes[15]).
1 The experiment of the liberalization of the air
transport in Europe
1.1 Comparison with domestic air transport in the United
States
Compared to american domestic air transport market, the intra-european market
presents different characteristics. In the demand side, the competing potential of
the other means of transport is more significant in Europe than in the United
States. Indeed, although the population of Europe is more significant than that
of the United States (380 million against 280 million in 2001), Europe presents
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a smaller geographical space . This difference of surface results on an average
distance per flight less significant into Europe than with the United states. In
2000 the average distance traversed by the intra-european flights was estimated
(balanced by the annual frequency of the flights) at 869 km whereas _4th the
United states it was established to 1665 km (Air Transport Association ATA).
This relatively short stage length explains the stronger competition of the other
means of transport in Europe. Moreover, the technological projection of high-speed
trains allows a more significant competition of railroads transport in Europe.
The aggregate size of the european airlines is less significant than that of the
american air companies. In 2000, the joined production of all the american airlines
rose to 1114 billion passenger kilometers whereas the european airlines (members
of the AEA) generated 613 billion passenger kilometers during the current of the
same year. Moreover the traffic of the european companies is much more directed
towards the international. Indeed, only 26.6% of the total passenger traffic of the
American airlines in 2000 (measured as a passenger kilometers) (corresponds to
8% of passengers)was international whereas more than 91.1% of the european
airlines traffic was international (55% of passengers). This international orientation
is partially explained by the small size of countries composing Europe, but if
Europe is seen as a one geographical entity, the percentage of the international
traffic (towards country except european geographical space) remains relatively
high with 77.5% (45% of the passengers) (Source ATA and AEA).
The charter traffic (low-cost included), much more present in Europe than in the
United States, is an additional side of divergence. Indeed in 2000 25% (50% of the
passengers) of the european airlines traffic was served in charter mode, a mode
which transports a broad part of the leisure traffic at a very competing tariffs.
This same figure does not exceed the 1.3% (0.8% passengers) for the american
airlines. All these characteristics of the air transport industry in Europe imply
that the demand side benefit from liberalization will be less significant in Europe
than from deregulation in the United States.
In the side of pricing policy, the european process of liberalization, in its first
package, offer airlines the possibility to propose reductions until 55% less expen-
sive than the coach fare. The second package had more flexibility by authorizing
reductions until 70% and by weakening the constraint, of double approval, hence-
forth a tariff will be implemented if the two respective governments do not notify
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their refusal at the end of 30 days after the fare demand. The third package came
into effect in January 1993 and introduced the complete liberalization of the tariffs
from January 1996. Although these measurements of liberalization allowed a fare's
drop of 20% on average, the yield in Europe remained relatively high. Indeed in
2000 the yield from american airlines domestic traffic was only of 0.095 per passen-
_Jaom_rs transposed tUTr_'V_get 1.-_ _,^ _, ,, _ ) whereas the european airlines ones related to
the intra-european traffic was established at 0.375. The average distance, relatively
more important, in the United States can explain a part of this yield's difference
but this effect remains partial. In fact, following the deregulation, the yield of the
domestic traffic in the United States dropped much more quickly than the one of
intra-european traffic following the liberalization process.
One of the most popular explanation of the relatively high yields in Europe is
that the european airlines would profit from a significant market power which rise
from the practices of collusive pricing strategy. Indeed, the system of bilateral
agreements which existed between the states members of the european union is
suspected of having implemented then reinforced such collusive practices between
airlines.
However measurements which were made concerning market power in the industry
of air 1;ransport in Europe do not plead for a t;ooperative pricing system. Indeed
the estimate of the standard conjectural x"ariations model(see Good, Roller and R.c
sickles [3]) leads to a parameter of behavior which suggests a pricing in conformity
with cournot model. It is true that the studies made on Europe are based on
aggregate data and thus a heterogeneous behavior of the airlines with respect to
different routes remains possible.
Brander and Zhang I171studied the question of market power in the industry, of
the american airlines and they concluded that the data are much more compatible
with the model of cournot competition than the Bertrand one or the model of
collusive behavior. Another branch of the literature suggests the existence of a
significant market power in the industry of air transport in the United States.
Hurdle 116] and _,qfinston and Collins[23] studied the assumption of contestability
of air transport market in the United States. They found that the market isn't
contestable and that on some routes, airlines are able to increase excessively their
profit . This joins the remarks made by Borenstein I21 and Bern/12011211 which
specify that the airlines are able to increase their yields on a given route through
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a strong presence on the two extreme airports and the domination of a hub.
Neven, Roller and Zhang[5] conclude the market power in the air transport euro-
pean market is not appreciably more significant relative to the market of domestic
transport in the United States. Moreover the available aggregate data suggests
that the european airlines do not exert any collusive practice of pricing. Indeed
they estimate that the profit margins observed are coherent with a non cooperative
nash equilibrium.
Given these results, it appears obvious that it is necessary to seek elsewhere for the
explanations of the relative rise of the yield in Europe. There were several expla-
nations presented in the literature. All these explanations put forward a relatively
high unit cost in Europe. This high unit cost can be explained either by a higher
prices of factors or productive inefficiencies.
Neven, Roller and Zhang[5] estimated a model that endogenizes costs and the
dynamics of competition on the market of transport in Europe. They concluded in
addition to the fact that the prices observed are not in conformity with a colluding
practices, that the relative rise of prices of the factors cannot explain the level of
unit cost of the airline in Europe and that the most reasonable explanation would
be the technical lack of efficiency.
Indeed when the firms are technically inefficient, the weak profit margins can be
associated high unit costs that the firms can allow themselves because of the lack
of competing pressure. In this case the fares will be high because the costs are so
and the margin fare-unit cost will be small. Encaoua [9] and Good[4]were leaning
on the question of productive efficiency of the european airlines. They highlighted
that, compared with the american airlines, the european airlines are of 50% to 70%
less productive.
1.2 Descriptive results of intra-european air transport
The liberalization process of the airline industry was set up with the aim of ending
with the situation of monopoly from which profits several airlines, and of dropping
fares through the intensification of the level of competition within the european
union.
In what will follow we will present our results from treatments on OAG data. These
data were available for the years 1995, 1999 and 2000 i.e for the period of partial
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liberalization (1995) and that of total liberalization (after 1997). These results are
articulated around three axes: the competing structure within the intra-european
routes, growth of hub structure and the level of domination of european airports.
It's important to mention that all results concern only intra-european flights for
which traffic is totally liberalized. This is done to find the most credible comparison
with domestic air traffic in the united states.
Concerning the domestic air traffic industry in the united states, JAN K.Brueckner
and Pablo T.Spiller [14] mentioned that after an initial decline, industry concen-
tration has increased at the national level over the post-deregulation period. The),
also remarque that. despite this rising national concentration of the industry, com-
petition in the average cith'-pair market has grown over the period.
O1
Q2
Q3
Q4
1995 1999 2000 %(1995//2000)
!46 16! 164 12.3
152 172 169 11.2
153 167 175 14.3
157 169 187 19.1
Annual 181 197 210 16.0
TAB. 1 - The Evolution of airline's number operating within the european union
The evolution of the number of airlines operating regular routes within european
union gives an overview of liberalization incidences. Indeed, as shown in table
1 this number rose on average _, 16% between 1995 and 2000 with differences
over quarters. This rising number of operating airlines doesn't necessarily mean a
concentration's decline in the european union because the level of concentration
depends on the distribution of market shares between airlines companies.
Table2 show the level of concentration within the european union based on ASK
(.available seat kilometers) shares.
The level of concentration doesn't appear to be sensitive to seasonality phenomenon,
so the level of concentration is globally the same for high and low season. The main
information sho_m in table 2 is a marked decrease in market concentration between
1995 and 2000. Indeed, the real number of competitors increased by more than 41%
from 18 to 26. Thus the real number of airlines increased much more rapidly than
the number of airline operating which implies an intensification of competition in
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High season(Q2-Q3)
Low season(Q4+Q1)
Real airline's number 1
1995 18.40
1999 22.04
2000 26.04
1995 18.29
1999 21.93
2000 25.39
1: Defined as the inverse of Herfindhal index
TAB. 2 - Level of traffc's concentration within the European union
the city-pair market level.
So, the intra-european concentration decreased at the aggregate and city-pair levels
between 1995 and 2000 allowing more route competition.
It is interesting to see how this competition growth had affected flight distribution
between different airports. To do this, we proceeded by classifying intra-european
airport into four categories: large hub, medium hub, small hub and nonhub. Thus
an individual airport falls into one of four hub classifications based on that air-
port's percentage of total ASK at intra-european airports. Those airports treating
1 percent or more of the total are classified as large hubs, airports treating between
0.25 and 0.99 of the total are classified as medium hubs, airports treating between
0.05 and 0.24 percent of the total are classified as small hubs, and those treating
less than 0.05 percent of the total are classified as nonhubs. For example, in 2000,
there were 29 large hubs, 41 medium hubs, 68 small hubs and 131 nonhubs.
1995 29
Larges Hubs 1999 30
2000 29
1995 37
Moyens hubs 1999 38
20OO 41
TAB. 3 - Hubs number for domestic traffic within european union
Table ?? insists on the fact that the number of large hubs remained stable between
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1995 and 2000 whereas the one of medium hubs grew from 37 to 41. This means
that the companies were developing their traffic around the medium hubs probably
because of the saturation of large hubs.
1995
Large Hub Medium Hub Small Hub Nonhub
Large Hub 31.8 22.0 16.2 15.4
Medium Hub 2.1 3.8 2.5
Small Hub 2.9 2.4
Non Hub 1.1
Nb. total scheduled flights1:2821
1999
Large Hub Medium Hub Small Hub Nonhub
Large Hub 29.2 25.3 16.2 14.2
Medium Hub 2.6 4.7 2.3
_mau Hub 2.5 L.-""
Non Hub 0.9
Nb. total scheduled flights: 3997
2000
Large Hub Medium Hub Small Hub Nonhub
Large Hub 28.7 27.1 15.2 13.3
Medium Hub 2.9 5.0 1.9
Small Hub 2.7 2.6
Non Hub 0.7
Nb. total scheduled flights: 4249
1: thousands
TAB. 4 - Distribution of scheduled flights per pairs of classified hubs within the
European union (expressed as a percentage )
This observationiswidelyconsolidatedby results from table4on the distribution
ofscheduledflightswithinthe European union.Indeed,thistableshows thatmore
than 80% of totalflights,come from or go to a largehub which emphasis the
preponderanceofhub structurenetworksinser_4ugintra-europeantrafficdemand.
The number of scheduledflightsgrew rapidlybetween 1995 and 2000,more than
50% infiveyears.This growth had been mainlyabsorbed by flowsoftrafficbetween
largeand medium hubs. Indeed the share offlightsbetween largehubs decreased
between 1995 and 1999 whereas the one between largeand medium hubs increased
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by 5 points. Airlines appear to prefer developing regional hubs where slots are
much more easily obtained and the delays are less significant.
FRANKFURT
PARIS(C.DEGAULLE)
AMSTERDAM
BRUSSELS
PARIS(ORLY)
MUNICH(INTL)
DUESSELDORF
MADRID
LONDON(GAT'WICK)
BARCELONA
LONDON (HEATHROW)
HAMBURG
COPENHAGEN(INTL)
NICE
ATHENS
ROME(FIUMICINO)
STOCKHOLM(ARLANDA)
MILAN (LINATE)
STUTTGART(ECHTERDINGEN)
DUBLIN
LONDON(STANSTED)
1995 1999 2000
100 114 112
89 102 104
89 93 96
88 80 86
87 64 65
84 102 107
75 101 98
75 75 77
73 79 81
73 78 80
73 65 61
71 78 82
71 69 69
71 68 60
67 62 63
67 72 73
67 78 81
62 68 71
59 66 74
57 56 61
41 62 81
TAB. 5 - Number o] cities within the european union connected to large hubs
Table 5 and 6 show the evolution of the number of endpoints served by large and
medium hubs within the european union. We note that globally the number of
city connected for large hubs doesn't grow as faster as the number of endpoints
connected to medium hubs. This can be explained by the fact that for large hubs
the jump in number of connected cities have been already done before 1995 whereas
medium hubs are now in full extension.
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NUREMBERG
DlmvlLN GHAM
ALICANTE
EDLNBURGH
NAPLES(INTL)
FARO
PORTO
BOLOGNA
M._RSEILLE
TOULOUSE
BREMEN
TURIN
BILBAO
LYON(ST. EXUPERY)
1995 1999 2000
32 47 52
34 35 43
25 33 41
27 36 39
22 36 39
20 34 38
28 28 38
22 36 35
32 33 34
29 39 33
23 29 32
22 23 27
21 23 25
53 54 52
TAB. 6 - Number of cities within the european union connected to medium hubs
The different type of operations are defined as follows:
1. Leased space flight: A flight where the operating airline leases some seats/space
to one or more other airlines and all participants to such an agreement sell
their seats/space on that flight under their own designator(s)
2. Joint operation flight a flight on which more than one airline operates one
or more of its legs.
3. Code shared flight: A flight where the operating airfine allows seats/space
to be sold by one or more than one airline and all participants to such
an agreement sell their seats/space on that flight under their own Flight
Designator. Operating airline pays monetary compensation to other airlines.
4. Franchised flight: A flight where the operating airline operate only under the
designator of an other airline and pays much more monetary compensation.
2 A model of entry in the intra-european airline
industry (to be continued)
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AIR-FRANCE
FINNAIR
ALITALL_
BRITISH-AIRWAYS
CONDOR-
FLUGDIENST
AER-LINGUS
RYANAIR
IBERIA
KLM-ROYAL-DUTCH-
AIRLINES
LUFTHANSA-
GERMAN-AIRLINES
OLYMPIC-AIRWAYS
AUSTRIAN-AIRLINES
SAS-SCANDINAVIAN-
AIRLINES
SABENA
TAP-AIR-PORTUGAL
Direct 1 Total leased 2 Partial leased 3 Joint 4 Franchised s Code share s
1995 170 8 (8) 7 7 (6) 20 (10) 3 (3) 7 (7)
1999 161 10 C4) 12 (5) 1 (0) 56 (53) 0 (0)
2000 193 21 (9) 73(33) 0 (0) 82 (74) 0 (0)
1995 61 1 (0) 2 (1) 3 (2) 2 (1) 1 (0)
1999 75 5 (2) 17 (10) 0 (0) 16 (16) 0 (o)
2000 71 4 (1) 14 (9) 0 (0) 2 (2) 0 (0)
1995 132 0 (0) 0 C0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0)
1999 144 6 (0) 23 (6) 0 (0) 1 (o) 8 (3)
2000 150 12 (4) 28 (19) 0 (0) 106 (106) 0 (0)
1995 135 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 C0) 110 C4) o (o)
1999 151 4 (3) 3 (2) o (o) 144 (36) o (o)
2000 162 13 (3) 29 (10) o C0) 168 (50) 11 (5)
1995 140 o (o) 0 (o) o (0) 79(56) o (o)
1999 219 0 (o) o (o) 0 (o) 76 (53) o (o)
2000 222 23 (21) 0 (o) o (0) 68 (61) o (o)
1995 40 2 (2) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
1999 41 1 (1) 4 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
2000 42 3 (2) 3 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
1999 34 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
2000 44 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
1995 115 7 (4) 1 (1) 16 (0) 5 (4) 0 (0)
1999 132 3 C1) 5 (3) 14 (1) 116 (83) 1 (1)
2000 120 19 C1) 29 (16) 12 (1) 82 (33) 0 (0)
1995 32 0 C0) 2 (2) 4 (4) 25 (4) 0 C0)
1999 31 18 (2) 37 (6) 3 (2) 29 (16) 1 (0)
2000 31 9 (0) 35 (10) 0 (0) 31 (14) 0 (0)
1995 246 0 (0) 0 (0) 31 (4) 68 (51) 36 (5)
1999 265 7 (1) 53 (11) 4 (1) 125 (85) 120 (17)
2000 286 126 (90) 128 (44) 5 (1) 155 (139) 8 (7)
1995 80 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
1999 71 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
2000 80 3 Co) 4 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
1995 20 0 (0) 6 (3) 22 C3) 7 (2) 1 (0)
1999 24 7 (4) 15 (11) 9 (4) 3 (2) 6 (2)
2000 25 13 (5) 40 C14) 4 (0) 9 (5) 25 (11)
1995 92 2 (0) 5 (0) 6 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0)
1999 91 40 (11) 106 (39) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
2000 105 48 (21) 119 (51) 0 Co) 0 (0) 0 (0)
1995 50 2 (2) 4 (4) 0 (0) 2 (2) 3 (3)
1999 61 10 (4) 15 (10) 0 (0) 9 (8) 0 (0)
2000 58 16 (5) 45 (14) 0 (0) 59 (53) 45 (12)
1995 50 2 (1) 7 (3) 0 C0) 1 (1) 1 (1)
1999 51 2 (2) 4 (1) 0 (0) 3 (2) 5 (4)
2000 57 5 (1) 12 (9) 0 (0) 2 (2) 9 (8)
1: Direct operations flight, 2: Totally leased space flight, 3:Partial13, leased space flight, 4: Joint
,5: franchised flight, 6: Code shared flight, 7 :Commun routes with direct operations
TAB. 7 - Distribution of operated routes per airline and type of operation within
the european union
operation flight
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1995 1999 2000
FRANKFURT
PAR.IS(C.DEGAULLE)
AMSTERDAM
BRUSSELS
LH 67.5 LH 65.5 LH 63.2
BA 4.7 BA 4.3 BA 4.5
AZ 3.3 DE 3.0 DE 2.8
AF _.9 AF 70.0 AF 56.5
BA 11.0 AZ 5.2 LH 6.4
AZ 9.2 BA 4.3 BA 5.7
KL 35.3 KL 22.5 KL 21.5
UK(Buzz) 11.2 UK(Buzz) 16.5 UK(Bu=z) 15.3
BA 5.3 EW 7.06 EVe 6.8
SN 52.4 SN 54.0 SN 38.6
BA 8.5 TV 12.2 QG 12.3
LI-I 5.1 BA 5.6 TV 10.8
AF 67.6 AF 57.9 AF 58.1
13 9.8 IJ 17.9 IJ 18.0
]'W 6.7 1"_T 11.1 IW 10.5
LH 60.5 LH 47.4 LH 46.8
MUNICH (I]_"I'L) DI 9.1 DI 12.2 DI 12.3
LT 5.4 BA 4.2 LT 3.8
ROME(FrUMICINO)
DUESSELDORY
MADRID
LONDON(GAT_qCK)
AZ 74.0 AZ 66.9 AZ 61.3
IG 6.8 AP 4.2 AP 6.5
BA 3.5 IG 4.2 LH 3.6
LH 41.9 LH 33.9 LH 35.5
LT 17.3 LT 17.6 LT 16.6
DI 7.4 DI 8.0 DI 7.3
IB 49.6 IB 46.6 IB 48.1
AO 17.9 UX 12.3 JK 14.7
UX 6.9 AO 10.5 UX 13.6
BA 39.1 BA _.8 BA 37.7
JY 10.2 FD 10.3 FD 16.3
FD 8_ JY 8.0 JY 7.0
IB 47.0 IB 35.6 IB 40.0
BARCELONA AO 16.4 UX 14.6 UX 15.7
UX 7.0 AO 9.4 JK 9.3
LONDON(HEATHROW)
BA _.7 BA 45.9 BA _.9
BD 16.3 BD 18.9 BD 20.7
LH • 7.1 _ 5.7 EI 5.9
LH 65.7 LH 45.7 LH 46.1
BA 4.6 DI 8.2 DI 7.1
LT 4.1 HF 8.0 HF 7.1
HAMBLrRG
SK 56.8 SK 63.0 SK 62.0
COPENHAGEN(LNTL) DX 9.6 QI 5.3 QI 5.2
DM 5.6 DM 5.0 DM 5.1
AF 49.4 AF 31.0 AF 26.1
NICE IVq 14.1 FU 10.3 FU 16.1
BA 6.2 IW I0.I I%V 9.3
ATHENS
STOCKHOLM(ARLANDA)
STUTTGART( EclrrERDIN GEN )
LONDON(STANSTED)
OA _.9 OA 54.8 OA _.6
AZ 6.1 X5 9.4 A3 133
LH 4.9 AZ 5.8 X5 11.2
SK _.7 SK _.7 SK _.3
TQ 14.1 BU 6.8 JZ 7.9
JZ 4.1 JZ 6.2 BA 4.6
LH _.3 LH 39.4 LH 38.1
DI 8.8 DE 7.2 DE 6.8
DE 6.7 DI 6.5 HF 6.7
UK 49.3 FR 33.1 FR 41.6
FR 28.2 OG 22.4 OG 24.2
JY 7.9 UK 20.6 UK 10.8
TAB. 8 - Carrier ASK (available Seat Kilometres) share at selected large hubs
(percentage of all intra-european union ASK at hub)
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Abstract
Aviation deregulation is usually a challengi_, and demanding_ task and accession to the
European Union requires that all candidate states should harmonise their legislation in the
context of the European Common Aviation Area. Malta and Cyprus, the small Mediterranean
island-states to join the EU in 2004, will have to abandon any protectionist policies in favour
of their flag-can'iers and let them survive in a liberal flameworic The paper discusses the
implications of this regime change for civil a-dation in l_Lalta and Cyprus and in addition to
the airline industry, it examines the impacts on the complementary tourism sector. Unless
carrying capacity limits are understood, the islands may become victims of successful airline
liberalisation. The paper concludes by stressing the need for sustainable development and
active policymaking.
Keywords: carrying capacity, Cyprus, air transport deregulation, Malta, tourism
1. Introduction
In May 2004 the European Union will admit ten new countries. These entrants vary greatly in
population and country size but also in terms of economic, socio-political and cultural
background. The impact of their contribution to the European jigsaw is still unknown and in
this context their economic liberalisation and integration into the Single Market constitutes
one of the major challenges for the future of the Union. The two smallest countries to join the
EuropeanUnion are Malta and Cyprus. Both Mediterranean island-states have commonalities
in terms of their British colonial past (Malta became independent in 1964 and Cyprus in 1960)
and their heavy dependence on tourism that accounts for a fifth of their GDP. By joining the
EU the two countries will also become members of the European Common Aviation Area
(ECAA) that will comprise the twenty-five EU countries plus Norway, Iceland and possibly
Switzerland. Carriers belonging to ECAA countries are granted full traffic freedom rights
within the Area (including cabotage) and are banned from receiving any form of state subsidy
or other preferential treatment by their governments. This may have major implications for
civil aviation in Malta and Cyprus as the lack of an internal aviation market and the seasonal
character of mass leisure tourism charter flights raised the need for a protectionist regime in
favour of the state owned flag carriers in the past (Papatheodorou, 2001). In the post-colonial
milieu, Air Malta and Cyprus Airways acted as institutions of social integration and
modernisation (Raguraman, 1997) and guaranteed stability of aviation services throughout the
year in addition to state participation in the lucrative leisure market largely controlled by the
tourism conglomerates of Northern Europe (Papatheodorou, 2002). As elsewhere in the
Continent, however, emerging inefficiencies resulted in the gradual relaxation of heavy
regulation and the adoption of market strategies by both carriers: participation in the ECAA
necessitates further radical changes.
This paper aims at analysing the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in the new
aviation corporate environment of the two island-states with emphasis on their flag carriers. In
particular, threats to the two flag carriers by network, charter and low cost carriers are
examined and possible reactions are discussed: in addition to the inevitable cost
rationalisation, participation in strategic alliances and acquisition by future Pan-European
airline groups are examined from a defensive perspective, while from an offensive one
emphasis is given on the exercise of fifth freedom rights, development of regional hubs and
majority shareholding in other EU carriers. The paper advises policymakers on the above by
also taking into account two major issues, i.e. the ongoing political developments particularly
in Cyprus and the need to develop tourism on a sustainable basis that will respect the carrying
capacity of both island-states.
2. The Case of Cyprus
L Regulatory Environment and intra - EU Aviation Markets
Scheduled services between Cyprus and the European Union member states are still highly
regulated at least de jure: most bilateral agreements allow single carrier designation, double
approval of fares and rates and mutual consent on capacity. In the case of Germany, the
United Kingdom and Greece the regulatory l_amework is looser as it allows dual designation
on a country pair basis but single designation in terms of airport pairings. London is served by
one ca,-rier operating _ Heathrow and *,he olher into Gat_dck AirporL Nonetheless, .Athens
and Thessaloniki (the two largest cities in Greece) are excluded from dual designation as only
the two flag carriers are allowed to operate (Vassiliades, 2003).
As
incumbent flag carrier.
players in the country.
EU accession and entry into the European Common Aviation Area will signify the end of
such regulatory constraints. Interestingly, however, the forthcoming liberalisation will not
have a major impact for most of the routes. First, the markets have been long liberalised de
facto and state interventions are infrequent. Second, as shown in Table 1, most mm-kets are
rather small in terms of passengers and a price war among incumbents and new entrants
would have a limited effect on the majority of price-inelastic business travellers. Third and
perhaps most important, it is apparent from Table 1 that with the exception of Greece all large
markets are predominantly related to charter flights. This is not surprising, as .Cyprus is
largely a leisure destination for the British, the Germans and the Swedish who visit the island
on a seasonal basis mostly to enjoy the sea and the sun. Despite any impediments in the past,
charter carriers are now largely unconstrained: the main exception is that such flights cannot
originate from Cyprus. Having the above in mind, the main effects of liberalisation should be
concentrated on the following:
• traffic creation m the Cyprus - Greece and Cyprus - UK markets, i.e. probably the only
ones to sustain additional potential players in direct scheduled services
traffic creation m the above and other markets by charter carriers originating from Cyprus
traffic creation and diversion by developing an airport hub in Cyprus
implications for the political re-unification of the island
expected, all the above will affect significantly the future of Cyprus Airways, the
For this reason the discussion will now focus on the main market
b. TheMain MarketPlayers
The Cyprus Airways Group is the indisputable dominant player in the market, largely because
of the protectionist regime on international flights - there are no domestic services. Cyprus
Airways, the main company of the group and the flag carrier of the Republic was established
in 1947 with British Airways (44.90%), the Cyprus Government (22.45%) and local investors
(32.55%) as main shareholders. Following Independence, Cyprus Airways grew dynamically
using the Nicosia International Airport as its base for services to Europe and the Middle East:
however, its plans collapsed in 1974 after the Turkish invasion as the carrier was left without
aircraft and had to relocate its operations to Lamaca Airport. In 1981, British Airways sold
most of its shares to the Cypriot Government, which currently controls about 70% of the
company - private investors hold now approximately 25% (Cyprus Airways 2003a). Over the
last twenty years, Cyprus Airways developed a second hub in Paphos (on the west part of the
island), expanded its network (in 2002 the carrier served 35 airports in 20 countries),
enhanced its tactical partnerships and codesharing agreements (at present with KLM, Gulf
Air, Alitalia, Syrianair, El-A1, Aeroflot and LOT) and renewed its fleet (with two A319s and
two A330s as the most recent acquisitions). In 2002, Cyprus Airways carried 1,654,719
passengers (a 9.9% growth over 2001), had a 73.1% load factor and recorded a loss before tax
of C£ 1.2 million (Cyprus Airways, 2003b).
To take advantage of the buoyant leisure market, Cyprus Airways established appropriate
companies. Eurocypria Airlines is a charter carrier founded in 1991 that focuses on the main
European origin travel markets (with new orders of Boeing 737-800). In 2002, the company
carried 497,729 passengers (a 4.3% growth over 2001) and recorded a loss before tax of C£
1.2 million (Cyprus Airways, 2003b). Cyprair Tours is a specialist tour operator established
in 1970 that organises inclusive holidays to Cyprus from the main British cities. Cyprus
Airways also owns the Duty Free Shops at Lamaca and Paphos Airports and Zenon NDC, a
company that manages electronic information through SABRE. In the financial year 2002,
Cyprus Airways Group made a consolidated pre-tax profit of C£ 4.7 million (Cyprus Airways,
2003b).
The other main player in the market is the independent carder Helios Airways. In May 2000
it started charter services from a number of European origins while in April 2001 Helios
acquired license to fly also on a scheduled basis. In March 2002 the carrier commenced
regular services from Lamaca to Dublin. At present, however, the charter market is still the
mainbusinessof Helios: in 2001 the company carried 221,947 passengers on charter flights as
compared to 20,122 in scheduled services (Cyprus Department of Civil Aviation, 2002). The
carrier is currently renewing its fleet focusing on Boeing 737-800 (Helios Airways, 2003).
During its short presence in the market it has lobbied for full liberalisation and has criticised
the government for being overprotective towards the Cyprus Airways Group: for example, in
February 2002 the carrier was refused a license for charter flights between Tel Aviv in Israel
and Paphos (Koumelis, 2002a). If Helios proves successful in its operations, other new
carriers might follow suit. Various plans for charter and scheduled services exist, including
those prepared by Capital L Airlines, the subsidiary of the Cypriot tourism conglomerate
Louis (Koumelis, 2000a).
c. The effects of Liberalisation on the Cyprus - Greece Market
Greece is the only large aviation market for Cyprus where passengers carried on scheduled
flights clearly outweigh those who travel on charter services. Cyprus and Greece have close
ethnic Qai_toric_xl and cttlraral) and business links. For the Greek-Cypriots, Athens and
Thessaloniki are the major melropolitan centres of the Hellenic world: they are places suitable
to work (Greece is the only EU country where Cypriots can work without immigration control
impediments), become educated (the University of Cyprus has only recently started admitting
students), be entertained and do shopping. In ether words, there is a strong Visiting Friends
and Relatives (VFR) and some business-related traffic from Cyprus to Athens and
Thessaloniki. The routes between Cyprus - Athens and Thessaloniki are operated on a
duopolisfic basis by Olympic and Cyprus Airways. Greece accounts for about a third of
Cyprus Airways traffic with Athens attracting three quarters of these flows (Cyprus Airways,
2002).
Interestingly, the above-described situation has great similarities with the Ireland -Britain
aviation market and in particular the Dublin - London route. British Airways and Aer Lingus
were the only carriers serving the route until 1986 when deregulation was introduced. The
subsequent entry of Ryanair led to a dramatic reduction in fares, a major increase in the
number of passengers and to the eventual exit of British Airways from the market (Barrett,
1997). This scenario could be replicated, therefore, in the context of the Lamaca - Athens
(and to a lesser extent the Lamaca- Thessaloniki) route. It should be noted, however, that the
level of fares in the Larnaca - Athens route has been significantly reduced over the last few
years by Cyprus Airways (Koumelis, 1999), possibly to pre-empt any potential new entry. In
fact,apricewaris unlikelyto startfrom the other incumbent, Olympic Airways, as the Greek
flag carrier is in a very difficult financial position and faces severe penalisation by the
European Court of Justice for receiving illegal state subsidisation in the 1990s. Similarly,
although Cyprus Airways is in a much healthier position, it faces substantial cost rigidities
related to strong unionisation and staff expenses: the latter accounted for 32.6% of total
operating costs (C£ 52.6 million) in 2002 (Cyprus Airways, 2003b). The carrier has also
recently faced adverse publicity for lack of meritocracy (Koumelis, 2003). Therefore, a low
cost carrier with a more flexible cost base could initiate flights between Lamaca and Athens
pressing fares further downwards. This could be an existing EU airline (such as Ryanair or
easyJet) using seventh freedom rights or a start-up company based either in Cyprus or Greece.
A traditional EU scheduled carrier (e.g. British Airways) could also consider entering the
route but the practice in the Single Aviation Market has shown that such moves have been
rather unusual so far (British Civil Aviation Authority, 1998). In any case, the new
deregulated environment poses threats for the two incumbent flag carriers, which might
experience substantial new rivalry in one of their most lucrative mutes.
Despite this threat on direct services between Lamaca and Athens, Cyprus Airways can take
advantage of new emerging opportunities in the Greek market. Over the last few years,
Cyprus Airways has repeatedly stated its interest to participate actively in the privatisation of
Olympic Airways (Koumelis, 2000b), however, the Greek government has postponed any
developments at present. Irrespectively of the outcome, Cyprus Airways decided to establish
Hellas Jet in May 2002: this new carrier based in Greece will fly to major European
destinations such as London, Paris, Frankfurt and Brussels and is expected to start operations
in summer 2003 (Cyprus Airways, 2003b). The existing rules within the European Common
Aviation Area preclude Cyprus Airways from having a majority shareholding either in
Olympic Airways or Hellas Jet, however, the forthcoming accession of Cyprus both in the
ECAA and the EU will obviously relax any such constraints. Moreover, the Cypriot flag
carrier will soon be able to use fifth and seventh freedom rights in Greece and endow the
Republic with flights to new destinations. In particular, in addition to any stand-alone
services between Athens (or Thessaloniki) and cities in other EU states, Cyprus Airways will
be able to achieve economies of density by filling its aircraft originating from Cyprus with
passengers in Greece en route to another ELI country. The financial sustainability of all the
above operations, however, is an open question as the aviation market in Greece is in crisis: in
additionto the financial problems of Olympic Airways, Axon Airlines went bankrupt in 2001
while Aegean Airlines and Cronus had to merge in the same year to survive.
A final point to consider is the effect of charter liberalisation on the Cyprus - Greek market
Given the expected rivalry among scheduled carriers, its impact will probably be limited in
the main mutes of Athens and Thessaloniki. Peripheral tourist destinations in Greece,
however, may be affected. For example, the relaxation of the seat-only rules (currently
limited to 15% of the total available capacity depending on airport) could exercise downward
pressure in existing air fares between e.g. Hemklion in Crete and Lamaca. Moreover, the
intl-oduction of charter flights originating from C'ypms will probably strengthen the gradually
developing vertical integration practices of major Cypriot tourism conglomerates in Greece,
such as the Louis Group. In fact, the latter is currently expanding its portfolio of hotels in
major Greek islands, such as Zakynthos: the combination of hotel accommodation with a
charter flight and perhaps other ancillary services could offer a cheap Greek holiday package
to the Cypriot traveller in the near future, in conclusion, although the major implications of
air transport libca-alisation will probably be seen in the context of sohextuled services, any
developments on charter flights and the leisure product should not be underestimated.
d. The effects of Liberalisation on the Cyprus- Britain Market
The largest aviation market for Cyprus is Britain and despite the great majority of passengers
flying on charter sos,ices, the scheduled market is also of respectable size. Cyprus has old
colonial links with Britain and in addition to any business traffic there are strong VFR flows
due to the presence first of a large Cypriot community in Britain (mostly in London and
Manchester) and second of British military bases and other expatriates (usually retired people)
in Cyprus. The British market is very important for Cyprus Airways as it accounts for about
24.6% of its Waffic (Cyprus Airways, 2003b).
Having the above in mind, the effects of h_x,_ralisation can be substantial. In terms of
scheduled services, Helios expects to start operations from Lamaca to London Luton in
September 2003 subject to appropriate (and anticipated) changes in the current bilateral
agreement between Cyprus and the United Kingdom. Other airlines might follow suit when
full liberal_tion takes place. Still, the market might not be as promising as it looks fyom a
first glance. The Greek experience can be useful in this perspective as despite initial
op "tmfism, the Athens - London market is currently facing crisis: South East European
Airways (a Virgin Atlantic franchise) stopped flying between London and Athens in 2001 and
Aegean - Cronus the year after. On the other hand, easy Jet expanded its operations in 2002
by adding a daily flight from London Gatwick to Athens on top of the two existing ones from
London Luton. Nonetheless, the economics of the London - Athens itinerary do not fit the
standard low cost model: it is occasionally argued with a sense of humour that easyJet started
flying to Athens because of the Greek origin of Mr Stelios Hadji-ioatmou, its founder.
Moreover, from a strategic perspective the carrier might have introduced the Gatwick flight to
secure valuable slots in this airport (after the relocation of British Airways to Heathrow) that
can be later used in other more profitable routes.
Therefore, if the Athens - London route can at most sustain three carriers (Olympic Airways,
British Airways and easy Jet), it is unlikely that the Cyprus - Britain market will be more
successful at least in terms of direct flights. Moreover, the long distance between the two
countries precludes the introduction of any low cost carrier de facto. Given the situation in
Greece, Cyprus Airways might find it difficult to use fifth freedom rights from Greece en
route to a British destination: Hellas Jet, its subsidiary, might also face problems if it decides
to feature London as a destination although some feeder services from Athens to Cyprus (and
vice versa) could perhaps alleviate the problem. Cyprus Airways could also use fifth freedom
rights in another EU city (e.g. Rome, Vienna or Paris) to boost its Cyprus - Britain markets
but this is unlikely to materialise in practice.
Compared to the Greek market, the impact of charter services liberalisation might be larger.
In fact, Britain is the most significant tourism origin for Cyprus and the abolition of the
current restrictions on seat-only packages will probably enhance competition and reduce the
level of fares: increasingly, more people in Britain prefer to make their own travel
arrangements (Thomson, 1999), while the existence of friends, relatives and second homes in
Cyprus discourages at present some travellers from booking a package that includes
accommodation as a compulsory element. The Cypriot based charter airlines have a good
presence in the British market and will probably survive in fiercer competitive conditions if
they also take appropriate cost reduction strategies. In 2002, Eurocypria flew about 128,000
passengers from Britain to Cyprus with a market share close to 14% and Helios flew about
66,000 passengers accounting for 7% of the market (Cyprus Tourism Organisation, 2003).
Figures very close to Helios were also reported by Excel Aviation, a subsidiary of Libra
Aviation, which is a company of essentially Cypriot interests. Moreover, the development of
charterservicesoriginating from Cyprus could lead to a decrease of existing fares quoted by
schedule carriers.
e. The Impact of Liberalisation on the other Markets
As argued earlier in the paper, the impact of liberalisation on the aviation market for services
between Cyprus and the remaining EU countries will be rather limited, as routes are either
thin or almost enl_rely of charter nature. Same conclusions hold for routes between Cyprus
and the other states that will join the European Union in 2004 as shown in Table 1. The latter
also reveals that Cyprus has significant traffic with other European countries such as
Switzerland and Russia as well as with most of the countries in the Middle East. Though this
traffic will not be directly affected by the EU accession of Cyprus, there might be some
indirect effects in the future if the European Commission is finally granted the power to
negotiate traffic rights collectively with third counlries. Such a development will undoubtedly
strengthen the bargaining power of Cyprus and might also have an impact on sixth freedom
rights and the emergence of Cyprus as a regional hub.
In fact, Cyprus Airways seems to have realised the strategic geographical location of the
island for transit traffic to Middle East and the Gulf countries. For this reason, the carrier has
recently fta-thered its operations to Pads *,hat accounts now for 50% of its total _t-an.sit traffic
(Koumelis, 2002b). Nonetheless, to develop a regional hub and acquire features of centrality
and mtermediacy (Fleming and Hayuth, 1994), Cyprus should first renovate its airport
infrastructure. Lamaca International Airport accommodated 4,972,758 passengers in 2002
but only 5.5% of these were transit; similarly Paphos International Airport recorded 1,587,057
passengers of which 4.9% were transit (Cyprus Department of Civil Aviation, 2003). At
present, the Lamaca Airport seems unable to win the regional 'war of hubs" where it faces
serious rivalry by the airports in Athens, Beirut and Istanbul: it has maximum capacity of 7.5
million passengers, a single runway and passengers cannot continue their journey to Turkey
due to existing political situation (Butt, 2001). In 2001, the Cypriot government received ten
offers by international consortia to renovate the two airports on a Build - Operate - Transfer
(BOT) basis (Koumelis, 2001). A decision was expected in early 2003, however, the change
of government has postponed any plans for the time being. Still, the aviation le_slation has
been recently harmonised with the Acquis Communautaire on issues of airport ownership and
operation, ground handling services, economic regulation and allocation of slots (Official
Journal of the Republic of Cyprus, 2002).
In its effortto becomearegionalnetworkcarrierandin additionto anyairportinfi'astmcture
improvements,Cyprus Airways should seek active collaborationwith other carriers.
Individualcodesharingagreementscanbeuseful,however,theairlineshouldseekentry into
oneof themainstrategicairlinealliances,suchasOneWorld,StarAllianceor SkyTeam. In
fact, noneof the threehasa partnerin EasternMediterraneanor Middle East and EU
accessionof Cyprusrenderstheflag carriera potentiallyattractiveoption. Of course,if the
long-awaitedmarketstructureconsolidationin theEuropeanaviationindustrymaterialises,
thenCyprusAirwayscouldbeboughtby oneof the majorsurvivingcarriersthat leadthe
strategicalliancesin Europe. Beforethishappens,however,thecompanyshouldovercome
its state-ownednatureandincreaseits shareholdingbasisthrougha privatisationprogramme.
As pastEuropeanexperiencehasshown,suchissuesalwaysraiseconflicts:theCypriotcase,
however,ismorecomplicateduetounresolvedpoliticalissueon theisland.
f. Political Issues
Since the 1974 incidents, the island of Cyprus has been de facto partitioned in two areas, i.e.
the Republic of Cyprus controlled by the Greek Cypriots in the South and the northern part
governed by the Turkish Cypriots. The latter declared an independent state in 1983, which is
only recognised by Turkey and Pakistan. In fact, the northern part is politically isolated; it has
no international relations and its airports are regarded as illegal points of entry to Cyprus by
the Republic. Consequently, travellers can only fly to the northern part by making a stopover
in Turkey, incurring extra time cost. If they wish subsequently to visit the South, they should
first go to a third country, e.g. Greece: there are no flights between Turkey and the Republic
of Cyprus as the two countries have not even exchanged first freedom rights! In other words,
politics have dramatically distorted transport geography and accessibility on the island.
Nonetheless, the decision over the EU accession of the Republic of Cyprus in May 2004 may
lead to an entirely new political situation, as the Turkish Cypriots are pressed by the
international community to follow Greek Cypriots and accept the resolution plan proposed by
the United Nations. In essence, the latter suggests the re-unification of the island under a
federal status.
The potential success of this plan will have important implications for civil aviation in
Cyprus. The emerging d&ente will enhance political stability leading to new investments and
further tourism development of the island: consequently, air traffic flows will grow.
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Moreover,the initiationof direct flightsbetwe_ thenew Republic of Cyprus and Turkey
could facilitate the development of an international hub on the island. Despite this rosy
image, however, there are some controversial issues to resolve. The first is related to the flag
carrier and the associated traffic fights. At present there is Cyprus Aim,ays in the Republic
and Cypriot Turkish Airways in the north: which company will be regarded as the flag carrier
of new Cyprus and under what terms and conditions? The second concerns airport
development As argued earlier in the paper, the Republic is in wain to renovate Paphos and
primarily Lamaca Airport: such a decision, however, would further inte_ify the existing
provocative asymmetry betwe_a the South and the North in terms of economic and air
transport development. As a re_tion, the Turkish Cypriots plan to renovate Ercan Airport:
however, the size of the market renders absurd the creation of more than one international
hub, while the renovation of the abandoned Nicosia Airport (as a middle solution) might
prove a very expensive project These issues are important and will undoubtedly play a
crucial role in future negotiations: the re-unification process of Western and Eastern Germany
can perhaps provide a useful benchmark in this perspective.
3. The Case of Malta
As a British Empire military base, Malta's economy prior to achieving independence from
Britain in 1964 was dominated by its need to supply dry-docks maintenance facilities for the
British Navy. The Maltese economy was still highly dependent on Britain in the early 1960's,
and economic development was far behind that of its northern European neighbours.
Recognition of the need to diversify Malta's "fortress economy" led to a rapid development of
new industries in the light manufacturing and service sectors from the 1960's onwards. By
2003, following years of national division and local debate over the merits of EU
membership, the centre-left Nationalist government succeeded in winning a "pro EU entry"
referendum and cemented this win with a general election victory shortly after for a further
five-year term in office. Accession into the EU is planned for May 2004, and expectations
followed that entry into the "Eurozone" (replacing Malta's own Lira currency with the Euro)
might materialise three years after accession - within the same term of office of the new
Nationalist government.
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a. Tourism and the Evolution of the Civil Aviation Regime in Malta
As part of Malta's economic diversification programme, tourism grew rapidly from the
1960's, and the Maltese landscape was transformed over the course of a few decades through
intensive hotel development. Mass tourism charter flights to cater for a growing demand for
tourism into Malta began during the late 1960s. When Air Malta started operating in 1973,
one of its early objectives was to increase tourism inflow from richer European countries,
with UK, France, Germany, Netherlands and Italy emerging as the top five supplier markets
to Maltese tourism. Air Malta was a government owned carrier, with a mission to increase
tourist arrival numbers so as to support the growing tourism economy.
Strong traffic growth in recent decades has resulted in a situation where tourism is now a
major contributor to the Maltese economy (24% of GNP according to a study by Mangion and
Vella, 2000), and an important element of the new service sector. Tourist arrival numbers
soon reached very high levels very quickly for a small and densely populated country. A
Maltese population of 0.4 minion residents now receives 1.2 million tourist arrivals per year.
A carrying capacity assessment by Mangion (2001) suggests that Malta cannot take any more
tourist arrivals and that a level of saturation has now been reached.
By 2003 the Republic of Malta had already liberalised air service agreements with four EU
countries (UK, Germany, Netherlands and Eire), no air service agreements at all with four
accession countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia), and restricted air service
agreements with all the other current and accession EU countries. Its accession into the EU
during 2004 and the associated liberalisation of Maltese civil aviation within ECAA will
result in the removal of many restrictions in its civil aviation markets (e.g. single carrier
designations, flight frequency limits and tariff approval processes which currently exist
regarding air transport operations with many European countries). If the market cannot get
bigger, and if a consequence of EU membership is that the Maltese government is unable to
maintain protectionist policies to cushion its (still predominantly government owned) national
camer from competition, then competition in air transport to and from the Maltese islands
may intensify, as carriers seek to erode Air Malta's dominant position in the market place
(more than half of all civil air traffic into and out of Malta is currently carried by Air Malta).
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b. Competition between Air Malta and carriers originating from other EU countries
Air Malta - given its low cost base compared with European airlines it competes _dth on the
_Ma!ta route - has hi_ori'cally done weU to fight off competition from its northern neighbours.
Though it has been characterised as over-manned, over-unionised, and over-protected as a
largely government owned carrier, comparative labour rates are such that it remains
nevertheless, low-c_st compared with many of its European flag-carrier counterparts (which
can also be characterised as over-manned and over-unionised but at much higher pay levels).
Air Malta is also relatively well managed by European standards, and it is financially self-
sustaining - it is not a dram on the Maltese taxpayer in the way that many European flag
carriers are on theft taxpayers.
As far as competition from European low-cost carriers is concerned (e.g. Ryanair and easyJet
from the UK), Malta's three-hour flight-time from the UK puts it out of single-sector range of
the UK's low-cost-carriers, which prefer to operate within a 2-hour sector-range so as to
m_Yimiqe aim_raft turnaround opportunities within a 24-hour time period and thereby
maximise asset utilisation. Though Ryanair and easyJet are considering establishing central
European hubs, and though conceivably the establishment of a north Italian hub near Milan
could bring Malta within connecting traffic range of high-frequency, short-sector, northern-
European cities; it is thought that the great majority of tourists to Malta will be prepared to
pay a premium to fly direct point-to-point services (e.g. London-Malta direct at a higher fare,
rather than London-Milan-Malta at a lower fare). Despite the common misconception that low
cost carriers only serve point-to-point and do not cater for connecting traffic (according to
Jeans (2002), 17% of Ryanair's 2001 traffic at Stansted comprised connecting passengers -
i.e. passengers who bought two individual fares to make up their own connecting journey, e.g.
Dublin-Stansted-Paris), the majority Of mass-market, holidaymakers to Malta are seeking the
convenience of a one-stop-shop package which mimes a point-to-point air travel component.
Comparatively small numbers of connecting passengers will find a cheaper way of getting to
Malta on combined low-cost-carrier services, but these are not expected in sufficient numbers
to cause Air Malta major problems.
c. Competition between Air Malta and other carriers which may originate from Malta
Though Air Malta is well placed to see off competition from its more expensive and arguably
less efi_cient northern European neighbours, it may however, find increasing competition at
home. Maltese entrepreneurs such as Robby Borg of Bargain Hohdays Ltd may take
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advantageof liberalisationopportunitiespostMay 2004throughthe establishmentof new,
home-growncompetitorsto Air MaltawhichcouldbeevenlowercostthanAir Malta isnow.
Borg suggeststhat "althoughAir Malta will continueto enjoy a monopolyin terms of
providingMalteseoriginatingair servicesthis cannotcontinueafter May 2004" (Busuttil,
2003). He has already been prevented from establishing a new Maltese based airline called
European Air Bargains - a Maltese government decision which was brought to the attention
of Neil Kinnock, the EU's Transport Commissioner. Borg already attempts to undercut Air
Malta by offering the Maltese public discounted flight-only fares from block-bookings he has
with existing LrK charter carriers via a retail outlet in Malta's capital and via his interact
booking site www.bargainholidays.com.mt.
Clearly the numbers of tickets sold is still small scale compared with Air Malta's current
Malta-originating traffic levels but the Maltese flag carrier may need to consider how big a
potential threat Borg could be. Though Malta-originating traffic numbers are small, if
European Air Bargains is successfully launched after May 2004, Borg may start to build up a
customer base from the major tourist supplier markets to Malta large enough to cause Air
Malta some problems. A future "European Air Bargains" airline based in Malta might provide
significant competition to Air Malta for the provision of block-space bookings of airline seats
to northern European tour operators, a market which is crucially important to Air Malta since
it represents the majority of seats sold on Air Malta flights.
d. Other competitive pressures on Air Malta
It is not only Air Malta's privileged position in the air that could be challenged. Air Malta will
also lose its monopoly on the supply of ground handling services at Luqa airport, and EU
procedures for the non-discriminatory allocation of airport slots may also erode some of Air
Malta's previously held operational advantages. Air Malta is likely to come under pressure to
restructure in order to address its problems of over-manning in the face of such competitive
threats. EU pressure to discourage the Maltese government from bailing out Air Malta from
any financial problems it may face along the way will add to pressures for Air Malta to
privatise, restructure and improve efficiency. In Air Malta's favour however, is that it does
benefit from a professional management team, which is well aware of its need to continuously
improve performance in the face of increasing competition. Air Malta has a history to date of
demonstrating a long-term trend to profitable operations without the need to resort to seeking
financial assistance from its government. Air Malta has also proved itself in the past by
14
competing successfully in a marketplace populated with highly competent carriers such as
British Airways and LuRhansa, so it should find itself well prepared to face up to the
challenges and dil_culties ahead.
4. Carrying Capacity in Malta and Cyprus
The demand for air transport services is essentially derived as most people fly to participate in
certain activities in a place away from their origin. Tourism plays a major role for Cyprus and
,Malta an_d as the p.,e_..fious _ysis indicated, the forthcoming aviation deregulation will
enhance tomfism flows. But is such development sustainable or is it likely to exceed the
carrying capacity limits of the two island-states causing environmental and other destruction
that would outweigh the benefits of liberalisation?
Entrepreneurs such as Robby Borg are lobbying the Maltese government with a view to trying
to persuade them to allow a dramatic increase in tourist arrival numbers in Malta. Borg does
not believe that 1.2 million tom'ist arrivals per year represent a capacity limit. He wants to see
numbers rising to 1.7 million over a five-year period (he believes that his company can grow
the market by 100,000 per year). His views are in conflict with a range of stakeholders in
Malta who are keen to keep tourist arrival numbers down and yields up. Similar discussions
and friction are also apparent in the Cypriot context.
a. Challenging assumptions regarding the tourist arrivals capacity limit
There are essentially two schools of thought regarding tourism planning on Malta that can be
characterised as follows. First, there is the pile-it-high-and-sell-it-cheap philosophy. Its
advocates suggest that 3* hotel capacity should be expanded - that the bottom end of this
highly price-elastic market is the place to make money. Large scale, low-cost hotels with
cheap bars and swimming pools are what the great majority of holidaymakers to Malta (and
certain resorts in Cyprus) are looking for. Interestingly, planned upgrades (overbooking lower
class product sales when higher class demand is low with a view to giving someone a 4* room
for the price of a 3* holiday) do not tend to work well in the hotel market in the way that they
work in airline sales: whereas many people would relish the prospect of a l_ee upgrade to
business class on an airline, someone looking forward to the consumption of cheap food and
beverages in a 3* hotel might not be grateful for being transferred to a more expensive
environment, even if it does come with a nicer bedroom. The supply sector (e.g. brewers,
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caterersellingtheir productsto hotels)alsosubscribesto thisview, oftenpreferringto win
higher-volume lower-margin supply contracts with 3* hotels which might prove more
profitable than lower-volume higher-margin supply contracts with 5* hotels.
The second philosophy stresses product quality improvements and focus on the high yield
sector. Malta and Cyprus are essentially price-elastic holiday markets - and that's their
problem (say critics of "pile it high and sell it cheap"), they need to change and move more
up-market. Overcrowding makes a stay on an island less enjoyable for its visitors and
consequently lowers the prices charged for services. It also becomes a less enjoyable
experience for the residents who complain that their home is being "invaded", rather than
celebrate the fact that foreign visitors are bringing in much needed hard currency. By only
allowing the development of 5* hotels on the two island-states, and by converting existing 3*
hotels to retirement homes and apartment blocks, Malta and Cyprus could become less
congested while tourism revenues will be maintained because yields will improve (a higher
price can be charged for a premium product).
Resolving which is the "best" strategy to pursue for Malta and Cyprus (or which mix of the
above approaches is optimal), will entail the application of sensitivity analyses and
evaluations of the impact of relaxing a range of"hard" and "soft" constraints in a model. This
should be designed to identify the optimal mix of capacities/prices in the overall Cypriot and
Maltese tourism economy such that revenues are maximised for the economy as a whole
rather than just favouring one sector such as air transport or hotel and catering.
b. Hard constraints on the expansion of tourist arrivals
First, there are energy supply considerations. Can the power plants on the two island-states
generate enough electricity? This is probably the most binding constraint. Power
consumption among tourists requiring air conditioning and other amenities can be very high.
Expansion beyond the 1.2 million visitors level in Malta might prove expensive in terms of
the need to expand power plant output and might be infeasible if the development of a new
power plant is required. Second, there are water supply problems. In this case, we need to
consider whether the desalination plants on the islands can generate enough potable water.
This might not be as critical as the electrical power constraint but it also needs serious
consideration.
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Third, there is an issue of land supply. Robby Borg, for example, advocates the replacement
of existing small-scale 3* hotels with the development of fewer but larger (more
commercially e_cient) 3* hotels with _-_Smmmg pools and capacities m excess of 400
bedrooms. Malta is a very small country and this may prove difficult to achieve on the scale
advocated by Borg. The etment planning philosophy advocates granting planning permission
only to 5* developments and high-yield boutique hotels, with a preference for converting
existing 3" hotels to retirement homes and apartment blocks. Cyprus is larger in terms of size
and has greater flexa'bility to diversify its conslruction activities and tourist products (e.g.
development of rural or mountainous tourism). Still, the introduced upmarket tourism
policies have occasionally failed or even aceentuated the problems caused by conventional
mass tourism (Ioannides and Holcomb, 2001).
e. Soft constraints on the expansion of tourist arrivals
The first important factor to consider is the residents' concerns regarding increased congestion
from tourism. Malta already becomes very crowded dutmg the peak v'k_itor months of July
and August, especially in the eonm'bation around Valletta towards the east of the island which
is very heavily populated by local residents. The quality of the Maltese road network is poor,
car ownership is rising quickly and roads are becoming congested. Advocates of expanding
the 3* sector on the Qa_T_dBu_gibba peninsula towards the north of the island,, however,
suggest that most of their 3* customers are more interested in cheap beer and discos and
coastal atUactious within walking distance of their Qawra/Buggibba hotels than they are in
hiring cars and exploring museums and cultural attractions in the conurbation around Valletta_
The implication is that though July/August crowding is currently a problem, it might not get
significantly worse. The additional 3* tourists - they argue - will probably remain
concentrated around the Qawra/Buggjbba peninsula. Furthermore, they suggest that as the
quality of the road network improves (perhaps with help from EU structmal funds post May
2004), and as the quality of the public transport service improves (new, improved buses and
bus services are already being introduced to replace Malta's ageing bus fleet), Malta's
congestion problems might even ease to some extenl_ It remains to be seen whether EU
structural funds will materialise, whether new buses, bus routes, park-and-fide schemes will
help, and whether 3* visitors really do confine themselves to tourist complexes.
There are also substantial residents' concerns regarding the cultural impact of tourism. The
argument that most tourists largely keep themselves to themselves is not one which will find
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muchsupportamongthoseCypriotsandMalteseconcernedwith the erosionof traditional
valuesamongthe youth. Malta (andalso Cyprusto a largeextent)is a deeplyreligious
country,with strongfamilyvalues.SomeMalteseconsidertouristsa badinfluenceon local
residentsandwouldbeparticularlyworriedaboutanexpansionof the 3" endof themarket
ratherthanthe5* endof themarket,sincetheywouldbequickto characterise3* customers
asbeingpartly responsiblefor an increasein licentiousbehaviourand alcoholand drug
consumptionamongMalta'syouth.Theydonot seeraucousbehaviourandloudpartyingas
beingconfinedto theQawra/Buggibbapeninsula- theStJulians/Pacevilledistricttowardsthe
northendof theconurbationaroundVallettais itselfa centrefor discosandbarsandnightlife
whichispopularamongbothMalteseresidentsandtouristsalike.It shouldbenotedthatsuch
traditionalattitudesarenot only found amonga few old-fashioned"fuddy-duddies"who
representa tiny constituency- manyMaltesedisapproveof soft-drugs,drinking to excess,
pre-marital-sex,topless-sun-bathingetcandwouldseemass-tourismaspart of theproblem.
This is acomplexissuehoweversincemanyMaltesewouldalsoconsidertourismto be an
essentialcomponentto theMalteseeconomy.A studyby Mangion(2000)showedthat71%
of theMaltesepeopleconsideredtourismessential,with a further28% consideringit very
important to the Maltese economy. This study showed that the main perceived benefits of
tourism are improved economy, job opportunities, cultural exchange and attaining recognition
from other countries; with the main perceived problems being pressure on the infrastructure,
Waffle/parking, overcrowding, increase in prices, deterioration of values and beach related
problems.
5. Conclusions
EU membership will result in increased competition in a more liberalised civil aviation
regime in Malta and Cyprus - but this should not necessarily imply a massive expansion in
terms of tourist arrivals numbers. The Cypriot and Maltese governments will still be able to
exert a certain amount of control and strategic direction on the development of their tourism
industry through the regulation of planning permission for the development of the islands
tourism infrastructure, but a lot of attention has to be paid to considering what is the best size
and mix of different elements of the tourism product. The most rational way of reaching a
conclusion, which maximises utility for the majority of organisations and stakeholders in the
two economies, is to apply forecasting and optimisation techniques to the problem - as in the
case of the airline industry, revenue management techniques might help.
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Revenue management is the integrated control of capacity and price through the application of
demand forecasting techniques at va__rying price/quality levels, and the subsequent application
of price mix optimisation techniques to those forecasts so as to maximise overall revenues.
The application of such techniques might also suggest better pricing strategies to help smooth
to some extent some of the peaks and troughs in demand (seasonality has a major impact on
employment and asset utilisation in Cyprus and Malta, with many hotels having to close
during winter as a consequence of insufficient demand at current winter price levels). Apart
from package price, another factor to consider m a model aimed at optimising revenue
conlributiom to the overall Cypriot and Maltese economy will be length of stay. It could be
shown that on a per-day basis, short stay visitors spend more than long stay visitors. This
suggests that during peak periods (e.g. summer) more one-week holidays rather than two-
week holidays should be sold, and during trough periods (e.g. winter), discounts should be
available for very long visits (e.g. there is a market for retired northern Europeans to fly south
for ex*-_'_d-_d._t_,_r. b.,__.ks of one month or more. - __ach _trips_.n prove vexy cam effective for
them in cost of living terms, considering the costs of staying at home and paying their heating
bins).
Apart from considering absolute numbers (i.e. demand in terms of number of tourist arrivals
on the islands - capacity constraints discussed suggest that these numbers might not
necessarily increase in any case), the quality and value dimensions might be improved
benefiting tourists arriving m Cyprus and Malta and making the two island-states a more
attractive tourist destination for potential EU visitors. Deregulation of civil aviation as a result
of EU accession might also mean that Cypriot and Maltese residents departing the island for
holidays in Europe would also benefit from the lower prices offered by new operators. It is
suggested that tourism planners in Cyprus and Malta need to adopt strategic revenue
management techniques to better optimise tourism resources to maximise revenue
opportunities. Whether this should be from a stable tourism arrivals numbers base or a
growing tourism arrivals numbers base remains to be seen. Improvements in the tourism
attributable contribution to the Cypriot and Maltese economy may not necessarily come from
more tourists but from a better mix of tourism arrivals by hotel class, time of year and length
of stay.
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Table 1 - Arrivals in Cyprus by Air in 2002
Countries
UK
Greece
Germany
Sweden
Netherlands
Norwav
Finland
iAustria
Ireland
France
Denmark
Italv
Beleium - Lux
Strain
Portueal
Iceland
Total ECAA
Charter Tourist Arrivals
Czech Retmblic
Hun_,arv
Poland
Slovakia
Baltic Countries
Slovenia
Total New EU
Russia
other CIS
Switzerland
Lebanon
Et, vtTt
Israel
UAE
Syria
Bulgaria
Romania
ffd
Total Market
931.658
5.059
122.147
95.126
17.597
52.581
2.475
8,473
29.857
2.841
30.990
356
10.657
71
n/a
n/a
1.309.888
13.866
2.9O7
10.473
1.916
2.156
48
31.366
97.199
6.732
43.538
n/a
n/a
8.913
n/a
n/a
139
426
?
1,520,930
Air Traveller Arrivals
1.354.156
396.820
189.357
95.897
66.377
49.273
45.941
43.315
41.709
38.179
34.301
27.230
23.117
1.138
0
0
2.406.810
35.309
24,590
21.040
4.674
1.188
n/a
86.801
161.749
n/a
74.317
41.198
37.007
33.873
23.021
20.765
20.330
10.427
3,028,939
Charter Share
68.80
1.27
64.51
99.20
26.51
106.71
5.39
19.56
71.58
7.44
90.35
1,31
46.10
6.24
54.4_
39.27
11.82
49,78
40,99
181.48
36.1_
60.09
58.58
26.31
0,68
4,09
50.21
Source: Cyprus Tourism Organisation (2003) and personal calculations
Notes: ECAA refers to European Civil Aviation Area (i.e. the fifteen European Union countries plus Norway and Iceland)
and Lux to Luxembourg. The Baltic Countries are Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. Total statistics for the new EU countries
do not include Malta. Where data are not available (n/a) a zero value is assumed.
The second column (Charter Tourist Arrivals) shows tourist arrivals on charter flights by nationality, whereas the third
column (Air Traveller Arrivals) shows arrivals by air (excluding excursionists) and country of flight origin. Consequently,
the two columns are not directly comparable and it is possible to have a Charter Share (the ratio between numbers m columns
two and three) that exceeds 100% (as for Norway). Still, the assumption that somebody flies to Cyprus on a charter carrier
from their own country is very plausible, i.e. nationality m column two coincides with country of origin of flight: therefore
the fourth column is informative.
The Table refers to arrivals, but since the great majority of passengers buy return tickets the total Cypriot air transport traffic
is about twice this size. In fact, the year closed at 6.03 million travellers (Cyprus Tourism Organisation, 2003).
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Abstract
The current allocationof slotson congested European airports constitutes an obstacle to the
effective liberalisation of air transportation undertaken in Europe. With a view to favouring
effluent slot utilisation and competition, as is the goal of the E_opean cornmJssion, we
propose to use a market mechanism, based on temporary" utilisation licences. In order to
allocate those licences, we propose and describe an iterated combinatorial auction mechanism
where a percentage of licences would be reallocated each season. A secondary market would
also be set up in order to reallocate slots during a season. Since a combinatorial auction
involve a complex optimisation procedure, we describe how it can be made to work in the case
of auctions.
Keywords: slots, airports, licence, auctions, combinatorial
Introduction
Air transportation has been liberalised in the European Union in 1997, after a few years
of transition. It seems, however, that so far, the effects on competition are not as important as
they have been in the USA, after the deregulation in 1978.
One of the key factors impeding competition in Europe is the lack of airport capacity at
major airports for takeoffs and landings. Because of this capacity shortage, in Europe
authorities decided to limit the number of takeoffs and landings to a specified number per hour
at certain airports corresponding to the runway capacity. A slot is then defined as "... the
scheduled time of arrival or departure available or allocated to an aircraft movement on a
specified date at an airport co-ordinated under the terms of regulation...".
In Europe, airport slots are allocated following the "grandfather rights" rule, which is the
historic rule prevailing before liberalisation. According to this rule, an airline using a slot
during one season keeps it for the following season, as long as the slot has been properly used
("use it or loose it" rule). Available slots are given as a priority to new entrant airlines. But
since very few slots become available each season, this leads to a very conservative allocation.
This rule enables stability in the market but by preventing entry of new airlines, it falls
short of the deregulators expectations to promote competition in the airline industry. In the
following article, we consider the situation from the point of view of the European
Community and we assume that the objective 1 is to favour efficient slot utilisation and
competition 2.
It is therefore vital, from the European commission point of view to study alternative
allocation rules, either administrative or market based rules, to prevent the liberalisation
process from stalling
This is what this paper proposes to do, after reviewing the way the current processes (in
Europe and in the USA) function, and the shortcomings of the current (part 1). We first
examine the question of the nature and property of the slots, and propose to define the slot as a
temporary utilisation licence (part 2). In part 3, we review the objectives of the slot allocation
and justify the choice of a market mechanism for allocating slots.
One solution, the designing of auctions for slots is more thoroughly studied: auctions are
presented and auction design discussed in part 4, and a possible mechanism based on
combinatorial auctions is proposed in part 5.
In the conclusion, we review our findings and intuitions, and discuss the problem of
acceptability of a market-based mechanism for allocating slots
1 Other political objectives could no doubt also have a role in the decision as to whether or not one slot allocation
system should be adopted rather than another.
2 The choice concerning the level of regulation or liberalisation of the air transport sector involves arbitration
between the interests of the various groups of society, and we do not intend to enter this debate which seems to
have been settled some time ago (although this in no way means that a political decision in the future cannot
reverse the tendency, even though such a perspective seems highly improbable at the present time).
2
1-Airport slots today: the current system and its shortcomings
The current system prevailing throughout the world for allocating slots (except in the
USA for domestic slots, as we shall see later on), is the "grandfather right" rule. Basically, the
outline of this system is the following: airlines are allocated the same slots each season, as
long as they really use it ("use it or loose" it rule). In Europe this system is based on the EC
rule 95/93 [r6glemeat CEE n°95/93 du Conseil des Communaut6s Europ6ennes]. It is not our
goal to give a complete description of this system, but rather to outline its main features. For a
more thorough description of this allocation system, see for example "allocating airports slots"
[71.
The EC rule is an adaptation of the former pre-liberalisation system, and has been
adopted to clarify the rules of allocation throughout Europe. Although it has harmonised the
allocations throughout Europe, it fails to reach an economically efficient allocation, because
slots are not attributed with the objective of maximising benefits for air services consumers or
the economy.
Furthermore, despite the fact that a part of the available slots is reserved for newcomers
on the MlporL the European procedure for assigning slots on saturated airports constitutes an
enLry b_er and restrains competition. This is because, according to the grandfather rule, only
a small number of slots are potentially reassigned to new airlines. Those not wanted by the
inctmabent airlines and those not properly used, falling under the "use it or loose it "rule, are
put into a pool; half of the pool slots are then reattributed to newcomers. This amounts in
general to very few slots each season.
In the USA, the grandfather right role existed before deregulation on a few airports 3
(others being "self=regulated" through congestion). After the 1978 deregulation, the federal
Authorities tried to find a new rule, more consistent with the objectives of deregulation.
They set up a system on four saturated airports, which assigned the property of the slots
to the airlines, and allowed those airlines to sell their slots to one another (the 1985 "buy and
sell" rule). The results of this experiment were not conclusive: The number of slots sold was
relatively small, and the sales tended to increase concentration. This is not particularly
surprising, since nothing was done to ensure that a large number of slots would be put up for
sale and that the sales would favour newcomers. The reason for this is that, as the demand for
slots is increasing on such airports, airlines are tempted to retain slots that they do not really
need, either for later use or in order to be able to sell them at a higher price. Furthermore, for
as long as there is no real possibility for airlines to enter the airport by directly acquiring a
sufficient number of slots, it is hardly surprising that it is the airlines already there who buy up
any slots that are up for sale.
Finally, if both systems have the advantage of su_ing in allocating slots each season,
and provide airlines with a certainty over future allocation, they fail to allocate them
efficiently, in a way that maximises benefits for consumers of air services. It is so mainly
3Four airports are concerned today : New York Kennedy, New York La Guardia, Washington National, and
Chicago O'Hare
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because they are rigid and prevents changes, they distort investment incentives 4 (by giving the
slots for free and forever), and above all they allocate slots arbitrarily (no economic criteria).
2- Property rights, the slot as a temporary utilisation licence
2.1 Property rights for slots
In view of the currently imprecise legal aspect, some organisations - including airports -
turn to the state for a more precise definition of who owns the property rights for slots. If such
a question exists, and if it is up to the State to settle it, then the question is meaningless: Slots
belong to the state de facto, and the state is entitled to give them away or sell them if it wants
to. In view of the capital strategic importance of this type of asset, we feel that it is
increasingly important that the state should retain these property rights and simply grant rights
of use for certain specified periods 5.
The reason behind this debate is obviously to define who should benefit from the income
connected with the possible sale of the slots. This question results from a political choice, and
it is not up to us to give our opinion. However, assuming that the state decides that airports
- for example - should.benefit from the advantages connected with the use of slots, it would be
preferable to set up a system which aims to assign the slots in an efficient manner, and then to
enable the airports to benefit from the corresponding income, rather than giving them the
property rights directly.
We should note, in passing, that if airports became the owners of the slots, they would
not have any incentive to invest in an increase in their capacities, because they would not want
to affect the income they would derive from the rarity of the slots. This comment remains
valid if a decision is made to transfer the entire income of the auction to the airports. If the
decision is made to give the benefit if the income generated by the slots to one of the players
in air transport, every effort should be made to do this through fixed transfers, i.e. transfers
which are not dependent on the income actually generated.
2.2 The slot as a temporary utilisation licence
We saw that with the grandfather right rule, only a small number of slots are reattributed
each season. Even in the case where all the slots of an airline are put back into the pool of slots
to be distributed (which is the case of Air Lib in Orly), the current procedure consists in
redistributing all the slots formerly belonging to a single airline to several other airlines, thus
4 They can give incentives to invest for example in marginally profitable routes in order to keep the slots ("baby
sitting" of slots)
5 The usual argument used to justify transferring property fights for a resource from the state to a company is that
it encourages the company to set up specific investments: If the company has no guarantee that it will retain the
right to use the resource, it is unlikely to f'mance investments which are specific to that resource despite the fact
that it would be efficient for society. In the context concerned herein, we nevertheless feel that this argument is of
minor importance.
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reinforcing the positions of the dominant airlines on the airport. Finally, if we consider the fact
that there is often a minimum number of slots that an airline must obtain on an airport for that
airport to be a cost-efficient destination (due to the frequency effect, for example), it is clear
that for competition to be effective in terms of entry onto an airport, it is necessary to be able
to reallocate, on a fairly regular basis, a considerable number of the slots on each airport.
This is why we recommend that the grandfather rule should be progressively dropped,
that airlines should be given temporary licences to use slots 6 (5 to 10-year licences, for
example), and that they should be allowed to sell those licences. Progressively, of come,
because we must not upshot the stability of a _stem which - although not t_'fect - does have
the advantage of working. We could, for example, attribute 10 % of the existing licences every
year for ten years (at the end of this period, the initially attributed licences would be due for
re,attribution, and so on). We are not giving any recommendation, at this point, concerning the
method to be used for the initial allocation of the slots, as this will be discussed in subsequent
chapters. We are simply pointing out that this procedure should make it possible for new
airlines to obtain sufficiently large sets of slots to enable them serve the airport efficiently
Furthermore, limited-period licences would encourage airlines to sell off the slots that
they do not really need - or that other airlines could make better use of- rather than keeping
+l_,,_ fc,r the future.
To summarise, we recommend, above all, that temporary licences to use slots should be
regularly reassigned, and that airlines should be allowed to sell them according to a system
which enables new entrants to set themselves up properly on an airport.
3- "The objectives of a slot allocation, choice of a market mechanism
3.1 Objectives of a slot allocation
Whatever system is used to allocate slots, it has to be judged by the benefits it brings to
the economy. More precisely, the air services resulting from this allocation provide some level
of "'social welfare" to the customers and to the rest of the economy (including some profit to
the airlines).
The optimal allocation is the one that brings maximum benefit for society. But it is not
sufficient, because what is optimal at one point in time, may not remain so for long: the
allocation should also be capable of evolvin_ in order to re-allocate the slots to the most
efficient use.
Slots are efficiently allocated when used by the airlines that can generate maximum
social benefit from them. We can consider, in a competitive situation, that if an airline thinks it
will make large profits by using a slot, this fact tends to indicate high demand and low costs,
and therefore a high profit is a reliable indication of a large social benefit.
6 This is onlyan example, andstudieshouldhavetobcconducted,astotheoptimalproportionofslotsto
atlribute each season, and how to select them. We feel however, that the right duration would be between 5 to 10
years, so that 10 to 20 % of seasonal slots should be reatm'buted each season.
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In order to approximatethis optimum, we can then target the intermediary goal of
maximisingtheprofit airlinesderivefrom theuseof a slot7,which is linked to thewillingness
to pay for theslotby theairline.
A marketmechanismwith pricesfor slotswould achievethis requirement,aslong asthe
pricereflectsthewillingnessto pay for the slot. Therecomesin the problemof the revelation
of thevalueof theslot for the airline,problemwhich couldbe solved,aswe shallseelater,by
anauctionmechanism.
In reality, the social benefitsmay not be maximisedwhen profits are maximum, for
different reasons:therecanbeconditionsof limited competition,when an airline on a market
hassomemarketpower,andusesthat situationto raiseprices,resulting in adecreasein social
welfare.Theallocationsystemchosenshouldthereforeaddressthis problemby preventingthe
buildingof marketpower.
Another potential problem is that airlines do not take into account the benefits for
society of serving for example one regional market when demand does not reflect the
importancefor theeconomyof thatparticularmarket (thereareexternalbenefitsnot reflected
in thedemandon theroute).This canleadto adaptationsin orderto takethoseexternaleffect
into account.
Finally, thereis anequilibrium to find betweenthe adaptabilityof the systemto changes
in demandor market conditions, and a stability necessary to the good functioning (return on
capital) and development (investment incentives) of the airlines. With respect to stability, the
established airlines currently favour the "grandfather right" system, which gives them a large
degree of certainty over the future holding of slots. They may therefore be reluctant to adopt a
new system whatever its qualities. We shall come back to the point of acceptability of a new
system in the concluding section.
3.1 Advantages of selling slot utilisation licences
The European procedure for assigning slots on saturated airports is characterised by the
fact that it is free of charge. Among the disadvantages of this procedure, the most obvious is
the disproportion between the demand for slots and the slots that are actually available.
Because of the information asymmetry between the authorities in charge of assigning slots and
the airlines, it is difficult to assess which airlines will use the slots in the best manner as far as
society is concemed.
Furthermore, due to the complexity of the problem, any administrative-type procedure is
likely to lead to an inefficient situation in which certain slots are not allocated to airlines
which are capable of valorising the situation.
A solution could therefore consist in selling a temporary licence to use slots. The most
basic way of doing this consists in setting a price (possibly variable, depending on the time of
day of the slot) whilst retaining the current procedure. Initially, this would reduce the demand
for slots and consequently the risk of mistakenly attributing slots to companies which do not
valorise them as much as others would. But this solution, which is the easiest to implement,
7 not taking payment for slots into accounts
6
only partially solvesthe problemof asymmetricalinformations and it does not solve the
problem of entry barriers.
Economists tend to prefer the auctioning solution, which has the advantage (when well
designed) of revealing private information held by airlines and favouring the possible entry of
new airfines on airports. With this in mind, the objective is not to generate funds but to use the
information based on how much an airline is prepared to pay as an indicator of the profits it
expects to draw fi'om operating that slot 9. In this context, an auction would aim to assign a slot
to an airline which considers that it can obtain the highest profit in exchange for a part of that
profit.
We will also see that it is perfectly possible to design the auction in such a way that it
takes into account factors that could appear to be important _om a social point of view, but
which would have no effect on the profits of the airlines or that they would not take into
account_ It is possible for example to reserve slots for regional services as it is done today.
However, the results can be catastrophic if the auction is not properly designed. And in
the present case, there are so many assets to be allocated, and those assets have such high
synergy, that we can expect a traditional auction to generate a number of perverse effects.
But to discuss auctioning a large quantity of assets without defining the rules of the
aueti'_o, i_s not parti'_eu!ar!y _grfifiean(, because, the designer of the auction has a very large
number of parameters that can be adjusted and fine-tuned, all with very different effects.
As far as putting slots up for sale is concerned, we insist on the fact that there are
systems which can considerably improve the efficiency of allocation. Even if we do not set up
an auction system, which can be a complex matter, we could at least set up a variable price
system without taking any risks, based on the time of day and on the estimated demand for
+he, " ,--- lO
slots at _ tune ol clay .
3.2 Market mechanisms and the survival of "reasonably" sound companies
The UMTS auctions that have been held in some countries are sometimes criticised for
having played an important part in the financial ruin of a number of mobile telephone
operators. Agreed, certain companies made astronomical bids in order to obtain a UMTS
licence, but this is only the consequence of (now apparently) unreasonably optimistic forecasts
made by those companies concerning the future of the sector. Those forecasts were
furthermore expressed in the form of an incredible wave of acquisitions at considerably
overvalued prices: Even if the auctions had not taken place, the situation would not have been
s According to economic theory, in order to solve the problem of risking an atm'bution of slotstothe "wrong"
airlines, it would be necessary to find the prices for which demand equals supply, but this is impossible due to the
very exisk."nce of asymmetrical information. And if we attempt to assess those prices in an aggressive manner, by
trying to come close to the estimated limit prices, there is a risk that some of the slots - specifically the most
sought-after - might not be atm_outed to anyone.
9In reality, the objective is not to maximise the profits of airlines, but rather the social surplus, defined as the
difference between what consumers would be prepared to pay for a service and the costs induced by the
production of that service. But we can consider, in a competitive situation, that ff an airline thinks it will make
large profits by using a slot, this fact indicates high demand and low costs.
io If we want to avoid taking risks, this system could be set up progressively, changing the prices cautiously over
a period of about ten years, for example.
very different. In the context of air transport, which has a longer history than new information
technologies, one can expect a little more moderation on behalf of airlines.
The fact that market mechanisms enable governments to raise funds generates criticism
towards those mechanisms. However, it is necessary to raise revenues in order to achieve
efficiency, since the revenues raised are the indication of the market value associated with the
asset.
Nonetheless, the sale of slots creates a new cost item in a sector which is not in
particularly good health. We can nevertheless establish certain measures which aim to reduce
the impact of these costs.
First of all, the auction price or selling price can be based on the amount that the airlines
are prepared to pay each month - for example - to obtain a slot. It is also possible to index the
payment determined by the auctioning process on the level of activity of the sector, or on other
indicators.
Finally, the income generated by the auctions can be used for the benefit of the airlines
themselves. For example, the money could be used to finance an insurance fund 11. But it is
important that any support provided to an airline as a result of the collected funds should be as
unrelated as possible to the amounts actually paid by that airline, in order to avoid distorting
the bids made by the airline during the auction.
4 - Auctioning slot utilisation licences
In this section, we will present an auctioning system which theoretically enables an
efficient situation to be reached, and which has certain very interesting characteristics. We
also propose a few possible changes to this system, that we consider viable and interesting.
4. 1 Choosing an auction mechanism
As regards auctions, several mechanisms can be designed, with different properties.
Concerning slots, there are specific issues to be addressed by the auction mechanism chosen.
We believe that the most important of theses issues is the aggregation problem: a specific
combination of slots has more value for an airline than the sum of the individual values of
slots. This is true between airports (we shall come back to this point later on), but also inside
an airport: the hub and spoke organisation of networks, with arrival and departures
concentrated in time, makes it important for an airline to have certain sets of synergetic slots.
With simple auctions, where assets are auctioned separately, airlines may fail to obtain
all the slots they need and may end up with an inefficient allocation (from the point of view of
their operation).
In order to reduce, or solve the aggregation problems, two main designs can be used: the
first one is a simultaneous, multiple rounds auction (SMRA). The Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) has used it for the spectrum auctions in the USA, with reasonable success.
Basically, it allows firms to bid on individual assets, the auctions are held simultaneously for
u This possibility is mentioned for the purpose of information: In the long run, the question of using the funds
collected by the auction is actually a political choice, and it is not up to us to give our opinion.
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all a_m_,and repeat_ as longasnecessary,sothat nobody wants to change its bid. Assets are
only allocated at this point.
DotEcon, in its January 2001 report [7], proposes a SMRA for the airport slots
allocation, relatively close to the FCC procedure.
Inais mechanism allex_iates the aggregation problem, but does not solve it entirely,
because auctions are simultaneous but still separate. Bidders can not bid on bundles of slots
and therefore may still face some aggregation problems.
Another way of solving this problem is the use of combinatorial or "package" bidding
where bidders can bid on multiple bundles of slots. They obtain a whole package or nothing.
This is what the FCC is currently experimenting with. By enabling bidders to bid on packages,
this kind of mechanism eliminates the aggregation problem entirely.
Since we feel that the aggregation problem is an important issue with the slot allocation,
we shall turn to a combinatorial bidding procedure, although this kind of auction is more
difficult to implement.
4.2 An efficient mechanisrru" Vickrey-CIarke-Groves auctions
4.2.1 Definition
Among the mechanisms invented by economists to allocate rare assets, the Vickrcy-
Clarke-Groves mechanism ([24], [3], [8]) has a remarkable property: Whatever the strategies
of the other buyers, the optimum strategy of any given buyer consists in bidding, without
l)_,ng, _e "_,_o'dmum value that he/she would be ready to pay for __ny bundle of assets.
To obtain this result, it is simply necessary for each buyer to have a reliable knowledge
of the value that the auctioned asset or combination of assets will have for him/her if ever
he/she were to obtain them. 12
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism allows for combinatorial bids: Bidders can
submit bids for multiple combination of assets rather than just individual assets.
This mechanism operates as follows: Each player is asked to bid the maximum value
that he/she would be prepared to pay in order to see each of the "states" of nature implemented
(here, the state of nature represents the allocation of the auction: an identification of all the
assets that each buyer obtains). The assets are then distributed according to the optimum
allocation: This is determined by maximising, out of all the possible allocations, the sum of
the values of the bundles assigned to the buyers on the basis of their bids. Finally, each buyer
pays the seller the difference between the sum of the values of the allocation that would have
been optimum if he/she had not taken part in the mechanism, and the sum of the values of the
effective allocation for the other buyers (each buyer pays the seller what he/she costs the
others -in terms of optimum allocation value- by taking part in the auction). For further
details concerning this mechanism, the reader can refer to the book by V. Krishna [9].
12Other theoretical contexts lead to different results, but in practice one can consider that only a VCG mechanism
would have good properties in terms of efficiency of the allocation for the slot allocation problem.
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4.2.2 Illustration
As an illustration, imagine that 3 assets A, B and C are up for sale, and that 4 potential
buyers are ready to buy them at the following prices:
A1 A2 A3 A4
A only 2 5 4 3
B only 3 1 3 3
C only 6 3 2 4
A and B 8 6 10 8
AandC 8 9 7 7
B and C 10 4 10 8
A and B and C 14 13 14 12
With a Groves mechanism, buyer A3 obtains assets A and B and buyer A1 obtains
asset C - which maximises the value of the assets obtained by the buyers, 16 in this case).
To determine how much buyer A3 must pay, it is necessary to observe what the
maximum value of the assets obtained by the buyers would be if A3 didn't take part. In this
case, buyer A1 would obtain B and C, and buyer A2 would obtain A, making a total value
of 15. In the end, A3 must pay 15 - 6 (where 6 is the value of the assets obtained by the other
buyers - A1 in this case - when A3 takes part), i.e. 9.
To determine how much buyer A1 must pay, it is necessary to observe what the
maximum value of the assets obtained by the buyers would be if A1 didn't take part. In this
case, buyer A3 would obtain B and C, and buyer A2 would obtain A, making a total value
of 15. In the end, A3 must pay 15 - 10 (where 10 is the value of the assets obtained by the
other buyers - A3 in this case - when A1 takes part), i.e. 5.
Another illustration: for auctions concerning a single asset, the highest bid wins the
asset, and in this case the buyer pays the second highest bid.
4.2.3 Properties
This mechanism has two very interesting properties. The first has already been
mentioned: Whatever the bids made by the other buyers, every buyer stands the best chance if
he/she bids his/her true values for each bundle of assets, and this implies that the allocation is
efficient. This is a classic result so we will not provide any further demonstration.
Furthermore, it is possible to add distribution constraints to this mechanism, without
losing the previous property. So if we decide for example that at least 70 % of the slots must
be attributed to European airlines, we retain the property according to which airlines are well
advised to make bids which are equal to their true values, provided that the payment rule is
adapted so that payment is calculated on the basis of the optimum allocation under this
constraint 13.
13Technical comment concerning the payment rule in VCG mechanisms with allocation constraints: To calculate
the payments, it is necessary to determine, for each buyer who obtains slots, what the optimum allocation would
be, under the constraints, ffthat buyer did not take part in the auction. This could pose problems: For example, if
the allocation constraint is that at least 4 buyers must obtain 4000 slots each, then if only 4 buyers take part in the
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4.3 The combinatorial explosion problem, and how to restrain it
In practice, if slots are defined as they are today, it is not possible to set up this type of
mechanism for selling slots because the number of combinations of assets increases
exponentially with the number of assets put up for sale (2 n possible combinations if n assets
are put up for sale). The real problem is not, in fact, the number of bids that the buyers would
have to place: After all, one could easily leave it up to the airlines to decide the level of
complexity of their bids, which would obviously not cover all the states of nature. The
problem is above all connected with the calculation of the optimum allocation and of the
payments, which becomes problematic as soon as the number of assets up for sale becomes
excessive.
Tuomas Sandholm ([22], [23]) has been working on this problem for a few years: He has
already designed an algorithm to calculate the optimum allocation and the corresponding
payments as quickly as possible. We can currently estimate that it is possible to implement a
VCG type mechanism for as long as the number of assets to be allocated does not exceed a
few hundred 14.
We shall see that by redefining the slot, we can limit the number of assets significantly,
without loosing flexa'bility in the bids
4.3.1 Definition of the asset to auction
The slot is the right to use airport capacity, and can thus be defined with this in mind. So
far, the slot is defined as "...the scheduled time of arrival or departure...", and the sum of slots
in a day matches capacity.
From an operational point of view, there is a 15-minute time window corresponding to
the slot time, during which the airline is supposed to leave or arrive at its stand.
From an auctioning point of view, things can be seen with the same perspective, and the
asset could be defined as "the scheduled time of arrival or departure, within a specified time
window". Within a time window, there would be many slots, but they would all be the same
from an auctioning point of view. This reduces considerably the number of assets to be
auctioned, even with only a 15-minute time window. Furthermore, this is coherent with the
operational constraints in an airport, and would not change fundamentally the current situation
from the point of view of the airline operations.
However, this would not be sufficient to reduce the number of slots to the level
necessary for solving the optimisation problem.
For example, let us take an airport operating 16 hours a day, with 100 takeoffs or
landing a day. This amounts to 584 000 slots per year. By defining a 15-minute time window,
auction it will not be poss_le to determine what the optimum allocation would be without one of the buyers,
because there would only be 3 buyers left_ To solve this problem, we can consider that there are also virtual
buyers (as many as necessary) who assign a value of 0 to each bundle of slots.
With this payment rule, the best interest of the "real" buyers is still to bid their true values.
14He has also developed a logical language which enables buyers to describe their bids using a program, which
means that it is not necessary to explicitly define the list of all bids.
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one comes to a number of assets of 23 360. If we sell 10 to 20 % of seasonal slots each season,
this amount to a number of assets between 1 168 and 2 336.
We may still have too many assets to calculate the optimal allocation, and we need
therefore to envision some additional methods, in order to reduce the number of assets.
The following are a few examples of methods which can be used to adapt a VCG
mechanism so that the number of calculations involved can be completed in a reasonable
amount of time, but they have a cost in terms of efficiency and we point out some of the
disadvantages of these adaptations.
4.3.2 Auction a few hundred predefined groups of slots
The first possibility consists in grouping the slots into coherent sets of slots, in such a
15
way as to obtain a few hundred groups at the most. This grouping must be carried out in such
a way that the groups are coherent in terms of synergy between the slots they contain (every
opportunity to use historical data should be taken, when defining the groups). After
proceeding in this manner to reduce the number of assets up for sale, they can be sold using a
VCG mechanism.
The most obvious grouping of slots, is the grouping of slots throughout the season. We
would obtain a slot for a time window specific to a day during the whole season.
This procedure is obviously not perfect in the sense that, although the airlines are always
well advised to bid their true values for the various groups of slots, the optimum reached is
nevertheless an optimum under constraint: all the slots in a given group are allocated to the
same airline. However, since most airlines operate on a regular basis throughout the season,
this would not be a problem, except for part season operators (charters). This can be dealt with
by the existence of a second market which could enable these inefficiencies to be corrected 16
(provided that the assets sold are time-limited operating licences- and this is an essential
point).
Illustration: We come back to our preceding example (584 000 slots), and group slots for
a season. Without using time windows, we find a number of slots of 11 230. Auctioning
between 10 to 20 % of slots each season, We find between 1 123 and 2 246 groups. Adding
time windows enables to reach a level of complexity low enough to solve the optimisation
problem in a reasonable time.
4.3.2 Iterate several auctioning rounds, limiting the number of bids by each airline at
each round
Another possibility would be to hold several rounds of auctioning. At the end of each
round, the allocation would be calculated using a VCG mechanism and the results (and
possibly the bids submitted) would be announced to the airlines 17. The airlines could then
is We shall call <<groups >>the sets predefmed by the auction organiser. The sets chosen by the bidders we call
<<bundles >>.In a combinatorial auction with predefined groups of slots, bidder can bid on bundles of groups of
slots
16One could also provide for the individual sale, in parallel, of some slots for non-regular flights.
17Milgrom et Weber [17] suggest that it would be interesting - in terms of efficiency and even of income
generated by the auction - to give the buyers as much information as possible concerning the bids made by their
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makenew bidsdm'L_ngthenextround,at theen_dof which the allocation would be recalculated
on the basis of the bids made during all the rounds since the beginning of the auction. The idea
would then be to encourage airlines to integrate the history of bids already made into their
calculations, in order to avoid making bids which would not enable them to obtain slots, with
the objective of limiting the calculations that need to be processed. With this in mind, it would
be better if the airlines started by making bids, fi'om the outset (i.e. the first rounds), for
isolated slots or for small groups of slots is. Conversely, several individual bids for slots would
immediately make it useless for anyone to bid for the complete bundle at a lower price than
the sum of all the individual bids).
One major difficulty in designing iterative auctions is connected with the design of the
rules for keeping the auction active or closing it. In other words, under what conditions does
the auction end, and under what conditions does the buyer have the right to continue making
further bids? The objective, here, is to limit any wait-and-see strategies on behalf of buyers, so
that the auction closes after a "reasonable" time 19. As an example, during auctions held by
FCC to seU licences for using the Hertzian spectruna, the buyers were given a limit on the
number of bids they could make at each round. This limit was determined on the basis of the
number of bids they had made during previous rounds: A buyer who makes very few bids
_rtlrr_r_g ._ e,_°ivon"-_ rr_lmd.___thorofnrp ln_o_ th_ vnO_sjhi|ity................. nf rnuklng u large numben" nfhid._ dtning
subsequent rounds. Obviously, for this to make any sense, the buyers must be prevented from
making bids which are purely symbolic. (For a detailed analysis of the solutions and results
concerning the auctioning oftbe Hertzian spectrum, refer to [4], [5], [12], [13], [15], [16]). We
could use this type of rule here, possibly with an additional obligation to only make bids for
individual slots (or small bundles) during the first rounds.
4.3.3 Limit the form of the bids that can be made by airlines
A final possibility, which enables the allocation calculations to be simplified
considerably, consists in limiting the form of the bids that the airlines can submit. For
rivals. In the case where the values of the various buyers are afffliated_, i.e. the same case in which the VCG
mechani._m no longer necessarily yields the optimum allocation, the phenomenon observed can sometimes tam
put to be what is known as the Winner's Curse: the one who wins an asset is the one who had the highest
estimation of the value of that asset. This results m the fact that his/her estimation is biased, and it is likely to
have been overestimated. Bearing this phenomenon in mind, buyers tend to adopt more prudent strategies which
can cause the auction to yield less income, and the allocation to be inefficient. By running an auction in several
rounds, between which the bids made by the buyers are made public, the buyers may be able to refine their
estimation of the value of the assets and thus reduce the winner's curse.
Conversely, this reinforces the risk of collusion between airlines. Although it is lrue that collusion reduces
income, it does not normally reduce the eliiciency of the allocation, and our principal quest is the latter.
The issue as to whether the bids or only the results of each round should be made public is a complex one, and we
shall not enter into a discussion on that subject here.
18whatever the amount of a bid made by a buyer for a bundle, another buyer could hope to obtain a part of that
bundle even by making a very low bid, if a third buyer happened to make a high bid for the other part of the
bundle
19This type of auction would then similar to the RAD mechanism designed by Kwasnica et al. ([10]).
The differences between the two are that, in this case, the mechanism makes buyers who win bundles pay the
exact price that they bid for those bundles, and it does not limit the buyers' bids to individual assets during the
initial rounds. Experiments carried out by these authors tend to show that this type of mechanism can have
interesting properties in terms of etiicieney.
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example,if 30,000 slots are up for sale,and if one considersthat an efficient allocation
consistsin allowing 4 airlinesto hold coherentbundlesof at least4000slots,it is possibleto
simply authorisethe airlines to makebids2°concerning(exactly)4000slots, 1000slots or a
single slot. The optimum allocationwould, in this case,be determinedunder the constraint
that atleastfourdifferentairlineswould obtainthebundlesof 4000slotstheyhadbid for.
Conversely,with this system,it is not necessarilyin the airlines' best interest to make
"honest"bids which correspondto thevaluesthat they actually assignto the slotsor bundles
of slots.This isbecausetherewill be complementaritiesbetweenslotsthat cannotbedeclared
as belongingto the samegiven bundle of 1000 or 4000slots. The airlines' strategywill
thereforehaveto takeinto accountthe existenceof these complementarities between assets
which have not been requested in the same bundle, and the amounts bid for a bundle will no
longer correspond solely to the value assigned to the bundle by the airline. Under these
conditions, it is apparently no longer of any interest to adopt the VCG payment rule. It would
no doubt be more pertinent to hold simpler auctions, similar to those held for the Hertzian
spectrum in the United States (several rounds, and the sum of the amounts bid is maximised in
order to decide on the optimum allocation. Each winner pays the exact amount of the bid
he/she made), whilst retaining the possibility of making bids for bundles of 1000 or 4000 slots.
This possibility is therefore of less interest than the ones presented before, and we shall
not take it into account in the final auction mechanism we detail in the next section.
5 - A proposed auctioning system
5.1 Description of the auction
Considering the advantages and disadvantages that we have discussed, we feel that the
following mechanism could provide some interesting results.
The assets for sale are defined as licences to operate slots for a period of n years (n being
between 5 to 10). Every year, (100/n) % of the slots are put up for sale (10 to 20 %,
corresponding to the duration chosen). After the auction, the airlines are entitled to sell their
licences.
On each airport, the slots are grouped by the auction organiser into a certain number of groups
which appear to be coherent from a historical point of view (the most probable coherent
grouping being seasonal grouping), and time windows are defined (in such a way that there are
only a few hundred groups of slots on each airport).
Then, iterated VCG (open) auctions are held on all the saturated airports, possibly with
distribution constraints (for example: at least 4 different airlines must obtain more than a
certain quantity of slots 21, or at least a certain percentage of slots is distributed to newcomers
on the airport). The bids of the previous rounds are sustained during subsequent rounds. A rule
for continuing the auction and a rule for closing it (similar to those used for auctioning the
20As many as they wish.
21Which provides a form of insurance against excessive concentration.
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Hertziaraspectrumin theUnitedStates)aresetup, andthebids concerningthe first roundsof
the auctionscanonly applyto individual slots.
Paymentsaredeterminedon thebasisof a monthly amountto bepaid, calculatedfrom
thebids madeby the airlines,usingtherule of paymentof aVCG mechanismwith constraints.
These payments are weighted according to the air transport activity level, on the basis of a rule
announced at the beginning of the auction.
Some of the slots might not be auctioned, in order to be able to allocate them using other
criteria. For example the government could keep slots for specific routes, as is already done
eurr_ently.
After the auction a secondary market would be set up, ensuring efficient reallocation
throughout the season. Since the organiser of the auction had to group the slots into groups of
seasonal slots, the secondary market would enable airlines to obtain part season slots. Care
should be taken as to the design of this market, in order to ensure that no building of dominant
position could happen, as was the case on the US market for domestic slots.
5.2 Interaction between airports
For the time being, we have only discussed _e problem of allocating slots _dthin a
single airport. There is obviously complementarity between the slots of the same airport, but
the complementarity is even greater between certain slots of different airports. This is because,
if an airline wants to set up a flight between two saturated airports, it will need to obtain a slot
at each airport at compatible times. In theory, the ideal solution would be to hold a single
global VCG auction, covering the slots of all saturated airports. But this would not be possible,
if only for technical reasons concerning the combinatorial explosion. There is neverdaeless still
the possibility of holding separate auctions on each airport.
How should these auctions be held? If they are held sequentially, the airlines will be
faced with one of the major problems of separately auctioning interdependent assets: the
problem of aggregation risk
This is because the airlines will initially do everything they can to obtain slots on one
airport, without knowing whether or not they will succeed in obtaining the corresponding slots
on other airports. In this situation, the strategies used by airlines become very complicated.
The random factors that face the airlines are considerable, and it will probably be hard to
obtain a coherent set of slots from one airport to the other.
From our point of view, it would be preferable to hold these auctions simnltaneously, in
several rounds, so that the airlines can adjust their bids on one airport based on the results
obtained on the other airports 22. It would require a European co-ordination.
It is not clear whether a single airport (or country) could find advantages in
implementing a market mechanism alone, because of the complementarity problem, but also
for another reason, the possible distortion of competition between European airlines.
An isolated auction could indeed disadvantage the nationad airline hubbing at this
airport, in its competition with the other national "hub" airlines. This could prove politically
unacceptable, as it would upset a fragile competition equilibrium. Solutions could however be
22For further details on this subject, refer to the debates on the form to be given to auctions of the Hertzian
specla'ttm in the United States, [4], [5], [12], [13], [15], [16]
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implementedto alleviatethis problem.Onewould be to run the auctionunder the constraint
thatnationalairlines(or all airlinesusingtheairport) eventuallyobtainthesameproportion of
slots asthey havetoday.Another would be to compensatefor the extracost to the airlines
using that airport (through an airport fee decreasefor example23).Both systemscould be
combinedandcould be used as a temporary mechanism, in order to wait for the generalisation
of the market mechanism.
Still, ideally, we think that a new system should have to be Europe-wide.
5.3 Strategic tinks
As we are concerned with efficiency, one of the major risks is that no airlines succeed in
obtaining the slots they require in order to set up an important link between two saturated
airports (or that the number of links set up is too small) or one saturated airport and a regional
one (regional service).
We can nevertheless adapt the preceding mechanism in order to protect the system from
this risk. For example, if we are worried that there might be an insufficient number of links
between Paris and Madrid, and we want to ensure that the slots distributed in a given year for
Paris-CDG and Madrid are used to provide at least one return link between these two cities
every day, the mechanism can be modified in two ways:
The first possibility is to allow the airlines to designate some of the slots in the bundles
they are bidding for as "Paris-Madrid" or "Madrid-Paris" in the auctions concerning Paris-
CDG and Madrid. The allocation of the auctions on each airport is then determined using the
constraint that at least one slot per day must be designated "Paris-Madrid" and another must be
designated "Madrid-Paris". This constraint can make it easier for airlines to obtain the slots
concerned. In exchange, the licence to use these slots must be used for the corresponding link;
otherwise the airline will be given a heavy fine or will have its licence withdrawn (even if it is
subsequently sold to another airline).
Having said this, the adaptation described above does not entirely solve the problem
because it may still be difficult for an airline to obtain both the slots corresponding to a given
flight in the case of two saturated airports. Conversely, this procedure enables airlines to
determine at what time of day the flights will take place, based on their information
concerning demand.
The second possibility consists in arbitrarily grouping together, in a single groups, two
slots which enable a Paris-Madrid link to be set up (one on each airport), and putting this
"Paris-Madrid" group up for sale either in the Paris-Roissy auction, or in the Madrid auction.
Here again, the corresponding licences would come with an obligation to use the slots for the
"Paris-Madrid" link, otherwise there would be a heavy fine or the licences would be
withdrawn.
This adaptation solves the problem of bringing together complementary slots on both
airports. Conversely, it is less flexible because the time of day is imposed on the airlines.
23As we already emphasised, this decrease in airport fees should be independent from the revenue generated by
the auction, in order not to distort the bidders' strategies.
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It is somehowclose to what is done currently, with the "grandfather rights" system,
where governments can reserve a proportion of the slots for regional services.
It should nevertheless be noted that both these adaptations could have adverse effects on
the competition factor. This is because the allocation of a route-related licence to an airline
makes it crech'ble for that airline to operate that link and this might restrict any incentive that
other airlines have to compete on that route. For this reason, we recommend that these
adaptations be used sparingly (to guarantee a minimum number of essential links, without
covering the full quota of passenger demand for the routes concerned).
5.4 Market power
Since one of the primary goals of the slot allocation is to promote competition, the
mechanism chosen should be capable of addressing the issue of market power. Rules should
be devised that prevent too much concentration on routes, even if no direct relation
systematically exists between concentration and market power on routes.
To this effect, constraints could be placed on the concentration level authorised overall
or on a route, _,,,,--'_m"tc_-mcd .,,:- ,t..,_,.,,,_..,,,_-....-'_-_,,.,.,_,o.,_,..._._..;0...,,,"_ ,,,.,_aool',with ati_.er_.,arab, on the
secondary market. Such constraints should also be taken into account in the secondary market.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop this subject in a more extended way, as it is a
matter for competition legislatio_
Conclusion
After reviewing the shortcomings of the current slot allocation procedure in Europe, we
have proposed a market mechanism, based on temporary utilisation licences, allocated through
an iterated combinatorial auction.
It is one among many possible (auction) mechanisms, but we believe it has interesting
properties in terms of efficiency and flexibility. We saw that adding constraints to the
allocation is always possible without distorting the optimal strategies of the bidders, which is
to announce their true values for each bundle of assets, implying that an efficient allocation is
obtained. We also saw that should we need to reduce the computational complexity induced
by the mechanism, it is preferable to predefine groups of slots rather than limit the form of the
bids.
Several parameters of the mechanisms remain to be specified, like the duration of the
licence, or the time window defining the slot, but overall, this mechanism should allow for a
much more efficient use of the slots than today.
As we pointed out, ideally, such a mechanism should be implemented at the European
level, in order not to distort competition between European airlines, and so that airlines can
constitute coherent sets of slots between congested airports.
A point we did not develop in the paper but needs careful consideration from a practical
point of view is the acceptability of this system. As mentioned, any new system would find
hostility on the part of the established airlines, since it would imply taking from them what
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they get nowadaysfor free, and considerto bepart of their assets.Other airlines would be
more favourableto a new system,if it enablesthem to gain accessto so far unreachable
airports.
Among new systems, one that solves the aggregation problem (the problem for an airline
of not obtaining a coherent set of slots) like the one we proposed, is likely to be seen more
favourably than one that does not address this problem.
Overall, the system of air transportation prevailing in Europe today is still one of
national airlines. A new slot allocation mechanism would allow for (gradual) changes in that
system, which may or may not seem acceptable from a political point of view, considering the
social implications (what consumers could gain from more competition could be lost by
workers, for example). The desirability of having a national airline is however a political
issue, which we can only mention but not solve.
We are not claiming that our proposal is final, we are simply trying to contribute to a
debate on the feasibility, the risks and the interest of such a procedure. We are in the process
of designing a computer program to simulate competition between airlines, in order to launch
an experimental economic program to compare the consequences of this mechanism with
those of different modes of allocation.
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<Abstract>
The main purpose of this study is located at developing Ominibus Monitors
System(OMS) for internal management, which will enable to establish standards,
finding out matters to be improved, and appreciation for its treatment in a systematic
way. It is through developing subjective or objective estimation tool with use
importance, perceived level, and complex index at international airport by each
principal service items,
The direction of this study came towards for the purpose of developing a metric
analysis tool, utilizing the Quantitative Second Data, Analysing Perceived Data
through airport user surveys, systemizing the data collection-input-analysis process,
making data image according to graph of results, planning Service Encounter and
endowing control attribution, and ensuring competitiveness at the minimal
international standards.
It is much important to set up a pre-investigation plan on the base of existent
foreign literature and actual inspection to international airport. Two tasks have been
executed together on the base of this pre-investigation; one is developing subjective
estimation standards for departing party, entering party, and airport residence and the
other is developing objective standards as complementary methods
The study has processed for the purpose of monitoring services at airports
regularly and irregularly through developing software system for operating standards
after ensuring credibility and feasibility of estimation standards with substantial and
statistical way.
1. The purpose of study
The main purpose of this study is located at developing Ominibus Monitors
System(OMS) for internal management, which will enable to establish standards,
finding out matters to be improved, and appreciation for its treatment in a systematic
way. It is through developing subjective or objective estimation tool with use of
importance, perceived level, and complex index at international airport by each
principal service items
2. Content consist
Service Management i
Supportive ii
_onnation
_- "_ ,SQI(_ Quality Index
3. Proc_re
In accomplishing this research, it is much important to establish and execute pre-
. investigation plan on a basis of existing foreign literature and the actual investigation of
Incheon International Airport. With this result the pre-investigation, it is possible to
develop subjective measurement scale of those embarking, those disembarking and the
airport residual employees as well as development of objectivity index as a
complementary method.
4.Composition of measurement index
1) The number of passenger related field(airport/terminal ground access) : 35
(1) The number of common items between ACI and IATA: 23
(2) The number of service categories used by which more than 18(25%) of ACI
member airports : 5
(3) The number of service categories used by which more than 12(20%) of ACI
member airports • 2
(4) The number of service categories used by which more than 3 of ACI member
airports but excepted from the measurement adopted above: 4
(5) SATS : 1
2) The number of important items in other field : 28
(1) The number of items which is excepted from the measurement adopted
above but used by more than 5 of ACI member airports
3) The number of airlines-related items : 10
(1) The number of common item between ACI and SATS : 8
(2) SATS : 2
5. Inducement of Weight Production Function
1) The fundamental concept of MCJ
In evaluating the service quality perceived by consumers or customers , most of
research adopts frequency analysis or descriptive statistical methods through the
qualitative data collected by surveys. But it is not pertinent to use this qualitative
data for quantitative analysis. For instance, 5 respondents answer back as 4.00
degree on the question of the level of importance of airport check-in service. It,
however, cannot said all of those 5 respondents evaluated with the same level of
importanceof check-mservices.Thiscomes from each person think each different
evaluating categories. These problems require a certain process to transform the
qualitative data into quantitative one. From this research which study on the
evaluation frame for airport service quality, the Metlx)d of Categorical
Judgment(MCJ) of a methodology of psychology field was used to transform the
qualitative data into quantitative one.
2) Benefit of MCJ (The Method of Categorical Judgment)
(1) quantifying qualitative data as quantitative one.
(2) quantifying probability of the characteristics of various airport users
(3) quahog qualitative weight according to the characteristics of airport users
(4) Classifying the service standard of use
(5) Classifying to general user's characteristics
(6) Differentiation of importance by each service items
(7) Ability to composite a matrix of importance and satisfaction for operation
management purposes
3) MCJ Methodology
MCJ(The Method of Categorical Judgment: Bock, 1LD., and Jones, L.V. The
measurement and Prediction of Judgment and Choice. San Francisco, Holden-Day,
1968.) is a method to convert qualitative data to quantitative one in evaluating of
airport service quality. The purpose of MCJ is lied in presuming a quality
(parameters) which shows the characteristics related with the respondents' attitude
to the series of stimulus by converting qualitative data to quantitative one
The measurement of response is made up using normal function. The average and
dispersion of the stimulus, and it is possible to presume the boundary of categories
relatedwith the qualitative measurement used from the responded data.
6. Implementing survey
1) Survey method
CLT method
2) Composition of survey target
(1) The number of total respondents : 204
(2) Departure passengers(95) : Domestic(52), Japanese(15), Chinese(13), Those
come from English-spoken culture(l 5)
(3) Arriving Passengers(63) : Domestic(33), Japanese(10), Chinese(10), Those
come from English-spoken culture(10)
(4) Airport residual employees(50) : airlines(20), shops(.10), government
officials(10), ground handlers(10)
3) Survey result satisfaction score (5 full score standards)
- Departure passengers : 3.72
- Arriving passengers : 3.62
4) Reliability
As a result of Cronbach-a test, most of them shows high reliability as above 0.8
(below* the examples of departure passengers are shown in table, and others omitted
due to the fall short of paper space)
(1) Items of satisfaction of departure passengers
[Charti] The reliability" of departure passenger' satisfaction
Categories of service Alpha
FIDS
Information desk/Telephone information
Information guidance post
Cheek-in service
Security ,search
Immigration
Baggage m_lley/porters
Food/Restaurants/Bars
Duty free shop/shop
Departing lounges/waiting areas Gate lounges
Customs
Transfer procedures
Car
Bus
Taxi
Parking
Otherservices
0.8513
0.9456
0.9234
0.9547
0.9346
0.7847
0.9362
0.9467
0.8929
0.9433
0.9506
0.9483
0.6486
0.9235
0.8997
0.7381
0.8739
5) Weight by. regression analysis
(1) The value of R2, t-value is not significant statistically
- The value of R2 is appeared to be significant only in case of departure,
however, is not significant in case of arriving or airport residual employees
As for the fl-value, the number of independent variables which has significant t- value is
6 out of 17 departing variables; otherwise in case of arriving, all of 16 arriving variables
are not significant, and in case of airport residual employees, one variable is significant
among 27 variables.
(2) Occurrence of multi-collinearitybecause there are highly correlation
between independent variables. The Pearson product moment correlation value
independent variables are all significant within 10% consideration levels, therefore it is
not desirable that applying regression equation with these independent variables.
7. Comparison of Weight
1) Comparison of arithmetic average between MCJ and raw data
(Ex. Departure passengers)
When it performs relative comparison with converted % of the value of arithmetic
average of raw data of importance evaluation, the gravity difference of importance by
each item is too low. It can be seen on the difference of the arithmetic average value of
raw data m measurement items. But in the comparison between items by MCJ methods
adopted in this study, it definitely shows the differences.
[ Chart 2 ] comparison between arithmetic average of raw data and MCJ
(Depature passenger)
Items of Service
Guidance post
Airport access road
Check- in service
Security Check
Bus
FIDS
Information desk/telephone
desk
Connecting with other
airline flights
Immigration/Passport
Taxi
Departing lounge/waiting
area/Gate lounge
Transfer procedures
Baggage trolleys
Customs
Car parking
Duty-free shop/shop
Food/Restaurant/Bars
Tatal
0.969
0.386
0.366
0.222
0.216
0.205
0.142
0.141
0.115
-0.089
-0.151
-0.159
-0.165
-0.215
-0.319
-0.610
-0.621
MCJ
i Converted
i value(10 ?)
i 10.00
i 7.75
i 7.67
[
i 7.12
i 7.09
[ 7.05
[
[
i 6.81
i
i 6.80
i 6.70
i 5.92
!
i 5.67
i 5.64
[ 5.62
i 5.43
i 5.03
i 3.91
i 3.86
ii 108.07
9.25
[ 7.17
' 7.10
i6.59
[ 6.56
[ 6.52
6.30
i
i6.30
6.20
[5.47
i
i 5.25
i
i 5.22
[ 5.20
ii 5.02
i 4.65
|
[ 3.61
i 3.57
i100.00
Arithmetic average
Arithmetici Converted
average i valuelO?)
4.677 i
4.560 [
4.559 i
4.467 i
4.4671
4.527 i
i
4.355 i
i
i
4.352 i
4.247 i
4.143 1
4.272 i
4.250[
4.194 i
4.033 i
3.921 [
3.728 i
3.758 i
10.00
9.75
9.75
9.55
9.55
9.68
9.31
9.30
9.08
8.86
9.13
9.09
8.97
8.62
8.38
7.97
8.04
i
i %
i 6.45
[6.29
i 6.29
i
[ 6.16
i 6.16
[ 6.24
[
6.01
i
i 6.00
!
15.86
[5.71
i
[5.89
[
[ 5.86
i 5.78
! 5.56
i 5.41
i
i 5.14
[
i 5.18
72.509 [ 155.02 i 100.00
2) Comparison MCJ with B-value (departure passengers)
When producing the level of importance of items using regressive formula, it is
predicted to be a problem of multi-cv!linearity because the correlation between items is
forecasted to be much high according to the natural characteristics of this study. And
the analysis result show it had no significant by statistically. Nevertheless, in the MCJ
analysis, the all items passed goodness of fit. Here follows the comparison of them.
[Chart 3] Comparision MCJ and gvalue(depamJre passenger)
items
Guidaace post
Airport Access road
Check-in S_dce
Security check
Bus
FIDS
Information desk,_w,lephonc information
Immigration/passport
Taxi
Departing lounges/waiting area/Gate
lounges
Customs
Transfer procedure
Baggage _rolley
Car parking
Duty- free shops/shops
food/restaurants/bar
MCJ
ranking
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Regression
B
0.061
0.571
0.409
-0.124
0.692
0.188
0.026
0.092
0.543
0.969 j
0.386 i
0.366 i
o.222 i
0.216 _
0.205 i
0.142 "
0.115 i
-0.089 i
-0.151 i
-0.215 i
-0.159 i
-0.165 i
-0.319 i
-0.610 i
-0.621 i
-0.341
-0.018
-0.092
0.085
-0.164
0.331
0.068
i ranking
i lO
i 3
4
! 14
i 1
j 6
i ll
7
i 2
i 16
i 12
i 13
i 15
j 5
|i 9
8. The example of producing the mended value
1) Departing passenger
The scores of each service items can be achieved through multiplying the satisfaction
level(5 full score standards) of each service items and the level of importance produced
by MCJ value by the converted level of importance(%) to 100% ration of component.
The final result was the scores of each service items. Setting 500 as full score standards,
the total sum of them was 372.38 as pre-test results and it fails to 74.50% of total. The
amended value of arriving passengers and airport residual employees can be achieved
through the same way
• [ Chart 4 ] Correction Value Output - departure passenger
items
Guidance post
Airport Access road
Check- in Service
Security check
Bus
FIDS
Information desk/telephone information
Connection with other airline fight
Immigration/passport
Taxi
Departing lounges/waiting area/Gate
lounges
Transfer procedure
Baggage trolley
Customs
Car parking
Duty- free shops/shops
Caf6/Restaurart/Bar
Average level of
satisfaction
3.60
3.93
3.89
3.46
4.07
3.54
3.60
3.75
3.49
3.70
3.90
4.03
3.82
3.76
3.57
3.66
3.40
Level of
importance(%)
9.25
7.17
7.10
6.59
6.56
6.52
6.30
6.30
6.20
5.47
5.25
5.22
5.20
5.02
4.65
3.61
3.57
Corrected
value
33.34
28.20
27.61
22.80
26.73
23.11
22.71
23.66
21.68
20.28
20.52
21.06
19.90
18.89
16.62
13.24
12.14
Total 100.00 372.48
Note) 1. The level of importance(%) is weight reproduced by MCJ
2. The Corrected value is achieved through multiplying the average satisfaction
level and MCJ level of importance(%)
3. Same process will be applied to arriving passengers and airport residual
employees
9. Conclusion
Seen from above research result, the foregoing research should include that the
airport service evaluation index to be developed with distinction the subjective field
from objective field fundamentally and each service level target should be
e.__b!ished and managed_ Particularly, in case of subjective index,, the hight
persuasive result value can be found as a result of investigating the weight level of
importance and applying it as more quantified through MCJ methods.
1) Classification of subjective area and objective area
2) Composition of index by existing literatures and opinions from experts
3) Distinction of departure passengers, arriving passengers, airport residual
emplovees_ objective index
4) Implementing substantiate market survey for development index
(1) Composition of plural items and measmement of level of importance
(2) Ensuring statistical reliability and reasonableness
_ Establishing target value by each index
6) Amending target value with consultation with concerned airport authority's
department
<Appendix>
[Chart 5] composition of subjective and objective items to be measured
Detail itemsService area - .,.
subjective Objective
FIDS/light board
Information desk
Guiding post
Check- in service
Security check
immigration/
passport
Baggage delivery
Baggage
trolley/porter
food/restaurant/bar
• pertinent location of deployed
• quick information
• familiarity with staff
• expert of staff working
•pertinent response to question
• optical perception
• pertinent number of posts
• expression
• familiarity with staff
• efficiency of staff working
• familiarity with staff
• efficiency of staff working
• feeling to security
• manner of staff working
• waiting time for procedure
• easiness for use of baggage
trolley
• service speed of baggage treating
• availability of carter
• convenience of moving carter
• pertinent fare for using porter
• the quality level of food
• cleanliness
• level of price vs service
variety of kind of selection
courtesy of restaurant employee
waiting time/staff service
efficiency/delivery time
• waiting time telephone response
• waiting time for check-in
• waiting and passing through time
time taken waiting and passing through
inspection
• time taken for immigration procedures
• the time period between first baggage
and last
• waiting time for passenger baggage
• exact classification of baggage
Duty-free
shop/shop
Departing
lounges/waiting
area/gate lounges
Custonl$
Other services
Transfer
Bus
Taxi
Car
Parkingarea
- variety ofselection type
• price when considering the
quality of product
- courtesy of clerk
• waiting time/staff service
efficiency/speedof service
• _at confortaVflit3#cleanliness
• seat availability
• attitude and courtesy of custom
officer
•speedyprogressofinspection
• delay measurement of flight
-customeropinionproposal
system
- availability of public telephone/
• rcstroom
• cleanness of terminal
• connect convenience other flight
• service efficient- of transfer
counter
• staffmanner of tramfer
counter
• friendliness and attitude of
bus driver
• interval time
friendlinessand
driver
-pickup ataxi
attitude of taxi
•roadsignpost/traffics gnpost
•disttLrbanceexpense
level(includingtofuelprice,
tonpay)
• ease of finding site
• proximity to terminal building
-fares
• waiting time
- customercomplainmcnt
hand!_i.i_g
• aircraliaveragerateof
punctuality
- tmmcfer time
• punctuality of longhaul limousine
• taxi waiting time
• The internal organs parking lot-
terminal for shuttle bus waiting time
- waiting time exit of parkinglot
•availability ofparkinglot
• attitude of personnel working at
parking
Airport residual employees(subjective inquiry)
Commol_ss
Cargo
Facilities
Security service
Terminal service
• attitude of airport corporation staff
• construction staff attitude, the control against the chief mourner worker
opinion proposal
• airport expense efficiency
• whole cleanness of terminal
• whole cargo service
• cargo equipment, warehouse/cargo facilities and land avalibility
• the number of runway, apron, taxiway
• apron and gate availability
• airport's technical equipment availability
• ground handling facilities availability
[terminal security]
•passenger baggage security check
•passenger soul cap hour control
• the travel document and the passport and contrast confirmation of onboard
volume
[airside security]
• the aviation side for luggage it searches
• luggage protection and escort
• luggage ID
• aircraft security checking
[ the freight and mail checking ].
• the freight and the express dispatch freight it searches
• security control of the treasure and the diplomatic mailbag
• protection and escort of freight mail
[ generality]
• urgent request confrontation attitude
• Courtesy and the attitude which helps.
•human being the etiquette
• Departure gate control
• boarding and the others guidance broadcasting clearness
• control of the passenger where the help due to an advance request is
necessary
•passenger support from the luggage arrival area
• lost article c_ter service
• the luggage tracking coordination which is controllod
•human being the etiquette
• courtesy and hep the attitude which it gives
Emigration passenger- Airport residual employee (common)
• airport fine view satisfaction.
- airport use general satisfaction
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Abstract
This paper updates prior research on aircraft leasing and contrasts the findings of current
data with prior results. Usage of leases by air carriers is a means to lessen the impact of
financial obligations from fleet purchases. The study revisits two previous studies, one in
i969 and one in i991, whicia analyzed the incidence of leases by major air carriers. The
current study updates these past studies to consider air carriers current usage of leases.
Additionally, since operating leases are not reflected in the balance sheets of airlines,
operating lease information was capitalized using a present value of future operating
lease payments. Then, financial debt burden ratios were computed to determine the
impact from the capitalization of lease information.
The usage of operating leases increased, significantly from the first study to the 1991
study, and this trend continues. The incidence of leasing, the classification of leases as
operating, and the percentage of operating leases to total fleet have all increased for the
majority of the airlines reviewed. When operating lease data were capitalized, debt ratios
weakened, providing further evidence of deterioration in the financial health of air
carriers.
Keywords: Leasing, Capital Leases, Operating Leases, Air carriers, Debt
Introduction
The airline industry has suffered recent financial distress. September 11 tb, SARS, and the
general economy have reduced air travel. UAL is currently operating under Chapter 11
bankruptcy, US Airways recently emerged fxom a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, and
financial indicators for most air carriers are in a decline. This paper looks at one
indicator of financial health - debt to equity ratios - and considers the impact of leasing
upon the reported financial burden of the airlines. This paper revisits two studies, one in
the early 1970s (Gritta, 1974) and the other in the 1990s (G-ritta, Lippman, and Chow,
1994) that investigated the use of aircraft leasing to lessen the impact that financial
obligations have upon financial ratios. This study updates the prior studies' data to
determine the continuing financial impact fi'om characterizing aircraft purchases as
leases.
Reporting of Leasing on the Financial Statements
Prior to 1976, the impact of most leases was not reflected in the financial statements of
air carriers. Then, lease accounting followed Accounting Principles Board (APB) No. 5,
Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements of Lessee. This pronouncement required
capitalization of a lease only when the lease created a material equity interest in the
property, e.g. when the noncancelable lease was, in substance, a. purchase. Specific
criteria outlined in APB No. 5 required lease capitalization when either the lease and
renewal option term were greater than or equal to the useful economic life of the asset, or
when a bargain purchase option was included in the lease. Firms were required to
include footnote disclosure for lease commitments of material noncancelable leases (APB
No. 5, 1964). In actuality, most leases were not recorded in the financial statements.
Through structuring asset purchases as leases, firms could use leases as a means of off-
balance sheet financing to avoid what many considered to be debt obligations. The non-
recording of leases on the financial statements significantly affected the financial
statements and ratios developed fi'om them (Gritta, 1974; Nelson, 1963).
Currently, the reporting of leases on the financial statements is governed by Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
13, Accounting for Leases. This statement, in effect since 1976, requires that firms
classify leases as either operating or capital, dependent upon four criteria: the lease
transfers ownership of the property to the lessee at the end of the lease term, the lease
contains a bargain purchase option, the lease term is equal to 75% or more of the
economic life of the leased asset, or the present value of the minimum lease payments at
the beginning of the lease term equals or exceeds 90% of the fair value of the lease
property (SFAS No. 13, 1976). If one of these conditions for capitalization is met, then
the lease is characterized as a capital lease, and the leased asset and corresponding
obligation are recorded on the balance sheet. If, instead, the lease is identified as an
operating lease, then only the yearly lease payment is reflected as an expense on the
income statement.
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While the APB primarily considered material equity as the underlying motivation for
capitalization of leases, the FASB considered whether the lease, in substance, transferred
ownership risks and benefits. With the implementation of No. 13, it was hoped that
firms' usage of off-balance sheet financing would diminish. However, since the criteria
for capitalization include specified targets, lease terms can be structured to avoid
capitalization, and some managers continued to classify as operating leases those leases
which are, in substance, capital leases (Donegan and Sunder, 1989). When classified as
operating leases, both assets and debt obligations are potentially understated.
Aircraft Leasing in the 1960s
The original lease study reviewed the large air carriers, now referred to as majors, and
determined the effect _om capitalizing lease obligations. Leases were identified as either
operating or financial. Classification of leases as financial followed the classic definition
as articulated by Vancil and Anthony (1963) who categorized leases as financial in nature
if the lease term was approximately equal to the depreciable life of the airframe, if there
were options to purchase and/or renew at the end of the initial term, if the aggregate
rentals under the lease's initial term exceeded the then new purchase price of the aircraft,
and if the leases were net leases.
The study found little ambiguity in the classification of aircraft leases, as the majority of
the lease agreemen_ were financial in nature. Only a few of the leases were categorized
as operating (short term), and most of these leases met none of the financial lease criteria.
But, regardless of whether a lease was identified as financial or operating, in practice
most leased assets and their corresponding debt were not reflected on the balance sheet.
Since financial leases resemble, in substance, long-term debt finance, the original study
determined the impact from constructive capitalization of financing lease data on total
capital and debt ratios. It was assumed that cancelable operating leases did not have a
significant impact upon the financial statements, so no capitalization of their data was
deemed necessary. Data were obtained from 1969 filings with the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), which provided actual lease obligations. The study found that only 19% of
the total fleet was leased, and of these only 13% were operating. The study reported that
most leases were not reflected in the financial statements, and capitalization of lease
information had a significant negative impact upon debt ratios, adding to the existing debt
burdens of the companies.
Aircraft Leasing in the 1990s
The follow-up study used the carriers identified in the earlier study, and updated the data
to consider lease usage in 1991. Subsequent to the original study, several carriers had
ceased operations (Eastern and Braniff) or merged with other airlines (National, Western,
and Northeast). The size of the sample for the follow-up study was increased by
inclusion of new major carriers including Alaska Airlines, Southwest, US Air, and
America West. Data were obtained from the financial statements as reported to the
3
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1991, since filings with lease information were
no longer required by the CAB by that time.
The study found that the percentage of the fleet leased increased from 19% in the first
study, to 54%, with 82% identified as operating, up from 13%. Clearly, a significant
change in fleet financing had occurred, from straight debt to more leasing as a means of
financing ownership, and the impact from the recording of these leases as operating
leases resulted in a large understatement of financial debt burden ratios.
Aircraft Leasing in 2002
In this current study, we again considered the incidence and nature of leasing by the
major carriers identified in past studies. The original study reviewed lease information
for 11 airlines, and the updated study identified nine carriers with available lease
information. Data for these airlines were similarly reviewed for the fiscal year ending
2002. Of the nine previously identified in 1991, two were operating under Chapter
Eleven bankruptcy protection (UAL and US Airways) for the year 2002. TWA is
privately held, and separate financial data are unavailable. Northwest, for which data
previously were unavailable for the second study although available in the original study,
has available information for 2002.
Table I reports the number and percentage of leased aircratt by carrier in 2002.
Information from the prior study is included for comparison. Percentage of planes leased
varied from a low of 25.9% reported by Southwest Airlines, to a high of 93.0% for
America West. This is contrasted with the rates found in the second study, which ranged
from a low of 44.2% to only 81.2%. Alaska and American Airlines had a decrease in the
percentage of planes leased, Delta was essentially unchanged, while the remainder had
increases. Southwest Airlines, with the lowest percentage of planes leased in 2002, did
not have data available for the 1991 study.
More critical than percentage of fleet leased is the percentage of leases identified as
operating leases, which avoid balance sheet classification. Table I classifies the number
of leases as operating or capitalized leases, and Table II identifies the percentage of
leases categorized as operating or capital, with information from the prior study included
for comparison. Consistent with the prior updated study, most leases are structured as
operating leases, a significant difference from the original study when operating leases
were only 13% of all leases. The percentage of leases classified as operating ranged from
80.1% to 99.2%; in the updated study the percentage ranged from 78.8% to 100%, so no
material increase was noted for air carriers as a whole. Operating lease percentage
increased greatest for US Airways and Continental.
Because the percentage of leasing changed, as had the mix of operating/capital
classifications, we looked at the percentage of planes identified as operating to total
planes in the fleet. This might better determine the company's usage of leasing as off-
balance sheet financing. The results are listed in Table II. Operating leases as a
percentage of the total fleet ranged from 24.0% to a high of 93.0%. In contrast, the prior
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study rangedfrom 37.8% to 81.2%. While the current study'srangeincluded a lower
percentage, this carrier, Southwest, did not have available information for the prior study.
Southwest is currently the most financially healthy of the airlines, having shown a profit
the last few years when other airlines have incurred significant losses. Only American
showed a decline in the usage of operating leases for its fleet.
Operating leases are not reflected in the balance sheets of the airlines, although the yearly
future obligations of the leases are disclosed in the footnotes to the financial statements.
We estimated the impact of these obligations on the balance sheet, by determining the
present value of the noneaneelable operating lease payments in a manner consistent with
the prior 1991 study. 1 The operating lease disclosures reported in the financial footnotes
include the yearly obligation for the next five years, and then a total of the remaining
obligations. We assumed that the last repomxl yearly amount would continue into the
future, allowing us to estimate the remaining life of the lease payments. These were then
discounted to the present year assmning an appropriate interest rate. 2 The present values
of the lease obligations were then included with the recorded long-term debt to compute
the adjusted long-term debt obligations for each airline. These computed values are
disclosed in Table HI along with the long-term liabilities and equity for each air cartier.
Table IV _rrresents the ratios of the airlines based, fir_, upon_ t_he r_%port.ed_fiuandal
statements and then assuming lease capitalization. Although the debt burden for the
airlines is already quite high without lease capitalization, capitalization of operating
leases increased the reported levels of the debt burden, particularly for the Debt/Equity
ratio. In essence, the frailty of the airlines industry becomes even more evident with the
capitalization of the operating airlines.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to update prior research on aircraft leasing and contrast the
findings of current data with prior results. In 1969, weaker carriers tended to lease a
higher percentage of their aircraft, and these leases tended to be classified as finance
leases. These leases were not reflected on the balance sheets of the air carriers. By 1991,
the incidence of leasing had significantly increased for all carriers and many of these
leases were classified as operating leases. In 2002, the incidence of leasing, the
classification of leases as operating, and operating leases as a percentage of total fleet
usage have all increased for the majority of the airlines. Capitalization of operating lease
obligation weakens the debt ratios, evidence of further deterioration in the financial
health of the air carriers.
1For some airlines the lease payments disclosed in the financial statements were detailed separately for
aircraft leases, and ground and other equipment leases; other airlines included both of these together as one
number. Since the majority of air carriers do not separate out the lease payments by type of asset, we
capitalized all operating lease payments.
2The 1969 and 1991 study used a 10% discount rate, and for consistency we used 10% for the current
study. Today, interest rates are considerably less than in the early 90s. A lower rate would increase the
amount of the obligation. This study's reported impact upon the financial statements from capitalizing
operating leases is understatecL
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Theprior studyarguedfor disclosureof specificair carderleasedata. Certainly,theneed
still existstoday. Shortof specific data,however,capitalizationof operatingleasedata
canbe determinedusingvariousassumptionsaboutmaturity andimplied interestin the
lease.Capitalizationisnecessaryto produceamoreaccuratepictureof theobligationsof
theair carders. With the currenteconomicclimate,capitalizationof leasesis imperative
to provideamorerepresentativeindicationof theair carriers'financialburden.
Carrier
Table I
Leased Aircraft
Total Operating Capital Planes % Leased
Fleet Leases Leases Leased 2002
% Leased
1990
(Per prior study)
Alaska 102 45 3 48 47.1% 79.0%
American 819 281 70 421 42.9% 61.6%
America West 143 132 1 133 93.0% 81.2%
Continental 636 453 9 462 72.6% 68.6%
Delta 831 313 45 358 43.1% 44.2%
Northwest 575 233 18 251 43.7% n/a
Southwest 375 90 7 97 25.9% n/a
UAL 567 241 59 300 63.3% 45.5%
US Airways 413 252 0 252 52.3% 47.3%
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Carrier
Alaska
American
America
West
Continental
Delta
Northwest
Southwest
UAL
US Airways
Table II
Lease Classification Percentages
2002 1990
% Leases % Leases
Operating Operating
93.8% n/a
80.1% 78.8%
2002
% Fleet
Operating
44.1%
34.3%
99.2% 100.0%
98.1% 84.3%
87.4% 90.0%
92.8% n/a
92.8% n/a
80.3% 85.1%
95.6% 80.0%
93.0%
71.2%
35.7%
40.5%
24.0%
42.5%
58.4%
1990
% Fleet
Operating
n/a
48.5%
81.2%
57.8%
39.8%
n/a
n/a
38.7%
37.8%
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Carrier
Table NI
Total Capital, Including Aircraft Leases
(in thousands)
Long Term Capitalized
Liabilities Leases Equity
Alaska 1,431,200 664,758 569,700
American 19,746,000 8,491,917 947,000
America West 859,941 2,012,205 68,178
Continental 7,047,000 9,645,374 767,000
Delta 17,372,000 7,473,171 893,000
Northwest 11,729,000 5,182,180 (2,262,000)
Southwest 3,098,305 1,483,456 4,421,617
UAL 22,146,000 12,093,198 (2,483,000)
US Airways 9,215,000 5,058,638 (4,921,000)
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Table IV
Capitalization and Ratio Analysis
Carrier
Long Term Debt/Total Capital
Without With
Leases Leases
Total Debt/Net Worth
Without With
Leases Leases
Alaska
American
America West
Continental
Delta
Northwest
Southwest
UAL
US Airways
71.5% 79.5%
95.4% 96.8%
92.7% 97.7%
89.9% 95.6%
95.0% 96.5%
NMF NMF
41.2% 50.9%
NMF NMF
NMF NMF
3.83 5.19
28.20 37.16
20.11 49.62
13.00 25.58
26.68 35.05
-6.87 -9.17
1.02 1.36
-10.53 -15.4
-2.33 -3.36
NMF - not meaningful figure
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This paper examines a range of methods to collect data for the investigation of
decision-making in airline Operations Control Cemtres (OCCs). A study was
conducted of 52 controllers in five OCCs of both domestic and international
airlines in the Asia-Pacific region. A range of methods was used including:
surveys, inte_ews, observations, simulations, and think-aloud protocol. The
paper compares and evaluates the suitability of these techniques for gathering data
and provides recommendations on the application of simulations.
Keywords
Data Collection, Decision-Making, Research Methocls, Simulation, Think-Aloud
Protocol.
In airlineoperations, decisions yielding optimal results may be the difference between
company survival and bankruptcy. Stakes are high, timing is crucial, and the consequences
of poor decisions _uld be critical. An airline's Operations Control Centre (OCC) operates
in a complex, dynamic, and intense environment and serves as the airline's nerve centre. It
is responsible for the control of aircraft to ensure economical, operational (Williams, 1967)
and commercial efficiency. Although decision-making has been examined in the aviation
industry, for example in Air Traffic Control (Corker, Pisanich and Bunzo, 1997), Pilot
Crewing (Fischer and Orasanu, 1997), Schedule Disruption Management (Thengvall, Bard
and Yu, 2000), and in Emergency Services (Flirt, Stewart, and Slaven, 1996), empirical
research on OCC decision-making is very limited. Understanding decision-making in
OCCs requires the investigator to gain an appreciation of the demands presented by
disruptions to operational schedules and the necessity to recover the situations, often under
severe time constraints. A study of decision-making would require an investigator to be
present 24 hours a day for many days, or even weeks in the international environment, to
gain a full understanding of the work demands. Alternatively, an investigation would rely
on the abilities of personnel to recall eventsand responses well after the disruption,
exposing the investigation to inaccuracies. Consequently, studying decision-making in
OCCs presents many challenges in terms of the study design. This paper examines and
evaluates a range of methods for gathering data in airline operations.
Review of Data Collection Methods
Investigators face a difficult task in attempting to capture data accurately in a way that is
methodologically sound so that generalisations can be made (Bordia and Rosnow, 1998).
According to Zikmund (2000), the main primary data collection methods include surveys
(including questionnaires and interviews), observation, and experiments. This paper
examines the appropriateness of each of these methods for investigating decision-making in
OCCs.
Survey
A common method of collecting data is the use of a survey (Sekaran, 1992) based on pre-
determined questions. A survey can be widely distributed at reasonable cost and is an
excellent basis for describing people's attitudes and behaviours (Shaughnessy and
Zechmeister,1994). However gathering information which rdies on the recall of past
events and behaviour may be of dubious validity and reliability (Foddy, 1994). Further, the
current study was predicated on self-reflection by controllers and accurate analysis of
events often well after the events occurred. There could be a lack of accuracy in recalLing
events, and confusion of details particularly where simultaneous disruptions occurred. A
major weakness of surveys is that they are ill-suited for in-depth examination of the
thoughts and feelings of individual respondents (Shaughnessy and Zechmeister, 1994). In
addition, surveys do not proxdde the means to explore uncertainty or to clarify responses
(Sekaran, 1992).
lmerviews
The use of intet_ews as a method of data collection provides a means for establishing
rapport with respondents, and exploring and understanding complex issues (Sekaran,
1992). Interviews allow researchers to adapt the questions as necessary, clarify doubts, and
ensure responses are understood properly (Sekeran, 1992). Interviews also assist in
understanding how individuals perceive and give meaning to certain phenomena or events
(Berg, 1995). For example Yorkston, Klasner and Swanson (2001) used in-depth
interviews to gain insider perspectives of communication by individuals (N=7) with
multiple sclerosis. Yorkston et al (2001) found that this process of interviewing
respondents yielded rich information. Interviews, therefore, may be useful for studying
decision-making by controllers in OCCs as they allow a great deal of interaction between
researcher and respondent. However there are limitations with interviews. Yin (1994)
warns that interviews are verbal reports only, and are thus subject to bias, poor recall, and
poor or inaccurate articulation. To address this issue in the current study interviews could
be conducted during disruptions to elicit accurate and timely information but such action
could interfere with the work process and controllers could be unwilling to coolmrme.
Even if interviews are conducted at a later time, the problems of accurate recall of details
would still be a problem.
Observation
Observation in the work setting is useful to further understanding of the context or
phenomenon (Yin, 1994) and establishes the validity of the findings. Observation enables
researchersto distinguish between real and verbal behaviour (Bogdewic, 1999), and gather
data at the time behaviour occurs (Atherton and Klemmack, 1982). In OCCs, observing
disruptions as they occur permits the researcher to monitor the progress of the disruption
and any actions being taken by controllers. Boote and Matthews (1999) found
observation to be the most appropriate research methodology to observe customer traffic
flows along main meets. Observational research requires no effort on the part of the
respondent, and is a very effective way to enrich and supplement data gathered by other
means (Boote and Matthews, 1999). However, attitudes and opinions cannot be recorded
using observation (Zikmund, 2000). Systematic observation may be costly and very time
consuming, and the lack of predictability of events may also create problems for
researchers. For example in OCCs, observation may be conducted over several hours or
even days without incident. Further, Zikmund (2000) noted several deficiencies with the
collection of data using this technique such as observer subjectivity, memory limitations,
inability to record all details, and inability to interpret observations such as body language,
appropriately. Consequently in the current study observation alone would not capture the
required information.
Think-aloud protocol
Think-aloud protocol is a technique for verbalisation, where participants are instructed to
think aloud as they work on a problem (Woods, 1993). This technique allows the
researcher to access the underlying thought processes, reasoning, and behaviours involved
in analysing and solving the problem (Ericsson and Simon, 1993). Respondents in
numerous studies have been asked to think aloud and talk through their thoughts. For
example de Groot (1978) presented chess players (N=22) with various combinations of
chess pieces on a board, and asked the players to think aloud while selecting the best move.
De Groot (1978) noted that most subjects found thinking'aloud, slowed thinking down, and
made the subject think more explicitly. Think-aloud protocol may be appropriate to gain
an insight of controllers' thought processes in decision-making. However, controllers do
not have time during actual disruptions to elucidate their reasons for taking particular
actions.
Methods for recording responses
Various methods and devices can be used to record responses, such as tape recordings of
dialogue, written responses, computer inputs, observations, or by some combination of
these approaches. However the method used may influence the results. For example
having participants respond in writing may be tedious and limiting. Adelman, Tolcott and
Bresnick (1993) examined the effec_ of gathering data on quality judgement with trained
Army Air Defence personnel (N=63), and concluded that the artificialities ofthe paper and
pencil task may have influenced the results.
Case study approach
The case study method is well su/ted to exploratory or descriptive studies (Yin, 1994). The
multiple case study approach has the benefits of deepening the understanding of the subject
(Miles and Huberman, 1994), enabling more information to be gathered and increasing the
generalisability of the research (Bryman_ 1989). Using a case study method would allow
the investigation of decision-making in several OCCs. The case study method may be
limited due to the necessity to gain access to (Burgess, 1984), and cooperation of (Zikmtmd
2000) a number of suitable companies, and to the time taken to complete the study (Yin,
1984).
Experiments and simulations
In an experiment, variables may be manipulated in controlled conditions to test a
hypothesis (Zikmund, 2000). Often comparisons are made between results from a control
group and an experimental group (Burgess, 1993). A simulation is akin to an experiment;
specially created in an artificial setting, but not very diffenmt from reality (Sekaran, 1992).
One of the mog important aspects of simulation is its ability to mimic reality so that
researchers can study phenomena too difficult or impossible to study in real life (Bordt,
1999). The use of simulation is also recognised as one of the most widely used techniques
in operational research and management science (Law and Kelton, 1991). The ability to
control the simulation allows the replication of situations, and the manipulation of certain
conditions (Blank, 1984). These aspects were important considerations in the current
study.
Simulationshavewide applications in research and practice. Simulation has been used as a
decision support tool for management. For example, in a study of operational changes in
an army hospital, simulation was used to assess alternative patient capacity and staffing
capabilities (Lediow and Bradshaw, 1999). Simulation may also be used in a teaching or
training context. According to Salas and Burke (2002), simulation may be effective
provided that it is instructional, meets task, performance, and feedback needs, and helps to
guide learning. Bordt (1999) found simulation to be a very effective teaching aid to
students studying criminology, because the students became fully engaged in the process,
could readily test real life situations, and demonstrated critical evaluation skills. Fisher,
Laurie, Glaser, Connemey, Pollatsek, Duff)', and Brock (2002) used simulation to test a
PC-based driving skills program with young drivers (N--45). Simulation provided a safe
environment to study the effects of experience and risk awareness on drivers.
In aviation, one of the most useful applications of simulation is the flight simulator which
allows the representation of aircraft flight with safety, training, and financial efficiencies
(Moroney and Moroney, 1999). Simulation is also used extensively in Air Traffic Control,
particularly for selection and training (Ackerman and Kanfer, 1993). The conclusion from
the use of simulation in these domains is that where appropriately designed and used,
simulation can be a most effective tool for testing,_teaching, and learning. The suitability
of simulations as a data collection method relies on the degree to which the simulation
replicates the work situation.. Therefore it is important to pay attention to detail in the
design of simulations.
In summary, all the methods of data collection considered have limitations. Therefore,
collecting data through multi-methods, although costly and time-consuming, lends rigour to
research (Sekaran, 1992). The current study combined a number of data-collection
methods to counter the deficiencies of any single method. This paper focuses on data
collection methods and therefore the substantive f'mdings are not reported in the paper.
Data collection in the current study
A survey was distributed as a preliminary test to controllers (n=6) from one Australian
domestic OCC. Respondents were asked to complete a questionnaire at the conclusion of
each disruption or at the end of each shift. Questions asked respondents to record the
nature, cause and duration of each disruption. Respondents were asked to answer questions
such as 'where did they obtain information for decision-making', and 'what amount of
information did they need to make decisions'? Qualitative data were also collected by
observing controllers during disruptions and asking ia'-_-h-actured and semi-s'_,acUa_ed
questions.
However the ,use of surveys and observations to collect data about decision-making during
disruptions was inappropriate. The fi'equmcy, regularity, and duration of disruptions were
unpredictable, making data coUection inefficient. Some disruptions continued across a
number of shifts or even days. Therefore, decision-making processes of any one
respondent were difficult to capture. Second, respondents were generally unable or
unwilling to answer questions during a disruption as they needed to focus intensely on
solving operational problems. Third, there was no way to compare the decision-making
outcomes of respondents. Some disruptions were resolved quickly and with minimal
decision-making from controllers, while others were longer and required extensive
decision-making. Fourth, if a number of disruptions occurred simultaneously, decision-
making relevant to any particular disruption could not necessarily be determined. Fifth,
there was no means by which the researcher could be confident that respondents completed
the questionnaire with any degree of accuracy or timeliness. The conclusion reached was
that the method using surveys and observation to study, decision-making in an OCC was
inappropmte.
Simulation study
The study was re-designed using a multiple case study approach to examine decision
outcomes of controllers (N=52) in five Operations Control Centres. The study was
broadened to include OCCs in other Australian domestic airlines, as well as OCCs of
international airlines m the Asia-Pacific region. One airline operated solely domestic
services, two operated solely international services and two operated both domestic and
international services. In domestic operations, flight stages are short, aircraft are scheduled
to operate a high number of flight stages in a day, and are on the ground for short durations
between flights. Controllers handling domestic disruptions, therefore, make numerous
decisionswithinvery short timeframes. In contrast, international flight stages may be very
long, aircraft may only operate a small number of flights per day, and are on the ground
between flights for longer durations. Deeision-making therefore is generally less intense.
A simulation to replicate each of the operational environments was designed in
collaboration with a panel of experts. The experts were current or retired senior operations
managers (N=10). For each simulation, hypothetical flight schedules were constructed to
replicate typical airline schedules. Each simulation consisted of a visual display showing a
coloured utilisation of a fleet of aircrai_, and was laminated to allow respondents to write or
draw on the surface. The display was a close representation of the computerised display
normally used by operations controllers. Information on the display included aircraft flight
stages with flight numbers, city pairs (routes), flight loadings, maintenance
unserviceabilities and requirements, and other relevant information. The flight stages were
positioned on the display according to a continuous time scale. A time-line could be
positioned along the time-scale to indicate the specific time of day, or a passage of elapsed
time.
Domestic Simulation
The domestic simulation was designed for OCCs in the Australasian region. Hence the
flight schedule was constructed for a hypothetical airline operating within Australia. The
base location of the airline was irrelevant for the study.
International Simulation
The international simulation was designed for OCCs in the Asia-Pacific region. Hence the
hypothetical airline was based at a fictitious location, but within the Pacific region.
Information for respondents included the approximate location depicted on a map, and the
local time zone of the location. Respondents could determine the flying time and therefore
distance to any destination of the airline from the flight schedules.
A series of simulation scenarios was designed in collaboration with the panel of experts.
The scenarios consisted of three typical operational problems for each of the domestic and
international operations, and each successive scenario was more complex than the previous
one, in terms of the nature of the disruption, the consequences of any decision, and
timeframes for decision-making. The three scenarios were completely independont of each
other. A short audio briefing tape was made for each of the domestic and international
simulations. The tape served to ensure a consistent briefing for each respondent, and
contained important information for the simulation. The preamble outlined the r_ason for
the study and emphasised to the respondent that the study was concerned with decision-
making processes rather than solutions to the scenarios. Respondents were asked to think
aloud as the simulation precceded.
The simulation was conducted tmwcen the researcher and one respondent at a lime at the
respondent's workplace, but in a separate room. Respondents were invited by their
managers to participate voluntarily in the study. As only three OCC controllers from three
different airlines declined the study, the sample was highly representative of the population
of controllers in the airlines studied. While large sample sizes are more reliable, they are
also more costly (Blank, 1984). The study was limited to the Asia-Pacific region for this
reason. In the OCCs of the two airlines in the study that operated both domestic and
international operations, respondents worked either as domestic or international controllers.
These respondents were permitted to select either the domestic or international simulation.
Prior to running the simulation, each respondent listened to the five minute audio briefing
tape. Respondents were asked if any information required clarification or whether they felt
they needed additional information. When restxmde_ indicated their readiness to
commence the simulation, the tape recorder was set to record all subsequent
c,3mmunications. Taping is more accurate than any other method of recording interview,
data, providing the respondent agrees to being taped, and the taped data are transcribed
('Yin, 1994). The current study satisfied both these criteria. The taping process did not
appear to present any difficulties and the respondents did not react adversely to the tape
recorder, even to the extent of waiting while tapes were changed. According to Ericsson
and Simon, (1993) respondents become so involved in the task that they soon become
accustomed to the prcsonce of the taping device.
Theresearchercommenced the simulation by showing respondents the utilisation of flight
schedules and describing the display. The respondents were asked to familiarise
themselves with the utilisation, and communicate observations and any questions to the
researcher. As each scenario was introduced, respondents were asked to think aloud as
they attempted to solve the operational problems. The researcher played two critical roles
throughout the simulation. The main role of the researcher during the simulation was to
control and direct each scenario according to a script. As the scenario progressed, further
information was given to respondents at appropriate times. Typical developments included
sudden maintenance failures, deteriorating weather conditions, or particular commercial
requirements. Second, the researcher acted as a resource base for the scenario, providing
any information required by respondents as the scenario progressed. On request from
respondents, the researcher provided information or answered questions relating, for
example, to crew availability or roster commitments, passenger connections, airport or air
traffic control related information, maintenance requirements, and weather advice.
As each scenario progressed, respondents were required to make decisions and attempt to
construct solutions to the operational problems. By observing respondents' actions, and
listening to their verbalised thought processes, the researcher could explore the decision-
making process. For example if a respondent noted several flights with low loadings
(proportion of booked passengers, to available seats), the researcher could probe the reason
for the respondent's comment. The researcher also asked questions such as 'why do you
doubt the information provided by Engineering?' or 'how do you know when you have
enough information to help you make a decision?' The scenario was continued until
respondents considered a problem was solved satisfactorily or the researcher considered
little would be gained by extending the scenario.
Discussion
Most respondents were familiar with details contained within the simulated displays.
However, respondents working in OCCs outside Australia, but participating in the domestic
simulation, required clarification of information such as Australian airport abbreviations.
Respondents were asked to treat the initial familiarisation of schedules as akin to
10
commencing a normal shift. The researcher provided a briefing (handover) to facilitate this
process.
Respondents described their thought processes throughout the simulation and readily
offered commeaats or answered questions as the scemxios progressed. P_Aods of silence
did not suggest disinterest or loss of awar_ess of the scenario. During these periods, the
researcher prompted respondents to verbalise their thoughts by asking questions such as
"what are you looking at'? or 'why are you indicating this flight'? Respondents became
totally absorbed in the scenarios. At times the researcher had to clarify flight numbers or
aircraft identifications to ensure the tapes could be transcribed accurately.
Preliminary findings
The influence of respondents' experience in other areas of the airline became apparent in
their approach to tackling the task. For example, respondents who had a crew rostering
background tended to give priority to crew-related problems during the scenarios.
Similarlyrcspond_ts who had experiencein airlineground-handlingroles,attended
initially to issues such as airport congestion or potential aircraft handling problems. These
preliminary findings suggest that a controller's previous experience, particularly in areas
outside OCCs may influence the decision-making process. The findings should not be seem
necessarily as negative but may imply that OCCs need to be aware of the influence of
controllerbackground.
Participant response
Re_-pondents reported that they enjoyed participating in the simulation. One respondent
(Male, 41-50 yrs old, 2 years experience in OCC) who participated in the domestic
simulation commented that he felt he should be reaching an immediate solution, but in the
absence of co-workers, was unable to solve the scenario.
Management response
Management in the five OCCs participating in the study commented very favourably on the
use of the simulations. None of the OCCs conducted simulations that investigated
decision-making outcomes of controllers prior to the study. Managers suggested that the
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simulationmethodmayprovideOCCswithavaluabletoolforselectingsuitablestaff,and
asameansofidentifyingstaffdevelopmenta dtrainingoppommities.
Data collection methods in the current study
The use of simulation in the current study provided a suitable means of investigating
decision-making of controllers in OCCs. However simulation alone would not have
yielded the degree of richness of information that was collected. The necessity to interact
with participants and observe their behaviour as they made decisions was a critical aspect
which contributed to the success of the data gathering method necessary for the study. The
simulation also provided a suitable context in which respondents could verbalise their
thoughts. In contrast, other individual methods of data collection fail to capture the degree
of data necessary for an in-depth investigation of decision-making. ,The study_ emRhas!se_l ............ . -" "{a_e¢_: 'l
that the use of simulation in conjunction with observation, interviews and think-aloud
verbal protocol was the most appropriate combination of methods to study decision-making
in OCCs.
Conclusion
The study represents a preliminary investigation of the application of several methods of
data collection in OCCs. A conclusion drawn was that no one method was sufficient to
investigate controller decision-making. However a multi-method approach using
simulation together with observation, interviews and think-aloud protocol provided a most
appropriate means. The full results of the study should make a substantial contribution to
the research to gain further understanding of thought processes behind OCC decision-
making. The simulation method has wide application and should lead to the development
of an appropriate management tool to identify selection and training opportunities, and
measure performance of controllers in OCCs. The current study strongly lends itself to the
development of a computer-based simulation.
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